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Quantum key distribution (QKD) can be proved to be secure by laws of quantum mechanics.
In this thesis, we review security proof methods in Renner’s framework and discuss numerical
methods to calculate asymptotic and finite key rates. These methods are highly versatile and
applicable to general device-dependent QKD protocols. We also discuss analytical tools that
extend the applicability of these numerical methods. We then present the asymptotic security
proof against collective attacks for a variant of the twin-field QKD protocol, which can overcome
the repeaterless secret-key capacity bound. Our variant reduces the sifting cost and uses non-
phase-randomized coherent states as both signals and test states. We confirm the loss scaling
of this protocol. Another important family of protocols that we investigate here are discrete-
modulated continuous-variable QKD protocols. They are interesting due to their experimental
simplicity and their great potential for massive deployment in the quantum-secured networks.
Our security proof method can provide tight asymptotic key rates. We demonstrate that the
postselection of data in combination with reverse reconciliation can improve the key rates. We
analyze both untrusted and trusted detector noise scenarios. Our results in the trusted detector
noise scenario show that we can thus cut out most of the effect of detector noise and obtain
asymptotic key rates similar to those had we access to ideal detectors. Finally, we present several
simple examples to illustrate our newly developed method for the numerical finite-key analysis
against the most general attacks via the entropy accumulation theorem.
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In the current digital world, cryptography provides an indispensable safeguard to protect our
data for both integrity and confidentiality. Classical cryptography is typically built on unproven
mathematical assumptions and certain restrictions of an adversary’s computational powers. In
particular, classical cryptographic protocols are designed by assuming that some underlying math-
ematical problems are difficult to solve; i.e., no efficient algorithm currently exists. A well-known
example is Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA), a public-key cryptographic encryption protocol based
on the difficulty of prime factorization. However, there is no guarantee that no efficient algorithm
can be discovered in the future to render such a cryptographic protocol insecure. In fact, if one
looks at the history of cryptography, the chase between code makers and code breakers has been
lasting for many centuries. A lot of cryptographic protocols have been broken by discovery of effi-
cient algorithms to invalidate the underlying assumptions. Since then, those protocols have been
replaced by new cryptographic protocols that rely on new unproven assumptions. The repetition
of this process continues.
In recent years, quantum information has become a rapidly developing field to build emerg-
ing technologies based on the laws of quantum mechanics. The idea of quantum computers was
firstly envisioned by a famous physicist, Richard Feynman. It is arguably to say that quantum
computing started to attract more attentions and became a more serious research area after the
discovery of Shor’s algorithm [1] for prime factorization and discrete logarithm by Peter Shor in
1994. While quantum computers are expected to bring us advantages in solving difficult problems,
they also bring challenges for cryptographic systems. With the invent of Shor’s algorithm, current
cryptographic protocols based on prime factorization and discrete logarithm will become insecure
soon after a practical quantum computer is invented to realize Shor’s algorithm. Recognizing the
threats posed by quantum computers calls the need of quantum-safe cryptography. Currently,
there are two major solutions: post-quantum cryptography, which consists of classical crypto-
graphic algorithms that are thought to be resistant to quantum attacks; quantum cryptography
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that directly uses quantum mechanics to achieve cryptographic goals. Both approaches have at-
tractive advantages and unfortunate limitations. Roughly speaking, post-quantum cryptography
is a software solution in the sense that switching from the current existing cryptographic protocols
to post-quantum cryptographic protocols can be done mainly on the software level. However, the
underlying security assumptions for post-quantum cryptography are still unproven and there re-
mains the possibility that one needs to constantly replace these algorithms by a newer generation
of algorithms. On the other hand, quantum cryptography can be viewed as a hardware solu-
tion since quantum cryptographic protocols usually require new hardware infrastructures. Unlike
classical cryptography, many quantum cryptographic protocols can be proven to be secure in
the information-theoretic sense, which is an attractive feature. Moreover, quantum cryptography
researchers have been investigating protocols that can reuse the existing classical communication
infrastructures with the hope that these quantum solutions can be more cost-effective, thereby
becoming more competitive to post-quantum cryptography. Nevertheless, it is highly expected
that both post-quantum and quantum cryptography will be useful and will complement each
other in different use cases. In this thesis, we focus on quantum cryptography and specifically
quantum key distribution (QKD).
1.1 Quantum key distribution
An early idea of quantum cryptography was proposed by Stephen Wiesner in 1970s. In his work,
he proposed a quantum money scheme based on conjugate basis encoding. However, his work
remained unpublished until 1983 [2]. The idea of conjugate basis encoding was later explored
by Bennett and Brassard, which led to the invention of Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol
[3] published in 1984, the first QKD protocol. QKD is a key establishment protocol that allows
two distant honest parties, traditionally known as Alice and Bob, to establish a shared secret key
even if an eavesdropper, Eve, can tamper the communication channel. Because their work was
published in the proceeding of a computer science conference, it remained largely unnoticed by
the physics community until 1991 when Artur Ekert independently invented an equivalent version
of the BB84 protocol in his paper [4] published in Physical Review Letters. This equivalence was
shown by Bennett, Brassard and Mermin [5]. More attentions from the physics community have
been drawn to quantum cryptography. Despite some common confusion, it should be noted that
the notion of quantum cryptography is not equivalent to QKD since QKD is not the only task
in quantum cryptography. There are many other quantum cryptographic tasks such as quantum
fingerprinting [6–10], blind quantum computing [11–15] and quantum digital signature [16, 17].
Among all quantum cryptographic protocols, QKD is arguably the most developed one. Many
QKD protocols have been designed and implemented with or without full security proofs. There
are many good reviews on the topic of QKD [18–23].
According to their detection technology, QKD protocols can be categorized into two families:
2
discrete variable (DV) and continuous variable (CV). In particular, DVQKD protocols like the
BB84 protocol [3] are realized by encoding the information into qubit-like degrees of freedom of
photons, such as polarization and time bin, and by measuring with single-photon detectors. On
the other hand, CVQKD (e.g., see Refs. [24–26]) uses detection technology that is widely used in
modern optical (classical) communication methods, which turns those classical methods and the
CVQKD apparatus into nearly identical devices. This technological similarity gives CVQKD a
competitive edge for large-scale deployment in quantum-secured networks. DVQKD enjoys great
success in experimental implementations and corresponding security analyses, and can currently
reach longer distances than CVQKD. Among the direct point-to-point QKD protocols, DVQKD
can currently reach over 421 km [27] while CVQKD recently achieves 202.81 km [28]. Many
experiments of CVQKD on both Gaussian modulation schemes such as Refs. [28–34] and discrete
modulation schemes like Refs. [35–39] have been demonstrated.
For conventional QKD protocols, one usually assumes that sources and detectors are trusted
and characterized in the security proofs. Under assumptions about behaviors of those devices,
QKD protocols can be proven to be information-theoretically secure. However, the physical
implementations of QKD usually deviate from the theoretical models. Thus, the deviations open
up side-channel attacks for Eve. The field of quantum hacking is an active research field to explore
gaps between the theory and the experiment, thereby breaking the implementation security of
QKD. One possible approach to solve this issue is (i) to revise models for real devices so that
security proofs use more reasonable assumptions and (ii) to implement necessary countermeasures
to safeguard the devices at the same time. However, this approach can be costly in practice since
one may not be able to completely close the gap between the theory and the implementation.
Countermeasures may also open up more side-channel attacks. Fortunately, QKD provides the
forward secrecy; that is, keys generated from QKD remain secure if they were secure at the time
they were generated. Future discovery of side-channel attacks cannot break the security of existing
keys generated by QKD. Another approach is to design device-independent (DI) protocols. In
DIQKD [40–42], one makes minimal assumptions about devices: devices do not maliciously leak
the private information. In particular, one needs not to trust devices. Instead, one typically
performs non-local games to test violation of Bell’s inequalities and to verify that those devices
operate in the quantum regime before any secret key is generated. Although recent theoretical
works [43, 44] make the implementation more feasible, a realistic demonstration of DIQKD is still
missing at the time of writing.
Notably, measurement devices are more vulnerable to side-channel attacks than sources as
there are more attacks targeted at measurement devices (see e.g. [45–53]; also see [54–56]).
Following this observation, the proposal of measurement-device-independent (MDI) protocols
[57, 58] aims to provide a more practical solution compared to DI protocols. While security
proofs still assume trusted and characterized sources, MDIQKD protocols have been implemented
to reach a couple hundred of kilometers in fiber [59, 60] and recently in free space [61].
The original MDI protocols are based on two-photon interference events. Recently, twin-field
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QKD (TF-QKD) [62, 63] is proposed based on single-photon interference events. A main motiva-
tion of this proposal is related to one major limitation of QKD protocols. As QKD protocols are
usually implemented with quantum optical systems, photons are used as the information carriers.
Unfortunately, photons can be lost during the transmissions and thus the secret key rate is lim-
ited. By now, it is known that there are key rate limits on the point-to-point direct link of QKD
protocols [64, 65], which are called repeaterless bounds. In particular, the bound by Pirandola,
Laurenza, Ottaviani and Banchi (PLOB) [65] is the tightest bound for the lossy channel and is
dubbed PLOB bound by the names of these authors. For the single-photon transmittance η, the
PLOB bound is − log2(1 − η) = O(η), where we use the big O notation from computer science.
This means that for all direct point-to-point QKD protocols, the secret key rate scales at most
linearly with the channel transmittance. Protocols like the single-photon BB84 and Gaussian-
modulated CVQKD have the key rate scaling of O(η). The BB84 protocol with weak coherent
pulses scales as O(η2) if no decoy state is used and scales as O(η) when the decoy state method
[66–68] is applied. Even though the MDI protocols involve an intermediate station and thus are
not subject to the PLOB bound, the original MDI protocols based on two-photon interference
events scale as O(η). In this case, although the probability of a photon arriving from each party
(assuming a symmetric setup where the intermediate station is at the middle of Alice and Bob)
is O(
√
η), a successful measurement outcome at the middle station requires two photons to ar-
rive and thus the key rate scales as O(η). The key observation in TF-QKD is that based on a
single-photon interference, Alice and Bob can also generate secret keys. Because only one photon
is needed for a successful detection, it is expected that TF-QKD can scale as O(
√
η). This bound
is confirmed in several works [63, 69–73] that appeared around the same time. While TF-QKD is
successful to beat the repeaterless bounds and current experiments can reach around 500 km, it
is like a one-node repeater and thus limited by one-node repeater bound that scales like O(
√
η).
To reach much longer distances, quantum repeaters are needed. The field of quantum repeaters
is an active research field that aims at extending the quantum communication to arbitrarily long
distances without trusting the intermediate nodes. Currently, it is still very challenging to realize
a practical quantum repeater that can overcome the repeaterless bound (if we do not consider
the TF-QKD as a special quantum repeater). If we sacrifice some security promise and trust the
intermediate nodes, then we can extend QKD to arbitrarily long distances by the trusted-node
relays (see e.g. [74]). Satellites can also be used for this purposes.
In summary, there are many progresses in the field of QKD. Novel protocols have been con-
stantly proposed and analyzed. Many QKD experiments have been demonstrated to reach in-
creasingly longer distances and/or to achieve higher key bits per second. The maturity of the
field can be witnessed by development of commercial prototypes in several startup companies,
successful launch of a QKD satellite in China [75] and many ongoing efforts to launch QKD
satellites from all over the world (see [76, Table 2] for a list), and developments of chip-based
QKD systems [77–80].
4
1.2 Contribution and structure of this thesis
This thesis covers in details these published papers [71, 81, 82] of which I am the first author
and an ongoing, unpublished work [83] of which I am a co-first author. It also summarizes some
important ideas from these papers [84, 85] of which I am a coauthor. It briefly mentions some
results from those papers [86, 87] of which I am a coauthor. Another paper [88] that I coauthored
during my Ph.D. study is not covered in this thesis.
The structure of the thesis is outlined as follows.
In Chapter 2, we review some background knowledge on quantum information theory, quan-
tum optics, convex optimization as well as quantum key distribution. This chapter contains
reviews only. Readers who are familiar with these topics can skip this chapter at the first reading
and can refer to this chapter when certain materials are referenced in other chapters.
In Chapter 3, we then review the security definition of QKD as well as various proof techniques.
Most parts of this chapter are literature review. It also contains some refinements of statements
that are presented in our work [84]. The discussion here focuses on Renner’s framework [89] for
security proofs based on the leftover hashing lemma since all security proofs in this thesis use this
framework. We briefly mention an alternative framework based on the phase error correction in
Section 3.8.1.
In Chapter 4, we discuss numerical methods for the security proof. It includes the formulation
of nonlinear semidefinite programs for both asymptotic key rate and finite key analysis. Some part
of Section 4.1 is a literature review. Section 4.2 contains a review of the qubit-based squashing
model [90–92], a summary of the flag-state squasher from our work [86], a summary of dimension
reduction method from our paper [85] as well as a summary of the facial reduction idea from our
paper [87]. The finite-key method based on a canonical approach in Section 4.3 is summarized
from our work [84]. The algorithm discussion of finite key analysis via the entropy accumulation
theorem in Section 4.4 is from our unpublished work [83].
We then move to the security analysis of individual protocols. These protocols that we pro-
vide asymptotic security analysis include phase-matching measurement-device-independent QKD
(PM-MDI QKD) that is a variant of TF-QKD in Chapter 5, discrete-modulated continuous-
variable QKD (DMCVQKD) with heterodyne detection in Chapter 6 and DMCVQKD with ho-
modyne detection in Chapter 7. We also include finite key analysis of some simple entanglement-
based device-dependent protocols using the entropy accumulation theorem (EAT) in Chapter 8.
In Chapter 5, the asymptotic security analysis of PM-MDI QKD is mostly from our paper [71].
Our variant of TF-QKD removes the need of phase randomization and uses properties of coherent
states directly. Our proof was among early works to show that such a protocol can overcome the
secret key capacity bound for point-to-point QKD. Since our initial protocol proposal involves
some idealization, we discuss some ideas to prove the security of a practical version of the protocol
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and we review a related work by Primaatmaja et. al. [93] that proves the security of a practical
version. Since TF-QKD has been a hot topic in the QKD community since its proposal in 2018,
there are many progresses made after we published our work. Therefore, we also provide an
additional, short literature review about recent progresses in Section 5.6.
In Chapter 6, we study the asymptotic security analysis of DMCVQKD where Bob applies the
heterodyne detection. The security analysis in the ideal (or untrusted) detector scenario is from
[81] and that in the trusted detector scenario is from [82]. Both analyses use the photon-number
cutoff assumption as explained in Section 6.5. While this assumption is numerically plausible, it
lacks rigorous justifications that one would like to have for a waterproof security proof. Our recent
dimension reduction method [85] allows us to remove the photon-number cutoff assumption. The
discussion about removing the photon-number cutoff assumption in Section 6.10 is based on [85].
In Chapter 7, we study the asymptotic security of DMCVQKD where Bob uses the homodyne
detection. The presentation is based on [81]. For this variant, we study only the ideal detector
scenario under the photon-number cutoff assumption. It is possible to extend the analysis of
this protocol to trusted noise scenario and also possible to remove the photon-number cutoff
assumption using methods similar to the heterodyne scheme. The exact modification is left for
future work.
In Chapter 8, we discuss more about finite key analysis based on EAT for entanglement-based
device-dependent QKD protocols. This discussion is based on [83].
We provide technical details in appendices.
In Appendix A, we discuss the formulation of classical postprocessing steps in the numerical
framework. This presentation is based on [81].
In Appendix B, we present technical details related the security proof of PM-MDI QKD
studied in Chapter 5. This presentation is from [71].
In Appendix C, we present additional technical details related to DMCVQKD. Specifically,
in Appendix C.1, we present a derivation of POVM elements for the noisy heterodyne detector
model used in Chapter 6. This presentation is from [82]. In Appendix C.2, we discuss how
to represent operators under the photon-number cutoff assumption. This presentation is from
[81, 82].
In Appendix D, we present technical details and proofs for the numerical finite-key analysis
method via EAT. While the main idea is due to Thomas van Himbeeck, a co-first author of
our work [83], the specific presentation in Appendix D.1 is mostly due to me. The proof in




To make this thesis more self-contained, we review some necessary background on quantum
information theory, quantum optics, convex optimization and quantum key distribution. They
are helpful to understand this thesis. This chapter also serves a purpose of defining common
notations used throughout this thesis. Readers who are familiar with these topics can skip this
chapter.
2.1 Mathematical preliminaries
We assume readers are familiar with basic linear algebra as well as basic concepts about norm,
metric and inner product (see, e.g., [94, Chapter 1, Section 1.1] for a quick review). In this section,
we start with some important mathematical concepts related to the quantum information theory.
We use physicists’ convention for the inner product, that is, 〈·, ·〉 is linear in the second
variable and conjugate linear in the first variable. We often use Dirac notations, for example, |·〉
for vectors, and 〈·|·〉 for inner products between vectors. We now review the definition of Hilbert
space.
Definition 2.1.1 (Hilbert space). A (complex) Hilbert space, denoted as H, is a vector space
over C equipped with an inner product 〈·|·〉 such that it is a Banach space (i.e. complete normed
space) with the norm induced from the inner product.
In this thesis, we always assume a given Hilbert space is over C. Furthermore, we only deal
with separable Hilbert spaces, which can emit a countable orthonormal basis. The dual space
H∗ of H is the space of bounded linear functionals, that is, linear maps from H to C. By Riesz
representation theorem, it is natural to define a unique element in H∗, denoted as 〈ψ|, a bra
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vector, for each ket vector |ψ〉 ∈ H such that the linear functional 〈ψ| takes the value 〈ψ|φ〉 when
evaluated at |φ〉 ∈ H and also ‖〈ψ|‖H∗ = ‖|ψ〉‖H where the norm on H∗ is the operator norm.
As we often deal with multipartite systems, the concept of tensor products is important.
Definition 2.1.2 (Tensor product of Hilbert spaces). Let H and K be two Hilbert spaces with
inner products 〈·|·〉H and 〈·|·〉K, respectively. Let H⊗K denote the tensor product of these two
vector spaces. For every |u〉 , |v〉 ∈ H ⊗ K such that |u〉 =
∑n
i=1 hi ⊗ fi and |v〉 =
∑k
i=1 xj ⊗ yj




〈hi|xj〉H 〈fi|yj〉K . (2.1)
This defines an inner product on the vector space H ⊗ K. We call the completion of the vector
space H ⊗ K under this inner product as the tensor product of these two Hilbert spaces. With
an abuse of notation, we denote this completion also as H⊗K.
One can apply this definition inductively to define n-fold tensor product spaces. In particular,
we write the n-fold tensor product of the same Hilbert spaceH asH⊗n, that is, H⊗n = H⊗· · ·⊗H
with n copies of H.
It is interesting to study linear maps on the Hilbert space H to itself, which are called linear
operators. In particular, let 1H denote the identity map on H. Let L(H) denote the vector space
of linear operators that acts on H. Let B(H) ⊆ L(H) denote the vector space of bounded linear
operators. There are several important sets of operators that are relevant for our discussions.
Definition 2.1.3 (Hermitian operator). An operator H ∈ B(H) is Hermitian or self-adjoint if






〈φ|Hψ〉 ∀ |ψ〉 and ∀ 〈φ|. Let Herm(H) denote the set of Hermitian operators on H.
Definition 2.1.4 (Positive operator). An operator P ∈ B(H) is positive, denoted as P ≥ 0, if
∀h ∈ H, 〈h|Ph〉 ≥ 0. Let Pos(H) denote the set of positive operators on H.
Remark 2.1.5. We note that an alternative characterization of Hermitian operators is that H
is Hermitian if and only if 〈ψ|H |ψ〉 ∈ R, ∀ψ ∈ H. We also note two alternative characterizations
of positive operators: (1) P ≥ 0 if and only if P ∈ Herm(H) and the spectrum of P lies in [0,∞);
(2) P ≥ 0 if and only if it can be written as P = X†X for X ∈ B(H).
Definition 2.1.6 (Projection operator). An operator P is a projection operator if P ≥ 0 and
P 2 = P = P †.
Definition 2.1.7 (Density operator). A density operator ρ is a positive operator with Tr(ρ) = 1.
We denote the space of density operators on H by D(H).
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If H is finite-dimensional, we can also call density operators as density matrices since they
can be represented by finite-dimensional positive semidefinite matrices with unit trace. As we see
later, it is sometimes interesting to talk about the set of positive operators with trace at most 1,
which is the set of subnormalized states. We denote the set of subnormalized states by D≤(H).
We are often interested in functions of operators. We briefly remark how one can extend an
ordinary function on real or complex numbers to a function on operators.
Remark 2.1.8. For a function of the form f : C→ C, one often would like to extend f to the set
of Hermitian operators Herm(H)1. By the spectral theorem [94, Theorem 1.3], such an extension
can be done. If the function f is defined on a subset of C, then the extension also needs to
restrict to operators whose spectrum is restricted accordingly. In particular, the square root and
logarithm of a positive operator can be defined. We omit the details here and direct interested
readers to [94, Chapter 1, Section 1.1.3] for more explanations.
We review some important norms for an operator in L(H). In particular, we are interested in
a family of norms called Schatten p-norms, which include the trace norm, Hilbert-Schmidt norm
and operator norm as special cases.
Definition 2.1.9 (Schatten p-norm). Let H be a Hilbert space. Let p ∈ [1,∞). For any









L†L. One can take the limit p→∞ to define ‖·‖∞.
Remark 2.1.10. For p = 1, the Schatten 1-norm is also called the trace norm. For p = 2, the
Schatten 2-norm coincides with the Frobenius norm and also the Hilbert-Schmidt norm, which
is the induced norm from the Hilbert-Schmidt inner product on L(H). For p =∞, the Schatten
∞-norm coincides with the operator norm. For each p ∈ [1,∞], the dual norm of Schatten p-norm
is Schatten q-norm where 1/p + 1/q = 1. In general, one can also define Schatten p-norm for
linear transformations between two different Hilbert spaces.
The Schatten p-norm and its dual norm satisfy the Hölder’s inequality for Schatten norms,
which is a quite useful relation.
Lemma 2.1.11 (Hölder’s inequality for Schatten norms). Let H be two Hilbert spaces. For each
p, q ∈ [1,∞] such that 1/p+ 1/q = 1, the following inequality holds for any A,B ∈ L(H):
|〈A,B〉| ≤ ‖A‖p‖B‖q. (2.3)
1More generally, the set of normal operators, i.e., {L ∈ L(H) : L†L = LL†}.
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It is useful in many practical scenarios to have some ways to measure closeness between density
operators or subnormalized states, or more generally, positive operators. We first define trace
distance and the fidelity function for this purpose.






It is worth noting that some authors define the trace distance without the factor 1/2.











It is worth noting that some authors (e.g. [95]) define the fidelity function as F(P,Q)2 in our
definition here. Also, it is helpful to know some relationship between the trace distance and the
fidelity function.










2− 2 F(ρ, σ) ≤ ‖ρ− σ‖1 ≤ 2
√
1− F(ρ, σ)2. (2.7)
Since the fidelity function is not a metric, it is sometimes handy to have a metric that is
closely related to fidelity. The purified distance is a metric that is related to the fidelity function
and is defined for subnormalized states.
Definition 2.1.15 (Purified distance). Let ρ, σ ∈ D≤(H). The purified distance between ρ and
σ is defined as











The trace distance can be upper bounded by the purified distance, which follows from the
Fuchs-van de Graaf inequalities. We state it as a lemma here.
Lemma 2.1.16. Let ρ, σ ∈ D≤(H). The following inequality holds:
1
2
‖ρ− σ‖1 ≤ P (ρ, σ). (2.9)
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In our discussion, we implicitly assume the Hilbert spaces are finite-dimensional. Many defi-
nitions and statements can be generalized to infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces, but some care is
needed. We briefly remark some complications in the infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces. Readers
interested in infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces may find it useful to learn more about functional
analysis and in particular operator algebra.
Remark 2.1.17. WhenH is infinite-dimensional, one often deals with compact operators instead
of general linear operators. Compact operators are limits of finite rank operators (with respect
to the operator norm). A finite rank operator, as the name suggests, is a linear operator whose
range is finite-dimensional. Let K(H) denote the set of compact operators on H. It is the case
that K(H) ⊆ B(H). If H is finite-dimensional, L(H) = B(H) = K(H). The definition of density
operator implicitly restricts to the trace-class operators, a subset of compact operators, since only
trace-class operators have a well-defined trace. Trace-class operators are operators whose Schatten
1-norm is finite. Similarly, the definition of quantum channel that we define in the next section
(in Definition 2.2.23) is restricted to a mapping from trace-class operators to trace-class operators
instead of general linear operators when the relevant Hilbert spaces are infinite-dimensional. To
avoid unnecessary complications, we assume the dimension of H is finite unless stated otherwise.
The generalization to the infinite-dimensional spaces can be straightforward in many cases by
simply replacing L(H) by either B(H), K(H) or some subspace of K(H). However, it can also
be complicated and some results are not generalized to infinite-dimensional spaces. The reader
is cautioned that some of results stated in this thesis may rely on the assumption that one works
with the finite-dimensional spaces.
2.2 Basic quantum information theory
We review the definitions of quantum states, measurements, quantum channels and relevant
entropic quantities in this section. This section is mainly based on the textbook by Watrous [94]
and the textbook by Nielsen and Chuang [96]. More details can be found there.
When we discuss physical systems, we typically use the term register. Intuitively, registers
are mathematical abstractions of physical objects, or parts of physical objects which can store
information. We use the term alphabet to mean a finite and nonempty set, whose elements may
be considered as symbols. We use capital Greek letters such as Σ,Λ to denote alphabets. One
can also think of an alphabet as an index set.
Definition 2.2.1 (Register, [94, Definition 2.1]). A register X is either one of the following two
objects:
1. An alphabet Σ.
2. An n-tuple X = (Y1, · · · , Yn), where n is a positive integer and Y1, . . . , Yn are registers.
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For a register X, we often write the identity operator as 1X in place of 1HX for simplicity.
2.2.1 Quantum states and measurements
In quantum mechanics, the state space of a physical system is a complex Hilbert space H. Pure
states are unit vectors in the Hilbert space.
Definition 2.2.2 (Pure state). Suppose H is the Hilbert space of the physical system of interest.
We call |ψ〉 a pure state if |ψ〉 ∈ H with ‖|ψ〉‖ = 1.
In general, an arbitrary state of a system is not necessarily pure. It can be given as a
probabilistic mixture of pure states. This leads to the concept of mixed state.
Definition 2.2.3 (Mixed state). Let {|ψi〉 : i = 1, . . . , n} be a collection of pure states. Let
pi ≥ 0 such that
∑n
i=1 pi = 1. We call {|ψi〉 , pi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} a mixed state.
We typically represent states by density operators. A pure state ψ can be represented by a
density operator ρ = |ψ〉 〈ψ|. Given an ensemble {|ψi〉 , pi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, this mixed state can be
represented by a density operator ρ =
∑n
i=1 pi |ψi〉〈ψi|.
Definition 2.2.4 (Ensemble of states). Let {ρi ∈ D(H) : i = 1, . . . , n} be a collection of states.
Let pi ≥ 0 such that
∑n
i=1 pi = 1. We call {ρi, pi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} an ensemble of states.
When we deal with bipartite or multipartite systems, it is often of interest to discuss the
marginal state on some parts of a system. A reduced density operator can be obtained by taking
the partial trace.
Definition 2.2.5 (Partial trace). LetHA1 , · · · ,HAn be Hilbert spaces. The partial trace mapping
that removes the k-th system is the unique linear map that satisfies the equation
TrAk(X1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Xn) = Tr(Xk)X1 ⊗ · · ·Xk−1 ⊗Xk+1 · · · ⊗Xn (2.10)
for all Xi ∈ HAi .
Definition 2.2.6 (Reduced density operator). Let ρAB ∈ D(HA ⊗ HB). The reduced density
operator on system A is ρA = TrB(ρAB) and the reduced density operator on system B is
ρB = TrA(ρAB).






λi |i〉A |i〉B (2.11)
such that ρA = TrB(ρAB) =
∑
i λi |i〉〈i|A and ρB = TrA(ρAB) =
∑
i λi |i〉〈i|B, where {|i〉A} and
{|i〉B} are orthonormal sets of vectors in HA and HB, respectively.
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In many practical scenarios, it is more convenient to deal with pure states instead of mixed
states. One can always find a larger space such that there exists a pure state whose reduced
density operator is the original mixed state.
Theorem 2.2.8 (Purification). Let ρA ∈ D(HA). Then there exists a reference space HR with
dim(HR) ≥ dim(HA) and a pure state |ψ〉 ∈ HA ⊗HR such that ρA = TrR(|ψ〉〈ψ|).
Entanglement is an important concept in quantum information. We now define separable and
entangled states.
Definition 2.2.9 (Separable states). A state ρ ∈ D(HA ⊗HB) is separable if it can be written




p(x)ρxA ⊗ ρxB, (2.12)
where Σ is some alphabet, p(x) is an entry of a probability vector p, and ρxA ∈ D(HA), ρxB ∈ D(HB)
for all x ∈ Σ.
Definition 2.2.10 (Entangled states). A state ρ ∈ D(HA⊗HB) is entangled if it is not separable.
When we discuss about de Finetti theorems in Section 3.5, it is useful to know symmetric
subspaces and exchangeable states. We briefly define them here and direct interested readers to
[89, Chapter 4] and [94, Chapter 7] for details. Let Sn be the set of permutations on {1, . . . , n}.
For any π ∈ Sn, let Wπ be the unitary operation on H⊗n which permutes the n subsystems, i.e.,
Wπ(|θ1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |θn〉) :=
∣∣θπ−1(1)
〉




for every |θ1〉 , . . . , |θn〉 ∈ H.
Definition 2.2.11 (Symmetric subspace). Let H be a Hilbert space and let n ∈ N be a positive
integer. The symmetric subspace of H⊗n, denoted by Sym(H⊗n), is the subspace of H⊗n that is
spanned by all vectors which are invariant under any permutations Wπ of the subsystems, i.e.,
Sym(H⊗n) := {|Ψ〉 ∈ H⊗n : Wπ |Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉 ∀π ∈ Sn}. (2.14)





for every permutation π ∈ Sn.
Definition 2.2.13 (n + k-exchangeable states). A density operator ρn ∈ D(H⊗n) is n + k-
exchangeable for some k ∈ N if there exists ρn+k ∈ D(H⊗n+k) such that ρn+k is exchangeable
and TrH⊗k(ρn+k) = ρn. Moreover, ρn ∈ D(H⊗n) is called infinitely exchangeable if it is n + k-
exchangeable for all k ∈ N.
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In a physical scenario, one often performs some measurements on some quantum state of
interest to obtain some classical measurement outcomes. We review the mathematical description
of measurements.
Definition 2.2.14 (POVM). Let H be a Hilbert space. Let Σ be an alphabet. A collection of
positive operators {Ei ∈ Pos(H) : i ∈ Σ} is called a positive operator-valued measure (POVM) if
∑
k∈Σ
Ek = 1H . (2.16)
A special type of measurements is projective measurements or projection-valued measure.
Definition 2.2.15 (PVM). Let H be a Hilbert space. Let Σ be an alphabet. A collection of
positive operators {Pi ∈ Pos(H) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} is called a projection-valued measure (PVM) if∑
k∈Σ Pk = 1H and P
2
i = Pi = P
†
i for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
While a general POVM is not necessarily a projective measurement, one can always construct
a PVM from POVM on a larger space, a consequence of the Naimark’s dilation theorem.
Theorem 2.2.16 (Naimark’s dilation theorem). Let HA be a Hilbert space. Let {Ei ∈ Pos(HA) :
1 ≤ i ≤ n} be a POVM. There exists a Hilbert space HR, an isometry V : HA → HA ⊗HR and
a PVM {Pi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} such that Ei = V †PiV for each i.
2.2.2 Quantum channels
Let HA and HB be some Hilbert spaces. We are interested in physical processes that transform
one state (density operator) in D(HA) to some density operator in D(HB). Such a process can be
described mathematically as linear maps. There are some additional requirements if we demand
the output of such a linear map to be a quantum state whenever the input is a valid quantum
state. In particular, they are quantum channels which are linear maps that map density operators
in D(HA) to density operators in D(HB). We now define several interesting linear maps that act
on linear operators on some Hilbert spaces, including quantum channels.
Definition 2.2.17 (Hermitian-preserving map). A linear map Φ : L(HA)→ L(HB) is Hermitian-
preserving if for every Hermitian operator H ∈ Herm(HA), it is the case that Φ(H) ∈ Herm(HB).
Definition 2.2.18 (Positive map). A linear map Φ : L(HA) → L(HB) is positive if for every
positive operator P ∈ Pos(HA), it is the case that Φ(P ) ∈ Pos(HB).
Definition 2.2.19 (CP map). A linear map Φ : L(HA)→ L(HB) is completely positive (CP) if
for every Hilbert space HR, the map Φ⊗ idR is a positive map.
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Definition 2.2.20 (TP map). A linear map Φ : L(HA)→ L(HB) is trace-preserving (TP) if for
every X ∈ L(HA), it is the case that Tr(Φ(X)) = Tr(X).
Definition 2.2.21 (TNI map). A linear map Φ : L(HA)→ L(HB) is trace-nonincreasing (TNI)
if for every P ∈ Pos(HA), it is the case that Tr(Φ(P )) ≤ Tr(P ).
Note that in the definition of TNI map, the condition is restricted to only positive operators.
This restriction is necessary since if one still required that the condition holds for all L(HA),
this definition would be identical to the definition of TP maps. One can see this by taking P ∈
Pos(HA) and −P , which leads to conditions Tr(Φ(P )) ≤ Tr(P ) and −Tr(Φ(P )) ≤ −Tr(P ) =⇒
Tr(Φ(P )) = Tr(P ) ∀P ∈ Pos(HA). Since any operator X ∈ L(HA) can be written as a linear
combination of positive operators, by linearity of Φ, it would be the case that Tr(Φ(X)) = Tr(X),
the precise definition of TP maps.
Definition 2.2.22 (Unital map). A linear map Φ : L(HA)→ L(HB) is unital if Φ(1HA) = 1HB .
Definition 2.2.23 (Quantum channel). A quantum channel Φ between two registers A and B
is a linear map from L(HA) to L(HB) such that Φ is CPTP.
In particular, a CPTP map maps density operators in D(HA) to density operators in D(HB).
A special channel is the identity channel which leaves the state intact. We denote the identity
channel acting on L(H) by idH. We now look at different characterizations of a quantum channel.
Proposition 2.2.24 (Kraus representation). Let H1,H2 be Hilbert spaces. Let Φ : L(H1) →
L(H2) be a linear map. Let Σ be an alphabet. Let {Aa : a ∈ Σ} ⊂ L(H1,H2) be a collection of











aAa = 1H1 , then Φ is TP.
Conversely, if Φ is CP, then there exists an alphabet Σ and {Aa : a ∈ Σ} ⊂ L(H1,H2) be a
collection of operators such that Φ can be written in the form of Eq. (2.17). If Φ is TP, then∑
a∈ΣA
†
aAa = 1H1 . We note that a map Φ can have many different Kraus representations.
For any map Φ, another interesting and related map is its adjoint map.
Definition 2.2.25 (Adjoint map). LetH1 andH2 be two Hilbert spaces. Let Ψ : L(H1)→ L(H2)
be a linear map. The adjoint map of Ψ, denoted by Ψ†, is the unique linear map that satisfies






for all A ∈ L(H1) and B ∈ L(H2).
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aY Aa. As Φ is TP, Φ
† is
unital.
Another useful representation of quantum channel is the Choi representation.
Definition 2.2.26 (Choi matrix). Let H1 and H2 be two Hilbert spaces with dim(H1) = d. Let




Φ(Ei,j)⊗ Ei,j , (2.19)
where Ei,j is a d-by-d matrix with (i, j)-entry being 1 and all other entries being 0.
Proposition 2.2.27. Let Φ : L(H1)→ L(H2) be a linear map with H1 and H2 being two Hilbert
spaces. The action of the map Φ can be recovered from the Choi matrix J(Φ) by
Φ(X) = TrH1(J(Φ)(1H2 ⊗XT )). (2.20)
Moreover, Φ is CP if and only if J(Φ) ≥ 0. Φ is TP if and only if TrH2(J(Φ)) = 1H1 .
We describe a particular type of channel called depolarizing channel.
Definition 2.2.28 (Depolarizing channel). Let p ∈ [0, 1]. Let H be a Hilbert space with
dim(H) = d. The depolarizing channel Dp : L(H)→ L(H) is defined as




for every ρ ∈ L(H).
An interesting special case is for a qubit system, i.e., H = C2. We can characterize this







(XρX + Y ρY + ZρZ), (2.22)

















In particular, we typically use the depolarizing channel to simulate noise on qubit systems (see
Chapter 8).
Finally, we end this section with the definition of the diamond norm for a linear map.
Definition 2.2.29 (Diamond norm). Let E : L(HA) → L(HB) be a linear map. The diamond
norm of E is defined as
‖E‖ = max
σ∈D≤(HA⊗HR)
‖(E ⊗ idR)(σ)‖1. (2.24)
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2.2.3 Entropy
Entropy is a powerful tool in information theory since it has operational significance in many
information-processing tasks and is often an indispensable tool for quantitative analyses. In this
thesis, we deal with security proofs of QKD protocols and we use many entropic quantities to
calculate the secret key rate. We review those important entropic quantities. In addition to
[94, 96], some of the material presented here is also based on [95]. While our focus is on quantum
entropies, it is often instructive to mention the classical entropies where quantum entropies are
generalizations of their classical counterparts.
Definition 2.2.30 (Shannon entropy). Let X be a discrete random variable whose value is taken
from a finite set X and which is distributed according to the probability distribution PX . The





The von Neumann entropy is a generalization of the Shannon entropy.
Definition 2.2.31 (von Neumann entropy). Let HX be the Hilbert space that describes the
physical system of X. Let ρ ∈ D(HX) be the state of the system. Then von Neumann entropy
H(X)ρ := H(ρ) of the system X in the state ρ is defined as
H(X)ρ = −Tr(ρ log2(ρ)). (2.26)
The following lemma, known as Fannes’ inequality, shows that the von Neumann entropy is
continuous and its proof can be found in [96].
Lemma 2.2.32 (Fannes’ inequality). Let H be a Hilbert space with dim(H) = n. Let ρ, σ ∈
Pos(H) such that ‖ρ− σ‖1 ≤ κ ≤ 1/e, where e is the base of the natural logarithm. Then,
|H(ρ)−H(σ)| ≤ κ log2(n/κ). (2.27)
Quantum relative entropy is a useful aid for studying the von Neumann entropy.
Definition 2.2.33 (Quantum relative entropy). Let P,Q ∈ Pos(H). The quantum relative
entropy of P with respect to Q is defined as
D(P ||Q) =
{




For classical systems, one can represent the probability distribution PX by a diagonal matrix
with entries specified by PX . Because PX is a valid probability distribution, this diagonal matrix is
a valid density matrix. Therefore, one can easily see the quantum entropies are generalizations of
classical entropies. For this reason, we state only quantum versions of different entropic quantities
and assume the classical version can be deduced as a special case directly from the quantum
versions.
Definition 2.2.34 (Conditional entropy). Let ρAB ∈ D(HA ⊗ HB). The conditional von Neu-
mann entropy of A given B is defined as
H(A|B)ρAB = H(A,B)ρAB −H(B)ρB . (2.29)
We note that the conditional entropy can be written in terms of quantum relative entropy as
H(A|B)ρAB = −D(ρAB||1A⊗ρB). (2.30)
Definition 2.2.35 (Mutual information). Let ρAB ∈ D(HA ⊗ HB). The (quantum) mutual
information between A and B is defined as
I(A :B)ρAB = H(A)ρA +H(B)ρB −H(A,B)ρAB . (2.31)
Definition 2.2.36 (Holevo quantity). Let X be a classical register with an alphabet Σ. Let Y be
a register and {ρa ∈ D(HY ), pa : a ∈ Σ} be an ensemble of states. The Holevo information (also
called the Holevo quantity), denoted by χ(X:Y ), is defined as the quantum mutual information




pa |a〉〈a|X ⊗ ρa. (2.32)
The accessible information is related to the scenario where classical information is encoded in
a quantum system with an ensemble of quantum states. It is the amount of classical information
that can be extracted from such a quantum system when an optimal measurement is applied.
Definition 2.2.37 (Accessible information). Let E := {ρx, px : x ∈ Σ} be an ensemble of states.
Let X be a random variable that takes value x ∈ Σ. Let YM be the random variable that
denotes the measurement outcomes from a POVM M applied to this ensemble. The accessible
information is defined as
Iacc(E) = max
M
I(X :YM ), (2.33)
where the maximization is over all possible POVMs.
Definition 2.2.38 (Conditional mutual information). Let ρABC ∈ D(HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HC). The
conditional mutual information between A and B conditioned on C is defined as
I(A :B|C)ρABC = H(A|C)ρAC +H(B|C)ρBC −H(AB|C)ρABC . (2.34)
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With the help of the conditional mutual information, one can define the Markov chain condi-
tion, a useful concept when we discuss the entropy accumulation theorem in Section 3.7 and in
Chapter 8.
Definition 2.2.39 (Markov chain condition). Let ρABC ∈ D(HA ⊗HB ⊗HC)). The tripartite
quantum state ρABC is said to fulfill the Markov chain condition A↔ C ↔ B if I(A :B|C)ρABC =
0.
Similar to the relative entropy, the α-Rényi divergence Dα is a useful tool to study the α-Rényi
entropy. There are many different quantum generalizations of the classical α-Rényi divergence.
We state two definitions that are commonly used.
Definition 2.2.40 (Sandwiched α-Rényi divergence). Let α ∈ [12 , 1) ∪ (1,∞), and let P,Q ∈


















if (α < 1 ∧ P 6⊥ Q) ∨ im(P ) ⊆ im(Q)
∞ otherwise.
(2.35)
For α =∞ and a density operator ρ, one can define D∞(ρ||Q) = log2 inf{λ : ρ ≤ λQ}.
Definition 2.2.41 (Petz α-Rényi divergence). Let α ∈ [0, 1)∪ (1, 2], and let P,Q ∈ Pos(H) with











if (α < 1 ∧ P 6⊥ Q) ∨ im(P ) ⊆ im(Q)
∞ otherwise.
(2.36)
We note that for α → 1 and for P ∈ D(H), both D̃α(P ||Q) and D̄α(P ||Q) converge to the
quantum relative entropy D(P ||Q).
One can define various conditional Rényi entropies from each α-Rényi divergence. There are
two useful variants of quantum conditional entropy from the sandwiched Rényi divergence. These
entropies will be useful if readers are interested in details of EAT in [97–99].
Definition 2.2.42. For α ∈ [12 ,∞] and for any density operator ρAB, the sandwiched α-Rényi
entropy of A conditioned on B is defined as
Hα(A|B)ρ = −D̃α(ρAB||1A⊗ρB). (2.37)
Definition 2.2.43. For α ∈ [12 , 1) ∪ (1,∞] and for any density operator ρAB, we define




There are two special conditional entropies of interest: conditional min-entropy which corre-





Definition 2.2.44 (Conditional min-entropy). Let ρAB ∈ D≤(HA ⊗ HB). The min-entropy of
A conditioned on B of the state ρAB is
Hmin(A|B)ρ = sup
σB∈D≤(HB)
sup{λ ∈ R : ρAB ≤ exp(−λ)1A⊗σB} (2.39)
Definition 2.2.45 (Conditional max-entropy). Let ρAB ∈ D≤(HA ⊗HB). The max-entropy of
A conditioned on B of the state ρAB is
Hmax(A|B)ρ = sup
σB∈D≤(HB)
2 log2 F(ρAB,1A⊗σB) (2.40)
We use the convention that the max-entropy corresponds to α = 12 since this max-entropy
satisfies the duality relation with the min-entropy [95, Section 5.3]. As we heavily rely on results
from Renner’s Ph.D. thesis [89], it should be noted that a different definition of max-entropy is
used there. It corresponds to α = 0, and is the quantum version of the Hartley entropy. We
denote this as H0.
Definition 2.2.46 (Conditional Hartley entropy). Let ρAB ∈ D≤(HA ⊗ HB). The quantum
Hartley entropy of A conditioned on B of the state ρAB is
H0(A|B)ρ = sup
σ∈D(HB)
log2 Tr[(1A⊗σB)ΠρAB ], (2.41)
where ΠρAB is the projection onto the support of ρAB.
The min-entropy and the max-entropy can be discontinuous, which can be undesirable in
some applications. This leads to the idea of smoothed entropies.
We first define a ball centered around a state ρ ∈ D(H) with a radius r as
Br(ρ) := {σ ∈ D≤(H) : P (ρ, σ) ≤ r}. (2.42)
In this definition, we use the purified distance as a way to measure how close the state σ is to
the state ρ. Different authors may use different distance measures in defining such a ball. In
particular, the trace distance is used in [89]. According to Lemma 2.1.16, the ball defined in terms
of the trace distance is contained in the ball defined in terms of the purified distance. This means
the derivation of any lower bound (upper bound) on the smooth min-entropy (max-entropy) from
[89] remains valid for the smooth min-entropy (max-entropy) defined with the purified distance.
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Definition 2.2.47 (Smooth min-entropy). Let ε ∈ [0, 1]. For any density operator ρAB ∈




where Bε(ρ) is defined in Eq. (2.42) in terms of the purified distance.
Definition 2.2.48 (Smooth max-entropy). Let ε ∈ [0, 1]. For any density operator ρAB ∈




where Bε(ρ) is defined in Eq. (2.42) in terms of the purified distance.
2.3 Introduction to quantum optics
QKD protocols are usually realized by quantum optical systems. Therefore, to prove the security
of a practical QKD protocol, it is necessary to understand some basics about quantum optics. We
review some essential concepts from quantum optics. This section is mainly based on [100, 101].
2.3.1 Optical modes
In classical electrodynamics, an optical mode is referred to some orthonormal basis solution to the
Maxwell’s Equations for the vector potential in the vacuum. A general solution can be expressed
as a linear combination of those modes. One can show that the energy of a classical electro-
magnetic field mode is of the form of a harmonic oscillator with canonical position and moment
variables (also called field quadratures), q and p, respectively, for the classical system. In quantum
mechanics, the field amplitudes of orthonormal modes are promoted to mode operators through
canonical quantization. Each mode is converted into a quantum harmonic oscillator. In terms
of the canonical variables, these classical variables q and p for each mode are replaced by their
corresponding field quadrature operators q̂ and p̂ where they satisfy the canonical commutation
relation
[q̂, p̂] = i~1 . (2.45)
We follow custom to drop the identity operator 1 and choose the natural units (i.e. ~ = 1)
throughout this thesis. The reader is cautioned that different authors may adopt different con-
ventions by setting ~ = 12 , 1 or 2.
Let â and â† be annihilation and creation operators of a mode, respectively. They satisfy the
commutation relation
[â, â†] = 1. (2.46)
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One can write the photon number operator n̂ as n̂ = â†â. We can write field quadrature operators




(â+ â†), p̂ =
i√
2
(â† − â). (2.47)
We can also define quadrature states which are eigenstates of the quadrature operators, q̂ |q〉 =
q |q〉 and p̂ |p〉 = p |p〉. They are normalized under the conditions 〈q|q′〉 = δ(q−q′), 〈p|p′〉 = δ(p−p′)
where δ(·) is the Dirac delta function. In particular, the set {|q〉 : q ∈ R} and the set {|p〉 : p ∈ R}
each form a complete basis, i.e.,
∫
|q〉〈q| dq = 1 and
∫
|p〉〈p| dp = 1.
2.3.2 Important classes of quantum states of light
We review several important single-mode states and their properties. We also review an important
two-mode state: two-mode squeezed vacuum state, which is the continuous-variable version of
Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) states, maximally entangled states.
Fock state
Fock states, or photon-number states, are eigenstates of the number operator n̂. We denote them
by |n〉 where n is the corresponding eigenvalue of n̂:
n̂ |n〉 = n |n〉 . (2.48)
Moreover, the set of Fock states {|n〉 : n ∈ N} forms a complete basis for the Hilbert space of a
single-mode system.
Coherent state
A coherent state |α〉 is an eigenstate of the annihilation operator â with a complex eigenvalue α.









Coherent states can be generated by the displacement operator, D̂(α), acting on the vacuum.
Definition 2.3.1 (Displacement operator). The displacement operator with a displacement α ∈







We also define s-ordered displacement operator by the relation
D̂(α, s) = D̂(α)es|α|
2/2, (2.51)
where s ∈ C.
Then |α〉 = D̂(α) |0〉. It is interesting to note the relationship
D̂(α)D̂(β) = ei Im(αβ
∗)D̂(α+ β). (2.52)




2α = π 1. The overlap between two possibly different coherent
states |α〉 and |β〉 is
〈β|α〉 = ei Im(−βα∗)e−|α−β|
2/2 = e−(|α|
2+|β|2)/2+αβ∗ . (2.53)
For a coherent state |α〉, its expectation values for first- and second-moment of field quadrature
operators q̂ and p̂ as follows:
〈q̂〉 := 〈α| q̂ |α〉 = 1√
2
(α+ α∗) (2.54)
〈q̂2〉 := 〈α| q̂2 |α〉 = 1
2
(α2 + α∗2 + 2|α|2 + 1) (2.55)
〈p̂〉 := 〈α| p̂ |α〉 = i√
2
(α∗ − α) (2.56)
〈p̂2〉 := 〈α| p̂2 |α〉 = −1
2
(α2 + α∗2 − 2|α|2 − 1). (2.57)
The mean photon number of a coherent state |α〉 is
〈n̂〉 := 〈α| n̂ |α〉 = |α|2. (2.58)
The photon number distribution of a coherent state follows the Poisson distribution. The prob-






Another interesting property about coherent states is that they are minimum uncertainty states,
that is, ∆q∆p = 1/2, where ∆q =
√
〈q̂2〉 − 〈q̂〉2 and ∆p is defined similarly.
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Thermal state
Thermal states are the states of the light that do not evolve in time in thermal equilibrium. They
are the statistical mixture of Fock states with maximal disorder; i.e. they maximize the von







where n̄ is the mean photon number of the thermal state. In particular, the photon number






The uncertainty in photon number is ∆n =
√
n̄2 + n̄.
One can define a thermal operator T̂ (θ) which creates thermal states out of the vacuum [102].
Definition 2.3.2 (Thermal operator). Let â be the annihilation operator for the mode of interest.
Let b̂ be the annihilation operator for a fictitious ancillary mode. Let θ ∈ R be a parameter. The
thermal operator is





The thermal operator is of the form of a two-mode squeezing operator (see Definition 2.3.4).
A thermal state can be created by tracing out the ancillary mode of T̂ (θ) |0〉a |0〉b. The mean
photon number n̄ of a thermal state is related to the parameter θ in the thermal operator by
n̄ = sinh2(θ).
Squeezed state
Another important class of minimum uncertainty states are squeezed states. Unlike coherent
states where the uncertainty is equally spread between q and p quadratures, they distribute the
uncertainty unequally between quadratures. One can use the squeezing operator to generate
squeezed states.
Definition 2.3.3 (Squeezing operator). Let ξ ∈ C. The squeezing operator with a squeezing











An important squeezed state is the squeezed vacuum state, Ŝ(ξ) |0〉. It has the following
expectation values:
〈q̂〉 := 〈0| Ŝ(ξ)†q̂Ŝ(ξ) |0〉 = 0 (2.64)
〈q̂2〉 := 〈0| Ŝ(ξ)†q̂2Ŝ(ξ) |0〉 = 1
2
[cosh2(r) + sinh2(r)− 2 cosh(r) sinh(r) cos(θ)] (2.65)
〈p̂〉 := 〈0| Ŝ(ξ)†p̂Ŝ(ξ) |0〉 = 0 (2.66)
〈p̂2〉 := 〈0| Ŝ(ξ)†p̂2Ŝ(ξ) |0〉 = 1
2
[cosh2(r) + sinh2(r) + 2 cosh(r) sinh(r) cos(θ)]. (2.67)









We can also express the squeezed vacuum state in the Fock state basis as








einθ tanhn(r) |2n〉 . (2.69)







and the probability of finding an odd number of photons is 0.
Two-mode squeezed vacuum state
The continuous-variable version of the maximally entangled states (EPR states) are two-mode
squeezed vacuum states. They can be generated using the two-mode squeezing operator Ŝ2(ξ).
Definition 2.3.4 (Two-mode squeezing operator). Let â, b̂ be annihilation operators for two






One can expand the two-mode squeezed vacuum state, Ŝ2(ξ) |0, 0〉, in the Fock state basis as





(−1)neinθ tanhn(r) |n, n〉 . (2.72)
We can see that it has perfect photon number correlations in two modes.
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2.3.3 Quasi-probability distributions
We review three types of quasi-probability distributions that are useful for our discussions. They
are Wigner function, Husimi Q-function and Glauber-Sudarshan P -function. We use a general
framework to define them (see [103, 104] for more discussions). They can be defined in terms
of characteristic functions with the s-ordered displacement operator. In particular, the Wigner
function corresponds to s = 0, the Q function corresponds to s = −1 and the P function
corresponds to s = 1. We first define the s-parameterized quasiprobability distributions W (α; s)
and then recover these three quasiprobability distributions as special cases. This discussion
follows from [101, Section 4.2.3] with an alternative representation in terms of a complex number
α instead of field quadratures q and p. It is often convenient to define the characteristic function
W̃ (η; s) first, and then the s-parameterized quasiprobability distributionsW (α; s) can be obtained
by the inverse Fourier transformation of the characteristic function. The characteristic function
W̃ (η; s) is defined as





and the s-parameterized quasiprobability distributions W (α; s) are




W̃ (η; s) exp(η∗α− ηα∗)d2η, (2.74)
where d2η = dRe(η)d Im(η). Note that the quasiprobability distribution is normalized, i.e.,∫
W (α; s)d2α = 1.
Wigner function
By convention, the Wigner function is denoted by W (α) for α ∈ C. It corresponds to s = 0.
To calculate Tr(FG) for two operators F and G in terms of their Wigner functions WF and
WG, the overlap formula is
Tr(FG) = π
∫
d2α WF (α)WG(α). (2.75)
We can easily generalize the formula to multi-mode cases. The input-output Wigner functions
under a beam splitter transformation whose transmittance is η are related by







We list the Wigner functions for some important quantum states below. The Wigner function

















The Wigner function of a displaced thermal state (DTS) ρDTS(α, n̄) := D̂(α)ρth(n̄)D̂
†(α) with









We notice that if we set α = 0, it reduces to Eq. (2.78).
It is also useful to note the Wigner functions of a squeezed thermal state (STS) and of a
displaced squeezed thermal state (DSTS). Let Ŝ(ξ) denote the squeezing operator with a squeezing
parameter ξ. For our discussion, we restrict ξ ∈ R. For a squeezed thermal state ρSTS(ξ, n̄) :=
Ŝ(ξ)ρth(n̄)Ŝ














The Wigner function of a displaced squeezed thermal state, ρDSTS(α, ξ, n̄) := D̂(α)Ŝ(ξ)
ρth(n̄)Ŝ















The Husimi Q function of a state can be obtained by convolution of the Wigner function of
that state with the Wigner function of a coherent state. This quasi-probability distribution




〈α| ρ |α〉 . (2.82)
It is normalized, i.e.,
∫
Q(α)d2α = 1. This quasiprobability distribution is always nonnegative














†) of the operator F
after replacing â by α and â† by α∗.
P function
This quasi-probability distribution corresponds to s = 1. When the P function of a state is
convolved with the Wigner function of a coherent state, it gives the Wigner function of that
state. An arbitrary state can be expressed in terms of its P function as
ρ =
∫
P (α) |α〉〈α| d2α. (2.84)
This means an arbitrary quantum state is diagonal in the coherent state representation due to
the overcompleteness of the set of coherent states.
2.3.4 Coherent detection
We give a quick introduction to homodyne and heterodyne detection as they are important to
understand the detection techniques used in CVQKD.
(a) Homodyne detection (b) Heterodyne detection
Figure 2.1: Setups for (a) homodyne and (b) heterodyne measurements. Devices enclosed in
each gray box represent the detector. LO stands for local oscillator.
2An operator is antinormally ordered if all annihilation operators are to the left of all creation operators in the
product when it is written in terms of sums and products of creation and annihilation operators.
28
Homodyne measurements
The setup for a balanced homodyne detection is shown in Figure 2.1a. The quantum state of
light to be measured is labeled as signal. The signal is mixed with a strong coherent state, called
the local oscillator, on a 50/50 beam splitter. A pair of photodetectors are used to measure
the intensity of the light in each output mode. The measurement outcome of interest is the
difference in their detected intensities. In particular, the difference in the measured intensities
in these two output modes 1 and 2 is proportional to the qθ quadrature of the signal, where
qθ = q cos(θ) + p sin(θ) and θ is the phase of the local oscillator. By controlling the phase of the
local oscillator, one may measure different quadratures of the signal.
Heterodyne measurements
A heterodyne detection is referred to a particular combination of balanced homodyne measure-
ments described previously. Its setup is depicted in Figure 2.1b. In the CVQKD community, the
meaning of heterodyne detection is conjugate homodyne detection; that is, a heterodyne detector
consists of a 50/50 beam splitter and two homodyne detectors. After splitting the signal by a
50/50 beam splitter, one measures one half with q quadrature in one homodyne measurement
and the other half with p quadrature in the other homodyne measurement. This setup allows us
to measure both quadratures of the signal simultaneously at the cost of introducing an additional
vacuum noise to the signal. The reader is cautioned that this terminology use of heterodyne
detection is different from the classical communication community. Throughout this thesis, the
heterodyne detection is always referred to this conjugate homodyne detection.
2.4 Introduction to convex optimization
Convex optimization has become an indispensable tool for theorists in quantum information
theory to study many interesting problems. This is because many problems can be formulated
as convex optimization or more specifically, semidefinite program problems. If a problem is a
convex optimization problem, it means in principle there exists an efficient algorithm to solve
this problem numerically.
We provide a very brief review of some key ideas in convex optimization that are needed to
understand this thesis. We direct readers to [106, 107] for details.
2.4.1 Basic definitions
We review some basic definitions relevant for convex optimization.
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θixi : x1, . . . , xk ∈ C,
k∑
i=1
θi = 1 for some k ∈ N
}
. (2.85)
We note that the affine hull is the smallest affine set that contains C.
Definition 2.4.2 (Relative interior). The relative interior of a set C ⊆ Rn, denoted by relint(C)
is defined as
relint(C) = {x ∈ C : Br(x) ∩ aff(C) ⊆ C for some r > 0}, (2.86)
where Br(x) is a ball centered at x with a radius r.
Definition 2.4.3 (Convex set). A set C is convex if for any x1, x2 ∈ C and any t with 0 ≤ t ≤ 1,
it is the case that tx1 + (1− t)x2 ∈ C.
Definition 2.4.4 (Cone). A set K is called a cone if for every x ∈ K and α ≥ 0, it is the case
that αx ∈ K.
Definition 2.4.5 (Face). A convex cone F is a face of a convex set, denoted F EK, if
x, y ∈ K,x+ y ∈ F =⇒ x, y ∈ F.
Definition 2.4.6 (Minimal face). Let K be a closed convex cone and let X ∈ K. Then face(X)E
K is the minimal face, the intersection of all faces of K that contain X.
Definition 2.4.7 (Affine function). A function f : Rn → Rm is affine if it is a sum of a linear
function and a constant, i.e., if it is of the form f(x) = Ax+ b for some A ∈ Rm×n and b ∈ Rm.
Definition 2.4.8 (Convex function). Let f : Rn → R be a function with its domain dom(f). We
say f is convex if dom(f) is a convex set and if for all x, y ∈ dom(f) and 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, it is the case
that
f(tx+ (1− t)y) ≤ tf(x) + (1− t)f(y). (2.87)
It is often convenient to let the function f be defined over the entire Rn and let it take the
value +∞ outside its domain. It is thus interesting to talk about the extended-value extension.
Definition 2.4.9 (Extended-value extension). If f is convex, we define its extended-value exten-
sion f̃ : Rn → R ∪ {+∞} by
f̃(x) =
{
f(x) x ∈ dom(f)
+∞ x 6∈ dom(f).
(2.88)
It is sometimes useful to define the domain of an extension as
dom(f̃) = {x ∈ Rn : f̃(x) <∞}. (2.89)
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Remark 2.4.10. Many results in standard convex optimization textbooks (e.g. [106, 107]) are
stated for the Euclidean spaces over R (i.e., Rn for some n). In quantum information, we are
often interested in Hermitian matrices as optimization variables. Hermitian matrices are complex
matrices, but they form a vector space over R. We note that one can always recast an optimization
problem with Hermitian matrices to a problem over Rm for some suitable choice of m ∈ N. For
example, for any Hermitian matrix H ∈ Cn×n, we can write it as a matrix in R2n×2n in the
following way which preserves positive semidefinite ordering. Let Re(H) denote the real part of






Moreover, for any complex vector w = u+ iv ∈ Cn, we have w†Hw ≥ 0 if and only if
[
uT vT







These relations imply that any optimization problem with complex vectors and Hermitian ma-
trices (or positive semidefinite matrices) can be stated as a problem with only real vectors and
symmetric matrices. Then those standard results stated for real symmetric matrices and real
vectors can be directly applied.
2.4.2 Fenchel duality
Duality is a useful concept in convex optimization. We need to review one form of duality called
Fenchel duality that is relevant for the algorithm in Section 4.4.2. See [107] for details about
Fenchel duality.
Definition 2.4.11 (Fenchel conjugate). The Fenchel conjugate of a function h : Rn → [−∞,+∞]
is the function h∗ : Rn → [−∞,+∞] defined by
h∗(v) = sup
x∈Rn
{〈v, x〉 − h(x)}. (2.92)
We now state Fenchel’s duality theorem [107, Theorem 3.3.5] with the condition for strong
duality replaced by Eq. (2.95) according to [107, page 74, Exercise 20(e)].
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Theorem 2.4.12 (Fenchel duality, [107, Theorem 3.3.5]). For given functions f : Rn →
(−∞,+∞] and g : Rm → (−∞,+∞] and a (bounded) linear map A : Rn → Rm, let
p, d ∈ [−∞,+∞] be primal and dual values in the following Fenchel problems:
p = inf
x∈Rn




These values satisfy the weak duality p ≥ d.
If f and g are convex and satisfy the condition
relint(dom(g)) ∩A relint(dom(f)) 6= ∅, (2.95)
where A relint(dom(f)) = {Ax : x ∈ relint(dom(f))}, then the strong duality holds; i.e., p = d,
and the supremum in the dual problem [Eq. (2.94)] is attained if d < +∞.
We note that although the formulation of this theorem is for unconstrained optimization,
one can easily handle constrained optimization by the extended-value extension [see Eq. (2.88)].
Similarly, one can define an indicator function for a set C by
δC(x) =
{
0 if x ∈ C
∞ if x 6∈ C,
(2.96)
and use this indicator function to convert a constraint set C into a part of the objective function.
2.4.3 Semidefinite program
Semidefinite program (SDP) is an important type of convex optimization problems. It is a special
form of conic programs where the cone is the positive semidefinite cone. It plays a significant
role in the theoretical study of quantum information processing tasks such as entanglement ver-
ification, coherence distillation and nonlocal games. Many important quantities like the fidelity
function, trace norm and min-entropy can be formulated in terms of SDP. In Chapter 4, we
discuss the formulation of key rate computation of quantum key distribution in terms of SDP
and the nonlinear version of SDP. Hence, we review some basic facts about SDP. As we discuss
previously, we can work with Hermitian matrices even though many standard textbooks on SDP
discuss only real symmetric matrices instead of Hermitian matrices. Here we define SDP directly
with Hermitian matrices, following the definition in [94]3.
3We state an equivalent definition instead of the exact form in [94].
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Definition 2.4.13 (Semidefinite program). Let Ψ : L(HA)→ L(HB) be a Hermitian-preserving
map, A ∈ Herm(HA) and B ∈ Herm(HB).
A semidefinite program is a triple (Ψ, A,B) with the following optimization problems:
minimize 〈A,X〉
subject to Ψ(X) = B
X ∈ Pos(HA)
(2.97)
maximize 〈B, Y 〉
subject to Ψ†(Y ) ≤ A
Y ∈ Herm(HB)
(2.98)
where Ψ† is the adjoint map of Ψ. We call Eq. (2.97) the primal problem and Eq. (2.98) the dual
problem. The set A = {X ∈ Pos(HA) : Ψ(X) = B} is called the primal feasible set, and the set
B = {Y ∈ Herm(HB) : Ψ†(Y ) = A} is called the dual feasible set. We denote the primal optimal
value as α and the dual optimal value as β.
Remark 2.4.14. Since SDP is a special form of convex optimization problems, by weak duality,
it is the case that α ≥ β.
Theorem 2.4.15 (Slater’s condition). For a semidefinite program (Ψ, A,B), if A 6= ∅ and there
exists a Hermitian operator Y that is strictly dual feasible, i.e., Ψ†(Y ) < A, then the strong
duality holds for this problem, i.e., α = β, and the optimal value is obtained in the primal
problem.
Sometimes, it is convenient to express the SDP problem in another common form, which is

















yi ∈ R, i = 1, . . . ,m .
(2.100)
2.5 Introduction to quantum key distribution
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2.5.1 Generic QKD protocols
To facilitate our discussions, we present generic (device-dependent) QKD protocols. Different
protocols fit in with the generic description after some modifications of details. Roughly speaking,
there are two major structures of protocols: prepare-and-measure and entanglement-based.
We present a prepare-and-measure scheme in detail and note how an entanglement-based
scheme differs from it in the first two steps.
Protocol 2.1 Generic prepare-and-measure QKD protocol
(1) State preparation and transmission: Alice prepares a state from an ensemble




(2) Measurement: Bob receives the state in his register B, and applies his POVM
{MBy : y ∈ ΣB} =: {MB(b,β)} to measure this state.
We call each repetition of the first two steps as one round. After N rounds, they continue to the
following classical post-processing part of the protocol.
(3) Parameter estimation: Alice and Bob randomly select a subset of rounds to perform
parameter estimation. Let m denote the number of rounds selected. For those rounds, they
disclose their measurement outcomes (x, y) to construct the frequency distribution F (x, y).
If F (x, y) is in the set of acceptable frequency distributions Q which they agree before the
execution of the protocol, they continue. Otherwise, they abort the protocol.
(4) Data partitioning and announcement: They partition their respective data from each signal
preparation and measurement, indexed by the round i, into private information α, β to
store in registers Ai, Bi, and public information a, b in registers Ãi, B̃i. Alice and Bob
announce the public information.
(5) General sifting: Alice and Bob throw away some rounds of the remaining N −m signals
according to the public announcement. Let n denote the number of remaining signals. The
remaining private information forms their raw data strings x̃ ∈ {0, . . . , kA − 1}n and
ỹ ∈ {0, . . . , kB − 1}n, respectively, where kA and kB are the number of possible outcomes
for Alice’s and Bob’s private information, respectively.
(6) Key map: Alice applies a key map, which is a function of her private data x̃ as well as the
public information of both parties to obtain a key string z ∈ {0, 1, . . . , d− 1}n, where d is
the size of the alphabet for the key.
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(7) Error correction and error detection: Alice and Bob use the public communication to try to
match ỹ with z. In the end, Bob obtains z′ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , d− 1}n. Then, they use the public
communication to choose a (two-universal) hash function at random and apply it to each of
z and z′. They compare their hash values via the public communication. If their hash
values disagree, they either redo the error correction or abort the protocol.
(8) Privacy amplification: By using a two-universal hash function on their key strings z and z′,
they obtain their final keys KA and KB, respectively. Let ` denote the length of the final
key KA.
Remark 2.5.1. In the parameter estimation step, to choose rounds for testing, there are two
possible approaches. They may choose these rounds in a probabilistic way: For each round, they
select it for testing with a probability γ > 0. Then the number of rounds selected is a random
variable with its expectation value Nγ. The other possibility is that they select randomly a fixed
number of rounds, m. For example, they may apply a random permutation to all rounds and then
choose the first m rounds for testing. However, if the number of signals N is large, implementing
this random permutation can be computationally challenging for the classical post-processing
units. Moreover, they may perform some additional data processing on F (x, y) to obtain coarse-
grained statistics in some cases if it is advantageous to do so. In some specific QKD protocols,
one may postpone the parameter estimation step until after the error correction step so that the
parameter estimation step can also use the information announced in the error correction step.
Remark 2.5.2. In the key map step, we present the direct reconciliation scheme by letting Alice
apply the key map. Then in the error correction step, Bob needs to correct his string to match
with Alice’s. This direct reconciliation scheme is commonly used in discrete-variable protocols.
On the other hand, if Bob applies a key map to his string and then Alice corrects her string to
match with Bob’s, this reconciliation procedure is called the reverse reconciliation. The reverse
reconciliation scheme is more commonly used in continuous-variable protocols to overcome 3 dB
loss limit for transmission.
To prove the security of a QKD protocol, it is often easier to work with an entanglement-based
scheme. We describe a generic entanglement-based protocol, which only differs from a prepare-
and-measure protocol in the first two steps. As we will see in Section 2.5.2, a prepare-and-measure
protocol can be converted as an entanglement-based protocol by the source-replacement scheme
[5, 108–110].
Protocol 2.2 Generic entanglement-based QKD protocol
(1) State preparation and transmission: Alice (or Eve) prepares a bipartite quantum state ρAB.
Alice keeps the system A and sends the system B to Bob.
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(2) Measurement: Alice applies her POVM {MAx : x ∈ ΣA} =: {MA(a,α)} to her register A and
obtains the measurement outcome x.
Similarly, Bob applies his POVM {MBy : y ∈ ΣB} =: {MB(b,β)} to his register B.
The rest of the protocol is identical to Protocol 2.1.
The protocols presented so far are conventional QKD schemes. Another family of protocols
to be discussed in thesis are the MDI protocols [57, 58]. MDI protocols can be described as
either entanglement-based or prepare-and-measure schemes. We highlight first three steps in the
prepare-and-measure version.
Protocol 2.3 Generic measurement-device-independent QKD protocol
(1) State preparation and transmission: Alice prepares a state from an ensemble
{|ϕA,x〉 , pA(x) : x ∈ ΣA} and sends it to an untrusted third-party Charlie. Similarly, Bob
prepares a state from an ensemble {|ϕB,y〉 , pB(y) : y ∈ ΣB} and sends it to Charlie.
(2) Measurement: After receiving the states sent by Alice and Bob, Charlie applies some
measurements and announce the measurement results to both Alice and Bob.
After N repetition of the first two steps, Alice and Bob continue to the classical post-processing
part of the protocol.
(3) Parameter estimation: This step is almost identical to that in Protocol 2.1. The difference
is that they may partition their data into several sets according to Charlie’s announcement
outcomes. Then they may process each set of data independently. If one set of data fails
the test, they throw away. If all sets fail, they abort the protocol. Otherwise, they continue.
The rest of the protocol is identical to Protocol 2.1.
Similarly to conventional QKD protocols, one can obtain equivalent entanglement-based schemes
by the source-replacement scheme discussed in Section 2.5.2.
2.5.2 Source-replacement scheme
The source-replacement scheme [5, 108–110] can be used to obtain an equivalent entanglement-
based scheme for the given prepare-and-measure protocol.
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Given Alice’s state ensemble {|ϕx〉 , px} for her preparation in the prepare-and-measure scheme,






px |x〉A |ϕx〉A′ , (2.101)
where {|x〉} is an orthonormal basis for register A. Then Alice sends register A′ to Bob via an
insecure quantum channel and keeps register A for her measurement described by the POVM
MA = {MAx = |x〉〈x|}. The quantum channel that maps register A′ to Bob’s register B is
described by a CPTP map, EA′→B, and is assumed to be under Eve’s control. Thus, Alice and
Bob’s joint state ρAB before their measurements is
ρAB = (idA⊗EA′→B)(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|AA′), (2.102)
where idA is the identity channel on Alice’s system A.
When Alice performs a local measurement using her POVM {MAx } on register A and obtains
an outcome x, she effectively sends the state |ϕx〉 to Bob. Bob’s received state ρxB conditioned




TrA[ρAB(|x〉〈x|A ⊗ 1B)]. (2.103)
Bob applies his POVM MB = {MBy } to register B to obtain his measurement outcomes.
To establish an equivalence between the original prepare-and-measure scheme and the entanglement-
based scheme obtained by the source-replacement scheme for the security proof, it is important
to note that Alice’s reduced density operator ρA is unchanged by Eve since her system A never















The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of several existing security proof methods for
general QKD protocols. In this chapter we start with the security definition of QKD and then
present several methods to prove the security based on Renner’s framework [89]. In particular,
under this framework, the security proofs are modular in the sense that one can prove the security
against a class of restricted attacks, known as collective attacks (which is explained in Section 3.2),
and then lift the security proof to general attacks by techniques like quantum de Finetti theorem
[89, 111], postselection technique [112] or the entropy accumulation theorem [97, 98]. We briefly
review these techniques. At the end of this chapter, we also provide remarks about an alternative
framework - phase error correction method and briefly mention the security proof method based
on entropic uncertainty relations.
3.1 Security definition of QKD
In the cryptographic setting of QKD, Eve may hold a quantum register E that is in some state ρE
after the quantum communication of a QKD session. She also obtains a copy of the register that
contains all the classical announcements since she can listen to all the classical communication.
Her goal is to guess the final key string K produced from this QKD protocol or the secret
information in the applications that use the key K. However, she is not forced to measure her
system immediately. She can perform any measurements that are physically allowed on her
system at any time of her choosing. Secret keys generated from a QKD protocol are supposed
to be consumed by other cryptographic applications such as one-time pad encryption and digital
signature schemes. This means that she may delay her measurements until the key is being used
in those cryptographic applications. Hence, it is desirable that secure cryptographic applications
which need perfectly secure keys remain secure if keys are supplied by QKD. This requirement
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is related to the notion of universal composability. It is also worth noting that it is unlikely to
generate perfectly secure keys in practical protocols. As we can see from the well-known BB84
protocol based on qubits [3], there is a nonzero probability (which decays exponentially in the
number of signals) that Eve guesses Bob’s basis correctly in each round and then learns every
single bit of the key without introducing any disturbance. Since this probability is negligible
when Alice and Bob exchange a sufficiently large number of signals, it is reasonable to consider
keys from a protocol like this to be secure. On the other hand, users should be aware of the risks
associated with using such a key. Thus, it is also important to quantify the risk via a security
parameter that has operational meanings. All these requirements are satisfied by the security
definition proposed in [113, 114], which achieves the goal of composable security.
Under the universally composable security framework, one often compares the real protocol
with an idealized protocol and quantifies the deviation from the ideal protocol. Both real and
ideal protocols can abort. In this case, Alice and Bob both output a symbol ⊥ to indicate the
failure of the protocol. If the protocol does not abort, the ideal protocol for QKD is supposed
to generate an identical key for Alice and Bob from the key space such that the key is uniformly
distributed among all possible choices of keys and that Eve knows nothing about the key. The
trace distance is used as the measure for deviation, which is a generalization of the variational
distance used for classical systems. This security definition has been widely used in the literature.
We state this definition here; see also Renner’s Ph.D. thesis [89] as well as [115] .
Definition 3.1.1 (ε-security of QKD). A QKD protocol consists of a state distribution process
that establishes a tripartite state ρABE among Alice, Bob and Eve, and a key distillation protocol
which is described by a completely positive and trace non-increasing map EABE→KAKBE′ . A QKD
protocol is ε-secure if for any input state ρABE to the key distillation protocol, the trace distance
between the (subnormalized) output state ρKAKBE′ = EABE→KAKBE′(ρABE) and the ideal state
ωKAKB ⊗ ρE′ is at most ε:
1
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k∈K |k〉〈k|KA⊗|k〉〈k|KB is a perfectly classically correlated state, {|k〉} is an
orthonormal basis for each of KA and KB, ρE′ = TrKAKB (ρKAKBE′), and Tr(ρKAKBE′) = Tr(ρE′)
is the probability of not aborting the protocol. Here, each |k〉 represents a possible key string in
the key space K.
In this definition, we use subnormalized states and the trace of each subnormalized state is
the probability of not aborting. We notice that whenever the protocol aborts, Alice and Bob
obtain a trivial key in both real and ideal protocol so that the trace distance between the real
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and ideal state is zero in this case. One can write any such subnormalized output state ρKAKBE′















E′ is Eve’s (normalized) state conditioned on the choice (k, k
′). The state ωKAKB ⊗ρE′
in this security definition is the state given by an ideal protocol. It has the property of correctness
(k = k′), and satisfies the uniform randomness requirement (p(k, k′) = 1|K|δk,k′). Moreover, Eve’s
conditional state is independent of any particular value of k, which is the secrecy requirement.













‖ρ̃KAKBE′ − ωKAKB ⊗ ρ̃E′‖1 ≤ ε, (3.3)
where pabort denotes the probability of not aborting.
We note that the trace distance of two states has an operational interpretation: the advantage
in distinguishing these two states, which are given with equal a priori probability, compared to
a random guessing. This means the ε-security definition of QKD can be interpreted as follows.
Suppose two black-box devices, one that implements a real QKD protocol and the other one
that implements an ideal protocol, are given to an adversary whose goal is to verify which device
is for the real QKD protocol. The adversary can send any input to each of the devices and
can examine the output states. Then the probability that this adversary guesses correctly which
device implements the real protocol by looking at output states is at most 12(1+ε). Alternatively,
based on Eq. (3.3), one can say that the probability of the event that Alice and Bob do not abort
the protocol and that the key K is not perfect (i.e., random, correct and secret) is upper bounded
by ε.
The security parameter ε can usually be subdivided into two parts by the use of the triangle
inequality: correctness εcor and secrecy εsec.
Definition 3.1.2 (εcor-correctness). Let εcor ≥ 0. A QKD protocol is εcor-correct if for key
strings KA and KB that are chosen according to the distribution defined by ρKAKB , it is the case
that Pr(KA 6= KB ∧ ¬abort) ≤ εcor.
The correctness of a QKD protocol is usually guaranteed by the error correction subprotocol.
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Definition 3.1.3 (εsec-secrecy). For any εsec ≥ 0, a key K is εsec-secret with respect to an









k∈K |k〉〈k|K is the completely mixed state on K.
As we discuss in more details in Section 3.3.1, the secrecy of a QKD protocol often comes
from the two-universal family of hash functions used for the privacy amplification subprotocol.
If a QKD protocol is εcor-correct and outputs an εsec-secret key, then the QKD protocol is
ε-secure where ε = εcor + εsec. This can be easily seen from the triangle inequality of trace norm:
1
2
‖ρKAKBE′ − ωKAKB ⊗ ρE′‖1 ≤
1
2
‖ρKAKBE′ − ρ̃KAKBE′‖1 +
1
2
‖ρ̃KAKBE′ − ωKAKB ⊗ ρE′‖1
≤ 1
2
‖ρKAKB − ρ̃KAKB‖1 +
1
2
‖ρ̃KAE′ − ωKA ⊗ ρE′‖1
= Pr(KA 6= KB ∧ ¬abort) +
1
2
‖ρ̃KAE′ − ωKA ⊗ ρE′‖1






E′ and we use the fact that the trace distance
is non-decreasing under the partial trace.
In some scenarios (e.g., see Section 3.6), it is also useful to consider a similar, related definition.
Definition 3.1.4 (ε-security of QKD in terms of diamond norm). Let N be a given positive
integer. Let Ereal : L((HA ⊗ HB)⊗N ) → L(HKA ⊗ HKB ) be the completely positive, trace non-
increasing map that represents the real QKD protocol. Let E ideal be the corresponding CPTNI
map that represents the ideal QKD protocol. The real QKD protocol is ε-secure if
1
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We note that the ε-security under this alternative definition implies the ε-security under the
Definition 3.1.1. It is because the diamond norm involves a maximization over all possible valid




We end this section by mentioning some history. A security definition of QKD based on Eve’s
accessible information about the key K was used in early works prior to [113, 114]. It was later
shown that small accessible information does not imply universally composable security [116].
While early security proofs of QKD were based on this obsolete security definition, the key rate
formula in the asymptotic limit was redeemed under the composable security definition.
3.2 Assumptions and eavesdropping strategies
On one hand, the security of QKD protocols is not based on computational assumptions used in
classical cryptography. Eve may have unlimited computational powers including both classical
and quantum computers. As long as she is bound by the laws of quantum mechanics, she is even
assumed to have access to any advanced future technologies that are physically allowed. On the
other hand, there are still assumptions in security proofs. For example, one may assume there
exist some protected spaces (like Alice’s laboratory) where Eve cannot access. One may also
make assumptions on how Alice’s and Bob’s devices function. Before we proceed with a security
proof, it is important to state all the assumptions. Some assumptions become requirements
for experimental implementations of a QKD protocol. If an implementation fails to satisfy the
assumptions in a security proof, then the given security proof is no longer applicable. If one ignores
the differences between assumptions in a security proof and an experimental implementation and
still applies that security proof to calculate secret key rates, it opens up side channels. These
side channels can be explored by Eve. Side-channel attacks can lead to the breach of security of
the QKD system. Quantum hackers for QKD search for gaps between theory and experiment,
design eavesdropping strategies to explore side channels and propose countermeasures to prevent
side-channel attacks.
Different assumptions on Alice’s and Bob’s devices usually also lead to variations in the
protocol design. According to different levels of assumptions on Alice’s and Bob’s devices, there
are three major types of QKD protocols: device-dependent, semi-device-independent and device-
independent.
1. Device-dependent: Both Alice’s and Bob’s devices are fully characterized and trusted. Its
security proof depends on the characterization of devices.
2. Semi-device-independent: One party’s device is fully characterized and trusted while the
other party’s device can be uncharacterized and untrusted. Security proofs may use some
entropic uncertainty relation to bound unknown measurement outcomes by the known one.
3. Device-independent: It is not required to characterize and trust Alice’s and Bob’s devices.
They need to perform self-testing of the devices to certify sufficient quantum correlations
for secret key generation, usually by violation of some Bell’s inequalities. The security
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proofs may still require some behaviors of the devices. For example, some proofs require
the devices have no memory between different sessions.
We note that MDI QKD protocols are in the category of device-dependent protocols. In MDI
protocols, Alice and Bob each have a source that is trusted and characterized. The measurement
device is located in the third-party Charlie’s domain and is untrusted. Eve can impersonate
Charlie and perform the measurements.
In this thesis, we focus only on device-dependent QKD protocols. For the device-dependent
protocols, according to structure of the protocol, we can put these protocols into two schemes:
entanglement-based and prepare-and-measure schemes. The device assumptions of these two
schemes as as follows:
1. Entanglement-based: Both Alice and Bob perform measurements on the state received.
There is a source that is supposed to distribute bipartite entangled states. This source may
be located in Alice’s laboratory or in Eve’s domain. If the source is assumed to be located
in Alice’s laboratory, then one may trust the source. Otherwise, the source is untrusted.
Both Alice’s and Bob’s measurement devices are trusted and characterized.
2. Prepare-and-measure: Alice has a source that prepares states for Bob. Bob performs
measurements. Both Alice’s source and Bob’s measurement devices are characterized and
trusted.
Assumptions on the devices require experimental validations. On the protocol level, a security
proof is typically done with a given mathematical description of devices. As one can typically
draw the boundary between trusted parties and adversaries, these assumptions do not unrea-
sonably restrict Eve’s abilities. On the other hand, there are situations where we would like to
make assumptions on possible eavesdropping strategies. These assumptions may or may not be
reasonable. However, it turns out that in many practical cases, some additional assumption may
help greatly simplify the security proof and can then be removed by some technical tools that
essentially lift the previous proof to the general cases. Therefore, it is worth discussing these
eavesdropping strategies. There are two major classes of eavesdropping strategies:
1. Collective attacks4: Eve interacts with each individual signal that goes through her domain
with the same strategy. For each round, she may attach one ancillary register to each
transmitted signal, perform a joint unitary operation on both the signal and her ancillary
system. She stores all her ancillary registers in a quantum memory and then performs a
4The definition of collective attacks does not necessarily lead to the i.i.d. assumption since not all protocols
use an i.i.d. source and perform i.i.d. measurements. For this reason, a more precise term for the main use of the
terminology collective attacks in literature is i.i.d. collective attacks.
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collective measurement on all of them at a time of her choosing. She may postpone her
measurements until after listening to all the classical communication between Alice and
Bob since she can use any additional information learned in the classical communication
to help her decide how to perform her measurements on her ancillary systems. Under this
type of eavesdropping strategies, when the source in a QKD protocol emits independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) states and Alice’s and Bob’s interactions with the signals
are also i.i.d., one can assume the joint state ρNABE among Alice, Bob and Eve after N
rounds has an i.i.d. structure, i.e., ρNABE = σ
⊗N
ABE for some single-copy state σABE .
2. Coherent attacks: They are the most general type of attacks. Instead of interacting with
each signal individually, Eve may have one giant ancillary system that is attached to all
the signals and then perform a joint unitary operation among her ancillary register and
all the signals. She can then measure her ancillary register at any time of her choosing,
possibly after listening to all the classical communication or even after the current QKD
session is finished. There is no assumption about the structure of the joint state ρNABE after
N rounds.
While one needs to prove the security against the general attacks - coherent attacks, this
task is usually daunting to handle directly. One then considers a simplified problem by assuming
collective attacks. Historically, individual attacks, a weaker type of eavesdropping strategy than
both collective and coherent attacks, were also investigated when it was still challenging to prove
security against collective attacks. While it helped to gain intuitions about potential performances
of the protocol, the restriction to individual attacks is often unjustifiable and would lead to over-
optimistic key rates, that is, insecure keys can be generated. On the other hand, it has been shown
that collective attacks are asymptotically optimal for many protocols. Thus, when studying the
asymptotic behavior of a protocol, it is often sufficient to assume collective attacks as long as
the protocol satisfies some requirement (e.g. permutation invariant among different rounds). Of
course, a realistic scenario is when the number of signals is finite. Fortunately, security proof
techniques often allow one to lift a proof from collective attacks to coherent attacks in the finite-
size regime by some changes of parameters or some small cost in the key rate, keeping the essential
parts of the proof the same. We discuss these techniques in the later parts of this chapter.
3.3 Overview of Renner’s security proof framework
Since the error correction (and error detection) subprotocol essentially guarantees the εcor-
correctness of any QKD protocol, to prove the ε-security of the QKD protocol, the main task is to
prove the εsec-secrecy of the output key from the protocol. The εsec-secrecy definition requires us
to bound the trace distance between the output classical-quantum state ρKE of the real protocol
and the output state of the ideal protocol. We focus on Renner’s framework to achieve this task,
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which is fundamentally based on the leftover hashing lemma. We review several key ideas from
Renner’s Ph.D. thesis [89]. In particular, we look at each protocol step in the reverse order, and
explain how the task of bounding the trace distance from the QKD security definition can be
reduced to the calculation of some entropic quantities. Following the notation used in the generic
protocol description (Section 2.5.1), in this section, we use Z to denote the raw key string (of
some length n) after the key map step and let Z to denote the set of all possible values of the
raw key string. We use K to denote the space of all possible final keys after an execution of the
protocol. We adapt all statements to these notations.
3.3.1 Privacy amplification: leftover hashing lemma
The leftover hashing lemma establishes a relation between the amount of extractable secret keys
from a string and the smooth min-entropy of the string given Eve’s (quantum) side information.
The essential part of the leftover hashing lemma is to use two-universal family of hash functions.
Definition 3.3.1 (Two-universal family of hash functions). Let Z and K be two alphabets. Let
F be a family of functions from Z to K and let PF be a probability distribution5 on F . The pair
(F , PF ) is called two-universal if for any distinct z, z′ ∈ Z, the probability that f(z) = f(z′),
when f is chosen randomly from F according to the distribution PF , is at most 1|K| , i.e.,
Pr
f∈F
[f(z) = f(z′)] ≤ 1
|K|
. (3.7)
As seen in a generic QKD protocol in Section 2.5.1, the last step of the protocol is the
privacy amplification step. If two-universal hash functions are used to achieve the task of privacy
amplification, then the leftover hashing lemma establishes a bound on the trace distance between
ideal key and the key from the real protocol. The statement of leftover hashing lemma is from
[89, Corollary 5.6.1].
Theorem 3.3.2 (Leftover hashing lemma, [89, Corollary 5.6.1]). Let ρZE′ ∈ D(HZ ⊗ HE′) be
classical with respect to an orthonormal basis {|z〉}z∈Z . Let F be a two-universal family of hash
















where F is the register that stores the choice of hash function f chosen from F and F (Z) is the
register that stores the result of f(Z).
5The probability distribution PF is typically a uniform distribution.
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We note that in Renner’s Ph.D. thesis [89] from 2005, the ε′-ball Bε′(ρ) in the definition of
smooth min-entropy (see Definition 2.2.47) is defined in terms of trace distance. More recent
works usually define it in terms of the purified distance. Because the purified distance provides
an upper bound on the trace distance (see Lemma 2.1.16), the statement of the leftover hashing
lemma is unchanged when we use the purified distance instead of the trace distance.
















Solving ` in terms of εPA and the smooth min-entropy leads to the the following corollary, which
is stated in [117, Eq. (11)].
Corollary 3.3.3 ([117, Eq. (11)]). Let ρZE′ ∈ D(HZ ⊗ HE′) and F be the same as in Theo-






′)−`−2). Then, the key obtained after applying a
hash function f chosen from F is εsec := ε′ + εPA-secret if the length of the key, `, satisfies the
following condition:




Note that the second term in [117, Eq. (11)] is −2 log2(1/εPA), which can overestimate the
key length ` by two extra bits due to a typographical error. This typographical error is corrected
here.
From Eq. (3.10), our task to prove the security is reduced to obtaining a (tight) lower bound
on the smooth min-entropy Hε
′
min(Z|E′) for some ε′ > 0.
3.3.2 Error correction and error detection
Alice and Bob have some partially correlated strings before they reach the error correction step.
The task of error correction is to correct errors in one party’s string to match with the other party’s
key string. Without loss of generality, we take the direct reconciliation scheme as an example. In
this case, Alice reveals some information about her key string through public communication and
Bob needs to correct his string to match with Alice’s. Some error correcting codes only require
communication in one direction such as low-density parity check (LDPC) codes [118] and polar
codes [119]. Other codes can require multiple-round two-way communications. We define the
total number of bits needed in communication for the error correction purpose as leakEC.
To achieve higher efficiency, error correcting codes are usually designed to correct errors with a
high probability instead of correcting errors perfectly. Therefore, the error correction step can fail
to produce two identical key strings. Even if Alice’s and Bob’s key strings are slightly different,
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their final keys after the privacy amplification step will then be dramatically different. Since it
is much easier to detect errors, they can use an error detection step after the error correction
subprotocol to minimize the failure probability of the overall error correction and error detection
step. To do so, they choose a two-universal hash function at random by communicating through
the authenticated classical channel, and then compute the hash values of their strings. If their
hash values disagree, they either redo the error correction subprotocol or abort the QKD protocol.
We note that this error detection step can also fail due to collision of hash functions. However,
this failure probability of error detection is much smaller than the failure probability of error
correction alone. In the literature, one typically introduces a security parameter εEC, which is
actually the failure probability of the error detection if error detection is performed. To guarantee
the QKD protocol is εcor-correct, we demand εEC to be εcor. From Definition 3.3.1, one needs to
choose the length of hash to be at least dlog2(1/εEC)e ≤ log2(1/εEC) + 1 = log2(2/εEC).
In the expression of the smooth min-entropy Hε
′
min(Z|E′), we note that Z is the raw key
string of length n before the privacy amplification step, and the system E′ contains not only
Eve’s initial system E after the quantum communication phase, but also public announcement
registers including the register that stores transcripts of the error correction communication. Let
C ′ denote the register that stores communication transcripts of the error correction step. Let
C ′′ denote the register that contains all other public announcement other than error correction
communication transcripts. That is, E′ = EC ′C ′′. The information leakage during the error
correction and error detection subprotocol has been estimated above. Then, we can bound
Hε
′
min(Z|EC ′C ′′) from below by Hε
′
min(Z|EC ′′) and the information leakage term, which is stated
in [117, Lemma 2]. That is,
Hε
′
min(Z|EC ′C ′′) ≥ Hε
′




where leakEC is the communication cost of the error correction subprotocol and log2(2/εEC) is
the communication cost of the error detection step. Combining Eq. (3.11) with Corollary 3.3.3,
one can see that the key is εsec-secret if its length ` satisfies







The task of calculating secure key length ` is then reduced to finding lower bound ofHε
′
min(Z|EC ′′).






In the parameter estimation step of a QKD protocol, Alice and Bob perform some statistical
analysis on their data to estimate Eve’s knowledge about the key. This estimation helps them to
47
make a decision about continuation of the protocol. It also helps to find a lower bound on the
smooth min-entropy Hε
′
min(Z|[E]) where the input state is unknown but subject to constraints
from the observed statistics.
Let M = {Mλ}λ∈Λ be Alice and Bob’s joint POVM used for the parameter estimation subpro-
tocol. To perform parameter estimation, they choose a random subset of signals. For the chosen
subset, they announce all the information to bound Eve’s knowledge about the key. Let m be
the number of signals used for parameter estimation. When they announce all the information,
they are able to construct a sequence of outcomes λ = (λ1, . . . , λm) ∈ Λ×m, and then they are




|{i : λi = λ}|
m
|λ〉〈λ| . (3.13)
We note that we write a frequency distribution as a diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries are
frequencies of outcomes. We may also write it as a vector by replacing |λ〉〈λ| with |λ〉 in the above
expression. For a frequency distribution F ∈ P(Λ), we abuse the notation to let F be either the
vector version of the diagonal matrix version, which should be clear from the context.
Before the execution of the protocol, they have agreed on the set of acceptable frequency
distributions Q. If freq(λ) ∈ Q, they continue the protocol. Otherwise, they abort.
εPE-securely filtered state
Statistics from parameter estimation give us constraints on possible eavesdropping attacks. Ide-
ally, we need only to evaluate Hε
′
min(Z|[E]) for states that can produce the observed statistics,
and consider the worst-case scenario among those states. However, when the number m is finite,
all measured data are subject to statistical fluctuations. Due to statistical fluctuations, some
extremely adverse states can also produce the observed statistics with an extremely small proba-
bility. It means that regardless of Eve’s attacks, it is always possible that the observed statistics
are produced by those states which lead to extremely low values of Hε
′
min(Z|[E]). If we cannot
exclude such states, the worst-case scenario may always lead to a key with short or even zero
length. For instance, let us consider the following scenario. Let HA ⊗ HB be the joint Hilbert
space of Alice’s and Bob’s single-round systems. Suppose they accept only the statistic that
would be produced by N copies of the maximally entangled state on HA ⊗ HB, i.e., perfectly
correlated data. However, if ρAB is N copies of the completely mixed state on HA ⊗HB where
Alice and Eve (as well as Bob and Eve) share N copies of the maximally entangled state in the
joint state ρABE , there is still a non-zero (but exponentially small in m) probability that Alice
and Bob would obtain perfectly correlated data by sampling m from these N signals. It is clear
that one cannot generate secret keys from this joint state ρABE . Thus, in this scenario, we would
trivially conclude that we could not generate any keys of nonzero length if we could not exclude
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the completely mixed state from consideration due to its nonzero probability of producing the
observed statistics.
It motivates the definition of εPE-securely filtered states, which are states that we want to
ignore in the security analysis due to their low probabilities of producing the desired statistics.
Definition 3.3.4 (εPE-securely filtered states, [89, Definition 6.2.1]). Let εPE ≥ 0. Let {Mλ ∈
Pos(HA ⊗ HB) : λ ∈ Λ} be Alice and Bob’s joint POVM, which is any measurement that
can be performed by two remote parties with an authenticated classical channel. Let ρNAB ∈
D((HA ⊗ HB)⊗N ). We say the state ρNAB is εPE-securely filtered if the parameter estimation
subprotocol, which applies the joint POVM {Mλ : λ ∈ Λ} m times on m randomly selected
signals from the state ρNAB, aborts with a probability at least 1− εPE.
In other words, the probability that the parameter estimation subprotocol accepts the statis-
tics produced from measuring m signals of an εPE-securely filtered state ρ
N
AB, by applying the
POVM {Mλ}λ∈Λ to each of these m signals, is at most εPE. One would like to exclude such
states from security analysis at the cost of a failure probability εPE, that is, the probability that
the real state (after Eve’s attacks) they sampled from to obtain the observed frequency distribu-
tion freq(λ) is actually excluded in the security analysis. Ideally, one would like to consider the
complement of the following set
S≤εPE = {ρ
N ∈ D((HA ⊗HB)⊗N ) : Pr
(
parameter estimation accepts | ρN
)
≤ εPE} (3.14)
in the security analysis. However, this set is in general difficult to characterize. If we are allowed
to restrict the set of states to i.i.d. states, we are able to consider εPE-securely filtered i.i.d. states
and then consider single-copy states that are much easier to analyze. This concept is relevant
for a proof against i.i.d. collective attacks. Thus, it is quite useful as in many scenarios we can
prove the security against i.i.d. collective attacks first before applying appropriate techniques to
lift the proof to general attacks.
Definition 3.3.5 (εPE-securely filtered i.i.d. states). Let εPE ≥ 0. Let ρAB ∈ D(HA ⊗HB) be
a state from a single round. We say the state ρAB is an εPE-securely filtered i.i.d. state if the
parameter estimation subprotocol aborts with a probability at least 1− εPE on the state ρ⊗mAB .
In [89], Renner defines the set Γ≤µM,Q of density operators for which the measurement M leads
to a frequency distribution which has (variational) distance at most µ to the set Q as
Γ≤µM,Q = {σ : minQ∈Q ‖ΦM(σ)−Q‖1 ≤ µ}, (3.15)




Tr(σMλ) |λ〉〈λ| , (3.16)
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and we write Q as a diagonal matrix. Sometimes, it is helpful to define another version of ΦM




Tr(σMλ) |λ〉 . (3.17)
This set Γ≤µM,Q contains all the states that one needs to consider in the security analysis
assuming i.i.d. sampling when we allow some small probability of failure εPE. Any state that is
not in this set is εPE-securely filtered. In order to relate the variational distance µ to the failure
probability εPE, some concentration inequalities are needed. This connection is established by
the law of large numbers in [89]. Although we assume the i.i.d. scenario here, as we will see,
a security proof under the i.i.d. assumption can usually be lifted to a security proof against
general attacks by techniques like the quantum de Finetti representation theorem [89, 111], the
postselection technique [112, 120] or the entropy accumulation theorem [97, 98] at some cost of
the key length. We also note that when the number of measurement outcome is two, one may find
tighter bounds such as Chernoff bound [121], Hoeffding’s inequality [122] or Serfling’s inequality
[123] depending on the assumptions used.
We note that a similar concept of εPE-securely filtered states exists when one applies the EAT
to the QKD security proofs. See Remark 8.2.2 for the exact claim in the context of EAT.
Coarse-graining
Another important concept related to how data are used in the parameter estimation step is
coarse-graining. As we will see later, for a fixed security parameter εPE, the variational distance
bound µ typically depends on the size of alphabet for the measurement outcomes. It is thus
sometimes helpful to consider a smaller alphabet in order to make the bound µ smaller. We
discuss the concept of coarse-graining here. Coarse-grained data and fine-grained data are relative
to each other. We call the data fine-grained if they have a larger alphabet. We call the data
coarse-grained relative to the fine-grained data if they have a smaller alphabet and there is a
(deterministic or probabilistic) function that maps from the larger alphabet to the smaller one.
In general, this function can be described by a conditional probability distribution pΛ|Σ where we
call the larger alphabet Σ and the smaller one Λ. For a given frequency distribution F over the





One may define a classical-to-classical channel N to represent this linear transformation from
P(Σ) to P(Λ). Then, one can write FC as N (F ) with
N (F ) =
∑
x∈Σ,y∈Λ
pΛ|Σ(y|x) 〈x|F |x〉 |y〉〈y| . (3.19)
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Here, we abuse the notation again to let F mean either the vector version or the diagonal matrix
version of the frequency distribution.
If the original POVM is {Γj : j ∈ Σ}, the effective POVM {Γ̃Ci : i ∈ Λ} corresponding to the





In a QKD protocol, Alice has a POVM {MAx : x ∈ ΣA} with some alphabet ΣA and Bob
has a POVM {MBy : y ∈ ΣB} with some alphabet ΣB. We typically call the statistics that they
obtain directly by applying their joint POVM {MAx ⊗MBy : (x, y) ∈ ΣA × ΣB} as fine-grained
since it captures the most detailed information that one can obtain via measurements allowed by
the protocol. Coarse-graining then typically refers to processing data from their joint alphabet
ΣA × ΣB to another joint alphabet Λ with |Λ| ≤ |ΣA × ΣB|.
Acceptance set of frequency distributions
For the rest of this thesis, we assume that the acceptance set Q is defined in the following way:
Q = {F ∈ P(Σ) :




for some alphabet Σ, where N is a classical-to-classical channel that models a coarse-graining
and F is a preferred frequency distribution in P(Σ), (e.g. one may choose F to be an expected
probability distribution in an honest implementation) and t ≥ 0 is some acceptance threshold.
We note that this description of the acceptance set is a simple and practical description of the
acceptance set since it includes a typical scenario in the BB84-type protocols; that is, one typically
defines an acceptance threshold for the phase error in those protocols. A protocol that accepts a
unique frequency distribution F can set t = 0.
3.3.4 Collective attacks, coherent attacks, and proof lifting
We now see the task of key length calculation is reduced to the evaluation of the smooth min-
entropy Hε
′
min(Z|[E]) from states which are not εPE-securely filtered by the parameter estimation
subprotocol. However, this evaluation is still challenging since each state contains N signals as a
QKD session typically has N rounds with N quite large (with typical values ranging from 105 to
1014). Moreover, it involves Eve’s system which is outside the control of Alice and Bob. On the
other hand, a security proof against i.i.d. collective attacks is much easier to perform since under






One can then use the asymptotic equipartition property (AEP) (see Theorem 3.4.2) or a similar
tool (Theorem 3.4.3) to bound Hε
′
min(Z|[E]) by the von Neumann entropy of each individual copy
σABE . While it is reasonable to assume both the state preparation and the measurement process
behave in the i.i.d. fashion, it seems too restrictive to assume that Eve’s attacks are also i.i.d. at
the first glance. Fortunately, for many protocols that are invariant under permutation of rounds,
it is shown [89, 124, 125] that the i.i.d. assumption is not too restrictive since the optimal attacks
in the asymptotic regime are i.i.d. collective attacks. Moreover, one can use some version of
the quantum de Finetti representation theorem [89, 111] to link the security proof against i.i.d.
collective attacks to a proof against coherent attacks in the finite-key regime. There are also
other techniques like the postselection technique [112, 120] and the entropy accumulation theorem
[97, 98] that establish links between the i.i.d. scenario and the most general case provided that
the protocol meets certain conditions. We discuss collective attacks as well as these techniques to
lift the security proof in the next several sections. It is worth noting that the lifting techniques
can still be improved and are an active research subject (e.g., see a recent paper [99]).
3.4 Security against i.i.d. collective attacks
We now consider a much simplified analysis by assuming i.i.d. collective attacks. As we will see
later, many essential ideas remain when we lift such a proof to the most general case.
3.4.1 Parameter estimation under i.i.d. assumption
Under i.i.d. assumption, we would like to consider the set of i.i.d. states that are not εPE-securely
filtered, which corresponds to the set Γ≤µM,Q. We now discuss the method to calculate µ from a
given security parameter εPE in [89], which is also used in [84, 117, 126, 127]. In [89], the law of





ln(1/εPE) + |Σ| ln(m+ 1)
m
. (3.22)
In other words, if a state σ produces a frequency distribution ΦM(σ) by applying the measurement
M , and ‖ΦM(σ)− freq(λ)‖1 ≤ µ for some freq(λ) ∈ Q, then the probability that the parameter
estimation subprotocol does not abort, when sampling from σ⊗m, is at least εPE.
LetAT denote the event that the parameter estimation protocol does not abort. Let Pr(AT |σ⊗m)
denote the probability of the event AT when the parameter estimation protocol samples from
σ⊗m. We state our result [84, Theorem 1] on the security analysis with multiple coarse-grainings.
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Theorem 3.4.1 (Security with multiple coarse-grainings, [84, Theorem 1]). Let εPE > 0. Let Ξ
be a finite alphabet that indexes multiple coarse-grainings. For each k ∈ Ξ, let







where F ∈ P(Σ) is a preferred frequency distribution to define the set of acceptable statistics Q,
each Nk is a classical-to-classical channel that realizes necessary coarse-grainings on F and Fk in
the definition of Q in Eq. (3.21), and tk is the acceptance threshold for the k-th coarse-graining.
The measurement channel ΦMk is defined in Eq. (3.16) with the same set of measurement out-
comes as the coarse-graining Nk. Each variational distance bound µk is calculated according to
Eq. (3.22) for the given security parameter εPE so that Pr(AT |σ⊗m) ≤ εPE ∀σ 6∈ Sµk .
Then if σ 6∈ ∩kSµk , it is the case that Pr(AT |σ⊗m) ≤ εPE.
Proof. It follows simply by the construction of Sµk which has the property that Pr(AT |σ⊗m) ≤
εPE for every σ 6∈ Sµk . Thus, if σ 6∈ ∩kSµk , there exists some j ∈ Ξ such that σ 6∈ Sµj . So,
Pr(AT |σ⊗m) ≤ εPE.
This result tells us that we can consider multiple coarse-grainings without modifying the
security parameter εPE, an improvement from a similar statement in [127] where the security
parameter is increased to allow multiple coarse-grainings. We also note that in this theorem we
allow the set of acceptable frequency distributions to set different threshold values for different
coarse-grainings, which is a generalization of the definition in Eq. (3.21). By this result, the set
of i.i.d. states that we need to consider in the security proof is




When there is ρA constraint, we add the promise that the reduced density operator on Alice’s
system is unaffected by Eve. This leads to a modified definition of SεPE which we call SPE:
SPE = {ρ ∈ D(HA ⊗HB) : ρ ∈
⋂
k
Sµk ,TrB(ρ) = ρA}. (3.25)
For the entanglement-based protocol where there is no ρA constraint, we have SPE = SεPE .
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3.4.2 Key length under i.i.d. collective attacks
Under the i.i.d. assumption, the quantum states that we want to evaluate the smooth min-entropy
are of a tensor product form. To evaluate the smooth min-entropy of an i.i.d. quantum state,
one can relate it to the von Neumann entropy of the state on a single system. This relation can
be achieved by a quantum version of AEP. We state the direct part of AEP [128, 129] that allows
us to obtain a lower bound on the smooth min-entropy by the von Neumann entropy. A converse
bound can be found in [128].
Theorem 3.4.2 (Quantum AEP (direct part) [128, Theorem 9]). Let ε > 0. Let n ∈ N such
that n ≥ 85 log2(
2
ε2





















2Hmax(A|B)σ + 1. (3.28)
Alternatively, we can use a result from Renner’s Ph.D. thesis [89] that relates the smooth
min-entropy and the von Neumann entropy. While this result is potentially looser than the
quantum AEP, it gives an easy way to evaluate the lower-order terms since we do not need to
calculate the smooth min- and max-entropy of the state on a single system. It is also sufficient
for practical cases. We correct a known typographical error of [89, Corollary 3.3.7] and make
a small improvement by taking an intermediate result from its proof. This result is stated in
Theorem 3.4.3.
Theorem 3.4.3 (Variation of [89, Corollary 3.3.7]). Let ε > 0. Let ρ = σ⊗nAB be an i.i.d. quantum




n|Bn)ρ ≥ H(A|B)σ −H(B)σ − δ (3.29)





We then state our result in [84] which is based on Theorem 3.4.3 and a generalization of the
result from [89] by allowing multiple coarse-grainings. We label the smoothing parameter of the
smooth min-entropy as ε̄ in this following theorem.
Theorem 3.4.4. Let n be the number of rounds for key generation and m be the number of
rounds used in the parameter estimation step. The QKD protocol is ε = εPE + ε̄ + εEC + εPA-


















where the feasible set SPE is defined in Eq. (3.25) with µ defined in Eq. (3.22), leakEC is the
number of bits leaked during the error correction step, and d is the size of key alphabet after the
key map step.
For DVQKD, the parameter leakEC is characterized as nfECH(Z|Y ) where fEC ≥ 1 is the
inefficiency of the error correction code used in the protocol. For CVQKD protocols, a different
convention for the error correction efficiency is used, that is, leakEC = n[H(Z) − βECI(Z : Y )]
for βEC ≤ 1. For the reverse reconciliation scheme, we simply replace Y by X in the above
expressions.
Then the key rate RcollN against i.i.d. collective attacks, when N signals is transmitted, is `/N ,































When the number of signals N goes to infinity, we see the last several terms in Eq. (3.31)








where ppass = limN→∞ n/N is the probability that a given round is used for key generation (n is
also a function of N), and the feasible set S is obtained from SPE [in Eq. (3.25)] by taking each
µ to be zero.
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3.5 Security against coherent attacks via quantum de Finetti
theorem
3.5.1 Finite quantum de Finetti theorem
We present the finite Quantum de Finetti theorem and its application to QKD security proofs
[89].
Let H be a Hilbert space and let 0 ≤ m ≤ n. For a pure state |θ〉 ∈ H, we define the set of
pure states that are partially i.i.d. pure states with respect to |θ〉 as
V(H⊗n, |θ〉n) := {Wπ(|θ〉⊗m ⊗ |Ψ〉) : π ∈ Sn, |Ψ〉 ∈ H⊗n−m} . (3.34)
(See Eq. (2.13) for the definition of Wπ.) The subspace of symmetric pure states that are partially
i.i.d. states with respect to a pure state |θ〉, denoted by Sym(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗n−r), is defined as
Sym(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗n−r) := Sym(H⊗n) ∩ span(V(H⊗n, |θ〉n)). (3.35)
(See Eq. (2.14) for the definition of Sym(H⊗n).)
Theorem 3.5.1 (Finite quantum de Finetti theorem, [89, Theorem 4.3.2]). Let ρn+k ∈
Sym(H⊗n+k) be a pure density operator. Let 0 ≤ r ≤ n. Then there exists a measure ν on














When it applies to QKD security proofs, the following theorem is an adaption of [89, Theorem
6.5.1] and is explicitly stated in [84].
Theorem 3.5.2 (Adaption of [89, Theorem 6.5.1]). Given a general entanglement-based protocol
as in Protocol 2.2, let N be the total number of transmitted signals in a QKD session. Let m be
the number of signals used for parameter estimation, and let n be the number of signals used for
key generation. Let k ∈ N such that bn+m+ k = N where b accounts for block-wise processing.
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H(Z|[E])− δ(ε̄)]− 2(m+ k) log2(dim(HA ⊗HB))








where the set SPE is defined in Eq. (3.25) with a modified definition of the variational distance





























+ dim(HA ⊗HB)2 ln(k)
]
− 1 ≤ N. (3.40)
For a prepare-and-measure protocol, when one applies the source-replacement scheme to ob-
tain an equivalent entanglement-based scheme, there is one additional promise that Alice’s re-
duced density operator ρA is unaffected by Eve. To guarantee that we need to consider only
states with the desired reduced state ρA in the parameter estimation step, one needs to intro-
duce another security parameter εSR > 0 according to [89, Remark 4.3.3], which we state as a
proposition here.
Proposition 3.5.3 ([89, Remark 4.3.3]). Let H = HA ⊗ HB be a bipartite Hilbert space. Let
ρAn+kBn+k ∈ Sym(H⊗n) be a pure density operator such that ρAn+k = σ⊗n+kA for some σA ∈
D(HA). Let ν be the measure in Theorem 3.5.1. Then for any δ ≥ 0, the set
Γδ := {|θ〉 ∈ S1(H) : ‖TrB(|θ〉〈θ|)− σA‖1 ≥ δ} (3.41)





To use this proposition, we set εSR = e
− 1
4











Then, the set SPE in the finite-key rate problem is replaced by the set S
SR
PE, which is defined as
SSRPE = {σ ∈ SεPE : ‖TrB(σ)− ρA‖1 ≤ δ}. (3.43)
In summary, for a prepare-and-measure protocol (as described in Protocol 2.1), one introduces
an additional security parameter εSR > 0 and modify the total security parameter ε as ε =
εPE + ε̄ + εEC + εPA + εQdF + εSR in Theorem 3.5.2 as well as changing the set SPE to S
SR
PE.
Similarly, in the prepare-and-measure version of a measurement-device-independent protocol,
systems AB together play the role of A in the discussion above and the classical register C plays
the role of B here.
3.5.2 de Finetti theorem for infinite-dimensional systems
The finite quantum de Finetti theorem [89, Theorem 4.3.2] (Theorem 3.5.1) does not apply to
infinite-dimensional systems since it requires the dimension, dim(H), of the joint Hilbert space
H to be sufficiently smaller than the number N of signals (otherwise, the bound in Eq. (3.36) is
trivial). Thus, it cannot be applied for CVQKD protocols. A version of the quantum de Finetti
theorem is developed for states that live in infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces in [111] by append-
ing an additional test in the protocol. In particular, the test measures two canonical observables
with an equal probability and then infers the measurement outcome of another (energy-like) mea-
surement based on measurement outcomes of these two canonical observables. CVQKD protocols
usually already perform such measurements. Thus, it is well suited for CVQKD. Not surprisingly,
this test for CVQKD is dubbed as energy test. If the protocol passes this test, then most of its
signals live in a finite-dimensional subspace except some small failure probability. One can then
apply a de Finetti-type argument to show that the state is well approximately by almost i.i.d.
states.
On the technical level, the energy test is based on [111, Lemma 1 and Lemma 2]. We consider
two canonical observables X and Y such that they satisfy the commutation relation [X,Y ] = i.




Y 2≥n0/2 and V1 := P
X2+Y 2≥2n0+1.
Let
γU1→V1(δ) := sup{Tr(V1σ) : σ ∈ D(H),Tr(U1σ) ≤ δ}. (3.44)
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For any n0 ∈ N and δ ≥ 0,





with c0 = (1− 1/
√
2)2.
This lemma in the context of energy test tells us that for all states such that the probability
that both observables lead to large values is small, then the probability that the maximum
energy among those states is large can be found to be small. Based on this lemma, the following
lemma tells us that we can do the security analysis in the finite-dimensional space under an
experimentally verifiable condition.
Before we state the lemma, we first define a subspace SMH̄⊗M−k of H
⊗M which consists of




Wπ(H̄⊗M−k ⊗H⊗k)W−1π , (3.46)
where the union is taken over all permutations π. With this subspace defined, we state the result
for the failure probability from [111, Lemma 2].
Lemma 3.5.5 ([111, Lemma 2]). Let (z1, . . . , zk) be the measurement outcomes when one applies
X and Y , chosen randomly with an equal probability 12 , to k subsystems of a permutation invariant
state ρN of N systems. Let Ω be the event that a projection on the subspace SMH̄⊗M−k applied to












for any n0 ≥ 12 ln(5N/k) and N/k  1.
In other words, if from the test, one finds both quadratures of the state are consistently
smaller than a certain threshold, then except some small probability, the rest of the state lives in
some subspace SMH̄⊗M−k . We note that the subspace H̄ in the definition of S
M
H̄⊗M−k can be chosen
to be the Fock space with a photon-number cutoff in the context of CVQKD. It then allows us
to perform the security analysis in the finite-dimensional subspace. With these lemmas, one can
either use a de Finetti-type argument to reduce to the collective attacks as given in [111, Theorem
4] or combine with the postselection technique [112] discussed in Section 3.6.
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Theorem 3.5.6 ([111, Theorem 4]). Let H̄ be a subspace of a (possibly infinite-dimensional)
Hilbert space H with dim(H̄) = d. Let M,k ∈ N with M > 4k and let ρM ∈ D(SymM (H) ∩
S̄MH⊗M−2k). Then there exists a probability distribution pV on a finite set V of unit vectors ν ∈ H̄








ν ) > 1− kde−
4k(k+1)
M . (3.48)
We note that the fidelity and trace distance are closely related as one can apply Fuchs-van
de Graaf inequalities (see Theorem 2.1.14). In order to apply this theorem to QKD, the protocol
needs to be invariant under permutations of N signal pairs held by Alice and Bob after the
state distribution step and the privacy amplification step needs to use the two-universal hash
functions. These two requirements are usually satisfied. In addition, the protocol needs to apply
measurements to verify the dimension of the relevant subspace H̄ of the signal space H is small
compared to N . For CVQKD protocols, one can verify this if all measurement outcomes from two
canonical observables are small in the sense of Lemma 3.5.5. Then the de Finetti representation
theorem (Theorem 3.5.6) allows us to conclude that for some n ≈ N , the reduced state ρn is
well approximated by a mixture of almost i.i.d. states. We can then lift a proof against i.i.d.
collective attacks to the general attacks.
3.6 Security against coherent attacks via postselection technique
We review the postselection technique by Christandl, König and Renner [112]. The name of
postselection comes from the fact (proven in [112, Lemma 2]) that any desired permutation
invariant state can be postselected from a fixed state (see also [120, Lemma 3]).
Definition 3.6.1 (Permutation-invariant map, [120, Definition 2]). Let H,H′ be Hilbert spaces
and let N ∈ N be a positive integer. A linear map E : L(H⊗N )→ L(H′) is said to be permutation
invariant if for any permutation π ∈ SN , there exists a CPTP map Kπ such that Kπ ◦E ◦Φπ = E ,
where Φπ is the CPTP map that permutes the subsystems according to the permutation π.
The postselection theorem [112] is stated more generally for a permutation-invariant map ∆.
In the application to QKD, the map ∆ is the difference between the CPTP map that implements
the real protocol and the CPTP map of the ideal protocol.
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Theorem 3.6.2 (Postselection theorem [112]). Let ∆ : L(H⊗N )→ L(H′) be a linear map. If ∆
is permutation invariant, then




N + d2 − 1
N
)
≤ (N + 1)d2−1 (3.50)




where µ(·) is the measure on the space of density operators on a single subsystem H induced by
the Hilbert-Schmidt metric [130] and the dimension of the purifying system R is sufficiently large
(i.e. R ∼= (HN )⊗3).
For an entanglement-based QKD protocol that satisfies the permutation invariant property,
this theorem allows us to prove the ε-security against coherent attacks by first proving ε′-security
against collective attacks for some ε′ that is related to the security parameter ε, the number of
signals N and the dimension dAB of Alice and Bob’s joint state on a single subsystem. We note
that many protocols satisfy the permutation invariant requirement either by construction or by
adding an additional symmetrization step.
Corollary 3.6.3. Let Ereal : D(H⊗NAB ) → D(HKA ⊗HKB ) be the quantum channel that models
the physical implementation of a QKD protocol. Let E ideal be the quantum channel that models
the ideal QKD protocol. Define ∆ := Ereal − Ereal. Suppose ∆ is permutation invariant. If Ereal




AB−1 =: ε, (3.52)
i.e., Ereal is ε-secure against the general attacks.
To the best of our knowledge, the postselection technique has not been rigorously applied to
prepare-and-measure protocols using the source-replacement scheme. As explained in the context
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of finite quantum de Finetti theorem, the reason is that the source-replacement scheme only proves
protocol security on states with a fixed reduced density matrix. However, the postselection
technique proof requires security on arbitrary i.i.d. states. A simple solution is to ignore the
promise on the reduced density operator. Alternatively, one proves the security of a virtual
protocol so that its security implies the security of the original protocol. In the virtual protocol,
one then introduces some extra testing on the reduced density operator. However, this solution
will come at some extra cost in the key rate for the small block-size regime. An alternative possible
solution is to prove a statement similar to Eq. (3.41) [89, Remark 4.3.3] for the de Finetti state in
Eq. (3.51) used in the proof of the postselection theorem. If one can show that for the measure µ
used in Theorem 3.6.2, the set Γδ has at most weight εSR for some security parameter εSR, then
one can first show ε′-security against collective attacks with the feasible set in Eq. (3.43). This
remains an open question for future work.
3.7 Security against coherent attacks via entropy accumulation
theorem
Entropy accumulation theorem [97, 98] is a useful tool to remove the i.i.d. assumption. We
summarize the entropy accumulation theorem (EAT) and adapt it in the context of device-
dependent QKD. The general idea of entropy accumulation theorem is to bound the smooth
min-entropy of an N -round process by the entropy of individual rounds with a much weaker
condition than the i.i.d. assumption. The specific condition is Markov chain condition between
the secret information and the public announcements. Effectively, the leading-order term in the
key rate is the one obtained under the i.i.d. assumption.
In this section, we review the statements of the entropy accumulation theorem so that we can
apply EAT to finite key analysis of device-dependent QKD. In particular, we are interested in
two versions of entropy accumulation theorem. They differ in the second-order correction terms.
Proofs of these two statements rely on novel chain rules of sandwiched α-Rényi entropies. They
are beyond the scope of this thesis. We direct readers who are interested in technical details to
[97, 98] for proofs.
We review definitions needed to understand the statement of entropy accumulation theorem.
We use a shorthand notationAN1 to denote a sequence of registersA1, · · · , AN . The EAT process is
depicted in Figure 3.1. In this diagram, {Si} are finite-dimensional quantum systems of dimension
dS , {Xi} are finite-dimensional classical registers, {Pi} and {Ri} are arbitrary quantum registers.
Definition 3.7.1 (EAT channel). EAT channels are CPTP maps Mi : Ri−1 → SiPiXiRi for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Each EAT channel can be decomposed as Mi = Ti ◦ M′i where M′i : Ri−1 →
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Figure 3.1: Diagrammatic depiction of the EAT process: (a) the overall process; (b) the process
captured by the min-tradeoff function (Definition 3.7.2). They are related by the Entropy Accu-
mulation Theorem (Theorems 3.7.3 and 3.7.4). Note that MN may be viewed as outputting a
trivial register, RN ∼= C, which we have suppressed.




(ΠSi,y ⊗ΠPi,z)WSiPi(ΠSi,y ⊗ΠPi,z)⊗ |t(y, z)〉 〈t(y, z)|Xi , (3.53)
where {ΠSi,y : y ∈ Y} and {ΠPi,z : z ∈ Z} are families of mutually orthogonal projectors on Si
and Pi, the function t : Y × Z → X is a deterministic function, and Xi are finite-dimensional
classical systems.
In order to apply the EAT, we demand the output state of the EAT maps
ρSN1 PN1 XN1 E
= (MN ◦ · · · ◦M1 ⊗ idE)(ρR0E), (3.54)




1 E ↔ Pi ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (3.55)
In the above definition, our choice of referring to the spaces by Si and Pi is to stand for secret
and public registers respectively as they are the natural interpretations of these registers in terms
of cryptography. One can then see the X register is a testing register which is a function of the
secret and public registers. The intuition of the above definition is that the testing structure
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characterizes how one constructs a test to determine the behavior of an on-going process per
round, which is useful for determining how entropy accumulates after each round. The use of
mutually orthogonal projectors generalizes the notion of Xi being a deterministic function of
classical registers Si and Pi to the quantum regime, where one, for example, may want to check
subspaces without destroying coherence within the subspace. The Markovian behavior restriction
[Eq. (3.55)] guarantees that the process (defined by the sequential application ofMi) does not a
priori destroy entropy being accumulated in the SN1 registers. It does this by guaranteeing that,
for all i ∈ [N ], the public information in round i, Pi, is not correlated to the generated secret
information of previous rounds, Si−11 , even though it may be correlated to the public information
of previous rounds, P i−11 , and the ancillary system E.
We notice that the Markov conditions can be trivially satisfied if all public announcements
Pi’s are seeded by randomness, which is the case for device-independent processes. However, one
advantage of device-dependent QKD over device-independent QKD is its ability to have more
complicated public announcement structures. Therefore, we would hope that the EAT can be
applied to QKD protocols whose public announcements are not simply seeded with randomness.
Another important definition is the min- and max-tradeoff functions. Let P(X ) denote the
probability distribution over the alphabet X .
Definition 3.7.2 (min- and max-tradeoff functions). A function f : P(X ) → R is called a min-
or max-tradeoff function for Mi if it satisfies
f(q) ≤ inf
ν∈Σi(q)




Σi(q) := {νSiPiXiRiR = (Mi ⊗ idR)(ωRi−1R) : ω ∈ D(Ri−1 ⊗R) and νXi = q}, (3.57)
where R is isomorphic to Ri−1.
The second-order terms in the entropy accumulation theorem can depend on properties of the






















where δx is the probability distribution over X defined by δx(x) = 1 and δx(x′) = 0 for all x′ 6= x.
We state two versions of the entropy accumulation theorem (EAT).
Theorem 3.7.3 (EAT version 1, [97, Theorem 4.4]). Let M1, . . . ,MN and ρSN1 PN1 XN1 E be such
that Eq. (3.54) and the Markov conditions [Eq. (3.55)] hold. Let h ∈ R, let f be an affine min-
tradeoff function for M1, . . . ,MN , and let ε ∈ (0, 1). Then for any event Ω ⊆ XN that implies
f(freq(XN1 )) ≥ h,
Hεmin(S
N
1 |PN1 E)ρ|Ω > Nh− c1
√
N (3.62)
holds for c1 = 2(log2(1 + 2dS) + d‖∇f‖∞e)
√
1− 2 log2(ερ(Ω)), where dS is the maximum dimen-
sion of the systems Si.
The second-order correction term can be improved. The improvement leads to the second
version of EAT. We also note that this version of EAT allows us to consider infrequent testing
by the construction of crossover min-tradeoff functions as explained below.
Theorem 3.7.4 (EAT version 2, [98, Theorem V.2]). LetM1, . . . ,MN and ρSN1 PN1 XN1 E be such
that Eq. (3.54) and the Markov conditions [Eq. (3.55)] hold. Let h ∈ R, let f be an affine min-
tradeoff function forM1, . . . ,MN , and let ε ∈ (0, 1). Let α ∈ (1, 2). Then for any event Ω ⊆ XN
that implies f(freq(XN1 )) ≥ h,
Hεmin(S
N
1 |PN1 E)ρ|Ω > Nh−N
(α− 1) ln 2
2









Var(f) + 2 + log2(2d
2
S + 1) (3.64)
Kα =
1
6(2− α)3 ln 2
2(α−1)[2 log2 dS+Max(f)−MinΣ(f)] ln3
(
22 log2 dS+Max(f)−MinΣ(f) + e2
)
. (3.65)
When the systems Si are classical, 2 log2 dS in Eq. (3.65) can be replaced by log2 dS . When α is
chosen to be









the statement is simplified to be
Hεmin(S
N
1 |PN1 E)ρ|Ω > Nh− c
√


























2 log2 dS+Max(f)−MinΣ(f) ln3
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In this statement, the parameter α is related to α-Rényi divergence and a chain rule about
conditional α-Rényi entropy is used. In the end, α can be optimized. The specific choice of α in
Eq. (3.66) leads to a nicely looking statement in Eq. (3.67). However, it is in general not optimal
for applications. In applications of this version of entropy accumulation theorem, one often needs
to optimize the choice of α in Eq. (3.63).
To handle infrequent testing, according to [98, Definition V. 4], we can express an EAT channel
Mi,Ri−1→XiSiPiRi with testing probability γ ∈ [0, 1] as
Mi,Ri−1→XiSiPiRi(·) = γMtesti,Ri−1→XiSiPiRi(·) + (1− γ)M
data
i,Ri−1→XiSiPiRi(·)⊗ |⊥〉〈⊥|Xi , (3.70)
such thatMtesti never outputs the symbol ⊥ on Xi. Let X ′ be the alphabet that is obtained from
removing ⊥ from the alphabet X . A crossover min-tradeoff function is a type of min-tradeoff
function that only uses the statistics from the testing parts Mtesti and is defined below.
Definition 3.7.5 (Crossover min-tradeoff function). Let Mi be a channel with a testing proba-







H(Si|PiR)ν , ∀q′ ∈ P(X ′), (3.71)
where the set of quantum states is
Σ′i(q
′) := {νSiPiXiR = (Mi ⊗ idRi)(ωQiR) : ω ∈ D(Qi ⊗R)
and [(Mtesti ⊗ idRi)(ωQiR)]Xi = q′}.
(3.72)
The crossover min-tradeoff function h automatically defines a min-tradeoff function f : P(X )→
R by:
f(δx) = Max(h) +
1
γ
[h(δx)−Max(h)] ∀x ∈ X ′ (3.73)
f(δ⊥) = Max(h). (3.74)
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Moreover, we have the relations
Max(f) = Max(h) (3.75)










It can also be seen that for q′ ∈ P(X ′),
h(q′) = f(q) (3.79)
for q = (q′T , 1 − γ)T by this construction. Moreover, every frequency distribution in the set
of acceptable frequency distribution Q over X always has the value of 1 − γ in the position
corresponding to the ⊥ symbol. This means for any q ∈ Q, one can always find q′ ∈ P(X ′) such
that Eq. (3.79) holds.
A recent work by Dupuis [99] establishes a version of the leftover hashing lemma (cf. The-
orem 3.3.2) with the sandwiched α-Rényi entropy instead of the smooth min-entropy. As the
proofs of two early versions of EAT use sandwiched α-Rényi entropy as an intermediate step
before converting to the smooth min-entropy, a version of EAT based on the sandwiched α-Rényi
entropy can potentially give a tighter key rate bound. This improved version of EAT is presented
in [99] and is also discussed in detail in our forthcoming paper [83]. We direct readers there for
precise theorem statements.
We state the application of EAT to the device-dependent QKD in Theorem 8.2.3 as well as
in Theorem 8.2.4.
3.8 Remarks
3.8.1 Phase error correction framework
The phase error correction-based approach was initially developed by Mayers [131] and Shor,
Preskill [132]. This framework was further developed by Koashi [133] and Hayashi [134].
The argument by Shor and Preskill involves a reduction to an entanglement distillation proto-
col based on Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) quantum error correcting codes (QECC). This initial
proof requires one to choose carefully methods for error correction and privacy amplification such
that the CSS code structure is preserved. By encrypting the error correction step, it is shown
[135] that one can decouple the error correction from the privacy amplification when a certain
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constraint from the CSS-QECC is satisfied. Reference [133] removes this constraint. It is based
on a complementarity argument. The core of Koashi’s qubit-based security proof [133] is to re-
gard the key after the error correction as the outcome of the Z-basis measurements on N virtual
qubits K⊗N . It involves a reduction from the two-party private and random key distribution
to a single-party private and random number generation by constructing a single-party virtual
protocol called the squashing protocol. Formally, if there exists a quantum operation Λ called
squashing operation that converts any state ρ ∈ D(HA ⊗HB) to a state Λ(ρ) ∈ D(HR ⊗ K⊗N ),
where HR is some virtual ancillary system, and the standard Z-basis measurement on K⊗N gives
the same result as the key after the error correction step in the actual protocol, then one can
construct a single-party squashing protocol. If one can show that the squashing protocol is εsec-
secret and the error correction protocol is εcor, then the actual protocol is εsec + εcor-secure. The
security of the squashing protocol can be proved by phase error correction. The complementarity
argument is basically the uncertainty principle of two complementary operators: If the X-basis
measurement on K⊗N is completely certain, then the Z-basis measurement on K⊗N is completely
random.
This framework can be easily adapted to BB84-type protocols and can give analytical solu-
tions. The essential asymptotic key rate formula is a variation of the qubit-based formula:
R∞ = 1− h(eph)− h(ebit), (3.80)
where eph is the phase error rate and ebit is the bit error rate. The core of a security proof is
to have a correct definition of phase error and then bound the phase error rate. For practical
DVQKD protocols, since the source is usually not a perfect single-photon source, one instead uses
some version of Gottesman, Lo, Lütkenhaus and Preskill (GLLP) formula [136] in combination of
the decoy state method [66, 67], which is used to estimate the contribution from the single-photon
part. It is given [66] as
R∞ = q{Q1[1− h(e1)]−QµfECh(Eµ)}, (3.81)
where Qµ and Eµ are the gain and the quantum bit error rate of the signal state, respectively,
Q1 and e1 is the gain and quantum bit error rate of of the single-photon state, respectively, and
q is a sifting factor. We note that a finite-key analysis based on this approach can also be done
as Ref. [133] gives a tool to do so.
However, it is usually difficult to apply this framework to other protocols that are quite
different from BB84, like CVQKD protocols and high-dimensional QKD. Another disadvantage
is that in many security proofs based on this framework, the phase error rate is loosely bounded
so that the key rate can also be loose. It is also arguable that the finite-key analysis based on
this framework is less understandable since the proof is not modular and sometimes details are
not clearly presented as some authors assume formulas like the GLLP formula can be trivially
adapted to new protocols and they study only the parameter estimation step in the finite key
analysis without explaining other finite-size effects.
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Finally, we note that there has been an effort to unify two frameworks [137]. Reference [137]
claims that both frameworks give essentially the same key rate (except an inessential constant). It
is interesting to explore this direction and to understand more about the mathematical structures
behind these two frameworks.
3.8.2 Entropic uncertainty relation
In addition to aforementioned proof techniques, entropic uncertainty relations (see [138] for re-
view) can be used to prove security of QKD protocols in both frameworks. In the presence of
quantum side information, there are two useful entropic uncertainty relations that can be used in
the asymptotic or finite-key scenarios: the entropic uncertainty relation for von Neumann entropy
[139–141] and the one for smooth entropies [142].
The setting is as follows. Let A,B,C be three quantum systems. These systems A,B and
C can be in any quantum state (potentially an entangled state). Suppose there are two POVMs
X = {Mx} and Z = {Nz} that act on system A. With an abuse of notations, we use X and Z
to label measurement outcomes of the corresponding POVMs. The uncertainty relation for the
von Neumann entropy [139–141] reads
















Similarly, the entropic uncertainty relation for smooth entropies [142] reads
Hεmin(X|B) +Hεmax(Z|C) ≥ q. (3.84)
In the context of QKD security proofs, entropic uncertainty relations are typically used for
BB84-type protocols as there are naturally two POVMs that give nontrivial values of q. If Alice
performs the key map, then A is typically referred as Alice’s qubits used for key generation,
B is Bob’s system and C is Eve’s system E. The key is obtained by measuring Alice’s qubit
using the POVM Z. Then in the asymptotic scenario, one bounds Eve’s ignorance about the
key (measurement outcomes associated with POVM Z) H(Z|E) by H(Z|E) ≥ q−H(X|B). For
the finite key analysis, we swap min- and max- entropies in Eq. (3.84) and bound the smooth
min-entropy Hεmin(Z|E) by q −Hεmax(X|B).
Entropic uncertainty relations have also been used for CVQKD. Based on an extension of the
entropic uncertainty relation of the smooth entropies to the infinite-dimensional scenario, Ref.
[143] provides a security analysis of an entanglement-based CV protocol using two-mode squeezed
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vacuum states with homodyne detection. However, the key rate is pessimistic and does not reach
the key rate obtained under Gaussian collective attacks when the number of signals increases to
infinity.
In summary, entropic uncertainty relations can be used in QKD security proofs. Unfortu-
nately, it either is limited to certain types of protocols or gives loose key rates.
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Chapter 4
Numerical methods for key rate
calculation
To aid our discussions about security proofs of specific protocols in the following chapters, we
discuss numerical methods for the secret key rate calculation. We start with a review of the
formulation of asymptotic key rate [144]. It provides the basics for the security proof presented
in Chapters 6 and 7 and captures the essential components of the two numerical methods for
finite key analysis. We summarize several analytical tools [85, 86, 90, 92] that can ease the
numerical calculation by reducing the dimension of the optimization problem. We then present
key ideas from our work [84] for numerical finite-key analysis which follows Renner’s framework
[89]. Finally, we present another finite-key analysis method using the entropy accumulation
theorem based on our ongoing work [83], of which we discuss applications in Chapter 8.
4.1 Asymptotic key rate optimization
In the asymptotic limit, one can typically restrict to the i.i.d. collective attacks since it is
asymptotically optimal for virtually any protocol (as long as the protocol is invariant under
permutation of rounds). The asymptotic key rate against i.i.d. collective attacks is given by the
Devetak-Winter formula [145]. In particular, one can rewrite it in terms of quantum conditional
entropy. Recall in the generic QKD protocol described in Protocol 2.1 (similarly in Protocol 2.2
and Protocol 2.3), after the key map step, the party who applied the key map holds z while
the other party holds ỹ in a direct reconciliation scheme or x̃ in a reverse reconciliation scheme.
Due to the i.i.d. structure, each position in the key string z is independently and identically
distributed according to some probability distribution. Let Z be a random variable which is
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distributed according to this probability distribution. Similarly, we can define random variables
X and Y associated with x̃ and ỹ, respectively.
For simplicity of writing, we use the direct reconciliation scenario as an example. For the
reverse reconciliation protocols, one can simply exchange the role of Alice and Bob starting from
the key map step, and thus replace Y by X. Thus, the asymptotic key rate is [145]







where the set S contains all density operators that are compatible with observed statistics (see
Section 4.1.1 for detailed explanations). We use again the notation [E] to denote all Eve’s
registers including her initial register E attached in the quantum phase of the protocol and
all classical communication registers. In this formula, it is assumed that the error correction
protocol can reach the efficiency given by the Shannon limit. Since the practical error correction
protocols cannot achieve such an efficiency, we replace the term H(Z|Y ) by the actual amount
of information leakage in the protocol. As defined in Eq. (3.32), let δEC denote the number of
bits of the communication cost in the error correction protocol per key generation round, i.e.
leakEC/n for a total number of n signals used for the key generation. We rewrite this formula





i.e., we express the key rate as the number of secret bits per signal sent. This expression is exactly
the same as Eq. (3.33) which we derived from the finite key rate RcollN against collective attacks
by taking the limit N →∞.
In the following subsections, we follow the works [144, 146] to express this key rate problem
as a convex optimization problem. We also consider a variation of the problem formulation in
[83].
4.1.1 Constraint set
The optimization variable is the joint density matrix ρAB for entanglement-based and prepare-
and-measure schemes. For simplicity of writing, we drop the subscript when it causes no confusion.
Besides the obvious requirement for ρ to be a valid density matrix, we can divide the constraints
into two sets according to origins of the constraints: observational and reduced density operator
constraint sets.
From the parameter estimation step, we have constraints from measurements. In the asymp-
totic limit, each observed frequency distribution is indeed a probability distribution. The set of
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states ρ satisfying the observational constraints is given by




= p(x, y), x ∈ ΣA, y ∈ ΣB}, (4.3)
where ΣA and ΣB are alphabets for Alice’s and Bob’s measurement outcomes, respectively. We
can also calculate expectation values of Hermitian observables from the probability distribution.
In general, we can consider Hermitian observables {Γi ∈ Herm(HA⊗HB)} with the corresponding
expectation values {γi ∈ R}.
For prepare-and-measure protocols, we have an additional promise that the reduced density
operator ρA from the source-replacement scheme is unchanged by Eve.
SR = {ρ ≥ 0 : TrB(ρ) = ρA}
= {ρ ≥ 0 : Tr(ρ Θj ⊗ 1B) = θj ,∀j = 1, . . . ,dim(A)2},
(4.4)
where θj = Tr(ΘjρA) and {Θj : j = 1, . . . ,dim(A)2} is an orthonormal basis for the real vector
space of Hermitian matrices on system A. Thus, S = SO ∩ SR.
We note that in the measurement-device-independent scheme, one also includes a classical
register C that stores Charlie’s classical announcements and thus one optimizes the joint density
matrix ρABC ∈ D(HA ⊗ HB ⊗ C|Λ|) where Λ is the alphabet for Charlie’s announcements. In
this case, since we apply the source-replacement scheme to both Alice’s and Bob’s sources, the
reduced density operator ρAB is unchanged by Eve. Therefore, registers A and B together play
the role of A in Eq. (4.4).
As our constraints are linear constraints and a positive semidefinite constraint, the feasible
set is a spectrahedron, i.e., the intersection of an affine manifold and the positive semidefinite
cone.
4.1.2 Modeling of postprocessing
The parameter estimation step gives us possible states ρAB immediately after the state distribu-
tion but before any measurements. In the worst-case scenario, Eve holds a purification of ρAB.
Let ρABE denote a purification. In Eq. (4.2), each state that we want to evaluate the conditional
entropy is after Alice’s and Bob’s measurements as well as the classical postprocessing steps in-
cluding announcement, sifting and key map steps, and it is before the error correction step. Thus,
we would like to describe the linear CPTP map that transforms a state ρABE to a final state
after aforementioned steps, which is a classical-classical-quantum state ρZPE , where the register
P holds all the public information.
In the measurement step, Alice holds a POVM {MAx : x ∈ ΣA} = {MA(a,α) : a ∈ S
A, α ∈ OA},
and Bob holds a POVM {MBy : y ∈ ΣB} = {MB(b,β) : b ∈ S
B, β ∈ OB} for some index sets
SA, OA, SB and OB.
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After applying their POVMs to the state ρABE and announcing public information a, b, if we
keep the post-measurement state, then the joint state ρ
(1)
ÃAB̃BABE
can be obtained by applying a


























The general sifting step basically performs a partition of the set SA×SB as SA×SB = K∪D,
where K is the set of announcements to be kept and D is the set of announcements to be discarded.
We define a projector ΠK which projects onto the subspace of HÃ ⊗ HB̃ corresponding to the










Thus, we can describe the sifting step that acts on ρ
(1)
ÃAB̃BABE
















ΠK ⊗ |K〉〈K|S + ΠDρ
(1)
ÃAB̃BABE
ΠD ⊗ |D〉〈D|S .
(4.7)
This map is also CPTP.
The key map step applies the key map function fKM, which is a function of one party’s private
information and all public information. For the direct reconciliation scheme, fKM : O
A × SA ×
SB → {0, 1, . . . , d − 1}, where d is the size of key alphabet6. The action of the key map can be






|fKM(α, a, b)〉Z ⊗ |a〉〈a|Ã ⊗ |α〉〈α|A ⊗ |b〉〈b|B̃ . (4.8)













6In many protocols like BB84, there is already a natural way of partitioning measurement outcomes into private
and public information (bit value and basis choice). Moreover, the private information has been mapped to the
key alphabet directly in the data partition. In this case, the key map fKM(α, a, b) = α just outputs the value of
the private information.
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The public announcement register P mentioned previously consists of registers ÃB̃S. Since Eve
has access to all public announcements, [E] denotes ÃB̃ES. The final state on which we evaluate
the entropy is given by the overall postprocessing map ΦPP as
ρ
(3)
Z[E] = ΦPP(ρABE) := (TrABAB ◦ΦKM ◦ ΦS ◦ ΦM)(ρABE). (4.10)
We note that in this formulation, ΦPP is a CPTP map. To handle sifting, we allow the key
map fKM to output a special symbol ⊥ whenever the round is discarded due to the sifting step.
Intuitively, those rounds output a fixed outcome regardless the private information and thus no
secret keys are expected to generated from those rounds. Formally, one can use properties of the
objective function in the optimization to show that all rounds with ⊥ symbol do not contribute
to the entropy. In Ref. [144], the postprocessing map is described as a CPTNI map by removing
rounds discarded in the sifting step. In Appendix A, one can also formulate this postprocessing
map ΦPP in an isometric fashion to preserve the purity of the output state ρ
(3). This formulation
is useful to rewrite the objective function in terms of quantum relative entropy. We note that
these formulations give the same reduced density operator ρ
(3)
Z[E] for the evaluation of H(Z|[E]).
They are equivalent in this sense. When we drop the discarded rounds, we call this description
of postprocessing map as G in the same way as presented in [144].
4.1.3 Objective function
We present two ways to write the objective function. The first one is based on the quantum
relative entropy and is presented in [144, 146] following the work [147]. The second approach is
directly based on the quantum conditional entropy and is presented in [83]. In both formulations,
we use the fact that in the worst-case scenario, Eve holds a purification of ρAB. In this section,
we write [E] as two registers P,E where the register P contains all public information and the
register E is Eve’s system in the initial purification of ρAB.
Quantum relative entropy
The purpose of writing H(Z|PE) to quantum relative entropy is two-fold: (a) The objective
function can be directly seen as a convex function since quantum relative entropy is jointly
convex in both arguments as mentioned in Section 2.2.3; (b) The state used in the quantum
relative entropy only involves Alice’s and Bob’s systems without the need to find Eve’s state. To
rewrite H(Z|PE) in terms of quantum relative entropy, we adapt [147, Theorem 1] to the QKD
setting.
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Theorem 4.1.1 ([147, Theorem 1]). Let ρRABPE be a pure state and let Z = {ZRj : j ∈
{0, . . . , d− 1}} be a projective measurement that only acts on register R. Define an isometry VZ













and ρ̃MZPE = TrRAB(ρ̃MZRABPE). Then





where ρPE = ρ̃PE and Z is a quantum channel whose Kraus operators are given by {ZRj ⊗1AB}.
In Appendix A, we present an equivalent formulation of the postprocessing map G in terms
of an isometric representation. This formulation allows us to apply this theorem in the QKD
setting where there exists a postprocessing map G such that ρRABP = G(ρAB).
Thus, we can write the objective function in terms of the quantum relative entropy. It then
becomes obvious that our optimization problem is a convex optimization problem, and specifically,

















Note that our matrix representation of ∇W(ρ) does not involve an additional transpose which
was initially presented in [144] since we absorb the occurring transposition in the definition of the
matrix representation of gradient; i.e., we represent the gradient in the standard basis |k〉 used











We note that when G(ρ) is singular (which unfortunately happens almost all the time given the
construction of the map G), the gradient is not well-defined. One may overcome the issue by
introducing a small perturbation as it is done in [144]:
Gε(ρ) = Dε ◦ G(ρ), (4.17)
where Dε is a depolarizing channel with the depolarizing probability ε (see Definition 2.2.28).
This perturbed definition Gε guarantees the positive definiteness of the output state so that the




. We note that an alternative
solution exists by a suitable regularization of G map via facial reduction (see [87]).
Quantum conditional entropy
An alternative way to write the objective function is to directly show the quantum conditional
entropy H(Z|PE) in the key rate expression is a convex function and to find a way to represent
Eve’s conditional state in terms of Alice’s and Bob’s joint state. We write the objective function
based on the quantum conditional entropy as
W (ρ) := H(Z|PE)ρ, (4.18)
for ρ ∈ D(HA ⊗ HB). Proposition 4.1.2 gives us a more explicit expression of W (ρ) in terms
of ρ ∈ D(HA ⊗ HB) and Alice’s and Bob’s joint POVM. The convexity of W (ρ) is given in
Proposition 4.1.3.
Proposition 4.1.2. Let {Mzp : z, p} be Alice’s and Bob’s joint POVM which is regrouped
according to be the public information p and the key value z. Let Mp =
∑
zMzp. Then for








where Kzp(ρ) := KzpρK†zp with Kzp =
√
Mzp, and Kp(ρ) := KpρK†p with Kp =
√
Mp.
Proof. Recall from the definition of conditional entropy that for a classical-quantum state ρZPE =∑
z,p |z〉〈z| ⊗ |p〉〈p| ⊗ ρ
(z,p)













E . We need to find the marginal states ρ
(z,p)
E = TrAB[(Mzp ⊗ 1E)ρABE ]. Without loss of
generality, we can write the purifying state as ρABE = |ψ〉〈ψ|, where |ψ〉 =
√
ρ ⊗ 1E |Φ+〉 and
|Φ+〉 =
∑
i |i〉AB |i〉E , from which we find
ρ
(z,p)




















By the fact that for any operator A, (A†A) and (A†A)T have the same spectrum, it is the
case that H(ρ
(z,p)








= H(KzpρKzp) = H(KzpρK
†
zp) and a similar
expression holds for H(ρ
(p)
E ).
Proposition 4.1.3. The function W (ρ) is convex.








AB) ≥W (ρ̄AB) . (4.21)
Let ρλABE be a purification of ρ
λ




ABE ⊗ |λ〉〈λ|Λ, which













where ρ̄ABE is the purification of ρ̄AB and where the inequality comes from sub-additivity because
the entropy is minimized when Eve holds a purification of ρ̄AB.
The gradient of W for ρ > 0 is given as















We can use the same perturbation technique in Eq. (4.17) that is used in the quantum relative
entropy formulation to define the gradient for every ρ ≥ 0. We similarly denote the perturbed
version of this function as Wε(ρ).
4.1.4 Numerical algorithm
The key rate optimization is a convex optimization problem since our objective function is convex










where f(ρ) is either the quantum relative entropy functionW(ρ) in Eq. (4.14) or quantum condi-
tional entropy function W (ρ) in Eq. (4.18). As both Tr(ρ) = 1 and TrB(ρ) = ρA can be written in
the form of Tr(ρΓi) = γi by using 1AB and {Θj ⊗1B} in Eq. (4.4), we can consider the following




subject to Tr(ρΓi) = γi, ∀i ∈ Σ′
ρ ≥ 0 .
(4.25)
Figure 4.1: Illustration of the two-step method (Algorithm 4.1) in a one-dimensional abstraction.
Red lines indicate the optimization steps performed in the algorithm. The gap between our lower
bound from the second step and the true optimal value can be made small by finding ρ close to
the true optimal point ρ∗.
In [144], a two-step procedure is proposed to provide a reliable lower bound on the secret key
rate. In the first step, a nearly optimal solution ρ for ρ is found by the Frank-Wolfe method
[148]. In the second step, one looks at the linearization of the objective function at the point
ρ. The algorithm is presented in Algorithm 4.1 and the main idea is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
The motivation to adopt a two-step procedure can be explained as follows. The problem in
Eq. (4.25) is a minimization problem. Due to finite precision in computers, an algorithm that
solves this minimization problem can stop at a near-optimal point ρ and thus f(ρ) is only an
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upper bound of the true key rate. We may overestimate the key rate if we simply use f(ρ). This
issue might be more severe given that our objective function is nonlinear and standard solvers
might not be optimized to solve such problems. On the other hand, we are only interested in
reliable lower bounds since they give us the desired physical meaning: number of secret key bits
(per transmitted signal). To find a lower bound, in the second step of the procedure, we solve
a linearized problem at the point ρ returned from the first step. Since our objective function is
continuous and convex, such a linearization always gives us a lower bound on the key rate. The
linearized problem at a point ρ is
minimize: 〈∇f(ρ), σ〉
subject to: Tr(σΓi) = γi ∀i ∈ Σ
σ ≥ 0.
(4.26)
Its dual problem is







where γ(i) = γi. We define the dual feasible set for this linearization at the point ρ as S
∗(ρ).
That is,
S∗(ρ) = {y ∈ R|Σ| :
∑
i∈Σ
y(i)Γi ≤ ∇f(ρ)}. (4.28)
For any optimal or suboptimal attack σ, one can always obtain a reliable lower bound β(σ) by
[144, Theorem 1]
β(σ) := f(σ)− Tr(σ∇f(σ)) + max
y∈S∗(σ)
γ · y. (4.29)
We note that β(σ) is a lower bound since it solves the dual problem of the SDP from the lineariza-
tion at a point σ. This equation provides a lower bound as long as the gradient ∇f(σ) is defined.
We note that since the gradient may not be well-defined, a small perturbation is introduced as
described in Eq. (4.17). Since our objective function is continuous, by a continuity bound, we
introduce a small correction term. More explicitly, we use the following lemma which shows the
closeness between the state before the perturbation and that after the perturbation.
Lemma 4.1.4 ([144, Lemma 7]). Let ρ ∈ D(H) and let G be a CPTNI map. Let Gε(ρ) = Dε◦G(ρ)
and let d′ be the dimension of Gε(ρ). Let Z be a CPTP map. Then
‖G(ρ)− Gε(ρ)‖1 ≤ ε(d
′ − 1) , (4.30)
‖Z(G(ρ))−Z(Gε(ρ))‖1 ≤ ε(d
′ − 1) . (4.31)
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For the objective function W(·) based on the quantum relative entropy, the continuity bound
is given in the following lemma from [144, Lemma 8].
Lemma 4.1.5 ([144, Lemma 8]). LetW be defined in Eq. (4.14) andWε be the perturbed version
of W under the perturbation defined in Eq. (4.17). Let ε ∈ (0, 1e(d′−1) ] where d
′ is the dimension
of Gε(ρ). Let ρ be any density matrix. Then
|W(ρ)−Wε(ρ)| ≤ ζε (4.32)
where ζε = ε(d
′ − 1) log2 d
′
ε(d′−1) .
This lemma basically follows from Lemmas 2.2.32 and 4.1.4 and its proof can be found in
[144, Appendix C. 2].
For the objective function W (·) based on the quantum conditional entropy, a similar continuity
bound can be found and is given in the following lemma [83].
Lemma 4.1.6. Let W be defined in Eq. (4.18) and Wε be the perturbed version. Let H be a
Hilbert space with dim(H) = d. Let ε ∈ (0, 1/(e(d− 1))]. Then for any ρ ∈ D(H),
|W (ρ)−Wε(ρ)| ≤ ηε (4.33)
where ηε = (|Z| + 1)|P |ε(d − 1) log2 dε(d−1) , |Z| is the size of the alphabet for the key string and
|P | is the size of the alphabet for all public announcements.
Proof. By Lemma 4.1.4 [144, Lemma 7], we know that
‖Kzp(ρ)−Kεzp(ρ)‖1 ≤ ε(d− 1) and ‖Kp(ρ)−Kεp(ρ)‖1 ≤ ε(d− 1), (4.34)
where Kεzp = Dε ◦ Kzp and similarly Kεp = Dε ◦ Kp. By the continuity of von Neumann entropy








)∣∣ ≤ ζε (4.35)
with ζε = ε(d− 1) log2 dε(d−1) . Thus, Eq. (4.33) holds with ηε by the triangle inequality following
from the definition of W and Wε.
Numerical issues related to constraint violations and numerical precision are discussed in
detail in [144]. We direct readers to [144] for more discussions about numerical precision and
perturbation. We also note that by using facial reduction as is done in [87], one can guarantee
the strict feasibility and thus removes the need of perturbation. Then one can also use an interior-
point method for solving this optimization problem. See Section 4.2.4 for a high-level summary
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of facial reduction applied to the key rate calculation problem and [87] for technical details. With
perturbation ε and constraint violation ε′ due to both floating point representation and solver
precision, a reliable lower bound that replaces Eq. (4.29) is then given as [144, Theorem 3]
βεε′(σ) := fε(σ)− Tr(σ∇fε(σ)) + max
(y,z)∈S̃∗ε (σ)
(






where the set S̃∗ε (σ) is defined as
S̃∗ε (σ) =
{






Algorithm 4.1 Asymptotic key rate algorithm based on a two-step procedure [144]
0. Let εth > 0, ρ0 ∈ S, maxIter ∈ N, and i = 0.
First Step
1. Compute
∆ρ := arg min
δρ+ρi∈S
Tr[(δρ)∇f(ρi)].
2. If Tr[(∆ρ)∇f(ρi)] < εth or i > maxIter, then proceed to Second Step.
3. Find λ ∈ [0, 1] that minimizes f(ρi + λ∆ρ).
4. Set ρi+1 = ρi + λ∆ρ, i→ i+ 1.
5. Go back to Item 1.
Second Step
6. Let ρ be the result of First Step. Let ζ ≥ 0 be the maximum constraint violation of ρ from
the original set S constraints.
7. Calculate ∇f(ρ) to use for constructing S∗
8. Expand S∗ such that states which violated the original constraints by ζ are included.
9. Calculate β(ρ) using Eq. (4.29) with the result of the SDP in Eq. (4.27).
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We also note that this algorithm is very flexible to include linear inequality constraints. With
inequality constraints of the form Tr(ρΩj) ≤ ωj , we solve the following linearized problem in each
iteration of the first step of the algorithm. The linearized problem at a point ρ (to be replaced
by a different ρi in each iteration) is
minimize: 〈∇f(ρ), σ〉
subject to: Tr(σΓi) = γi ∀i ∈ Σ
Tr(σΩj) ≤ ωj ∀j ∈ Λ
σ ≥ 0.
(4.38)
The corresponding dual problem to be solved in the second step of the algorithm at a point ρ (to
be replaced by a suboptimal solution ρ̄ from the first step) is









y2 ∈ R|Λ|,y2 ≥ 0 .
(4.39)
4.1.5 On numerical performance and limitations
To solve linear SDP problems in both first and second steps, we employ the CVX package
[149, 150] with either SDPT3 [151, 152] or MOSEK [153] solver in Matlab.
In principle, this numerical framework is general for many device-dependent QKD protocols.
In practice, it can handle only low-dimensional protocols. The reason is as follows. In our key
rate calculation problem, the optimization variable is the joint density matrix ρ and the size of ρ
depends on the dimension of Alice and Bob’s joint Hilbert space. When the dimension becomes
large, the problem becomes more numerically challenging and requires more computational re-
sources. The running time can also depend on the number of constraints although the dimension
is the major factor. If too many constraints cause an issue, one may perform coarse-grainings at
the potential cost of losing key rates. Typically, for a problem with dimension less than 100 and
with fine-grained statistics, one Frank-Wolfe iteration may take several seconds to a minute on a
personal computer. The running time largely depends on the number of Frank-Wolfe iterations.
For some protocols in less numerically challenging parameter regimes (e.g. low loss scenario), the
first step calculation can finish within a few iterations. For numerically challenging problems, it is
possible to use several hundred of iterations. We typically set the maximum iteration number to
be around 300 for many protocols as it is usually sufficient to produce relatively tight key rates.
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However, there exist scenarios where the solver uses the maximal iterations and still produces
loose key rates. As the gap between our lower bound and true optimal value depends on the
performance of the first step of our algorithm, it is sometimes necessary to improve the result of
the first step calculation in order to obtain a better lower bound. Possible ways to improve the
first step result include:
(i) replacing the Frank-Wolfe algorithm by other optimization algorithms (e.g. Gauss-Newton
interior point method with facial reduction [87]);
(ii) using a different SDP solver;
(iii) choosing a different initial point (ρ) for the first step;
(iv) increasing the number of iterations for the first step of Algorithm 4.1.
The main reason behind these alternatives is that different solvers and different algorithms
can have different rates of convergence and thus can potentially give better results within the
time limit.
To extend the applicability of this numerical method, we discuss some analytical tools that
can help us to reduce the dimension of some protocols in Section 4.2. Developing a customized
algorithm for this particular optimization problem can also help reduce the running time and
improve the numerical performance as it is done in [87]. More research along this direction is
desired.
In addition to the key rate calculation for a fixed protocol setting, one may be also interested
in optimization of free parameters in the protocol description such as the probability distribution
of signal states or intensities of coherent states (if the protocol uses coherent states). It is
interesting to note that machine learning techniques have been adopted to the QKD setting to
help reduce the computational resources for the optimization of protocol parameters when the
key rate calculation for a single setting is computationally expensive [154, 155].
4.2 Analytical aids to numerical security proof
As mentioned previously, it becomes numerically challenging to deal with protocols with high-
dimensional Hilbert spaces. Before we discuss finite-key rate optimization problem, we present
some analytical tools developed so far that ease the numerical challenges by finding smaller-
dimensional effective Hilbert spaces. These methods can then make the key rate optimization
problem more numerically feasible. We note that in principle they may also be applicable for the
finite-key rate calculation problems.
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In this section, we start with the idea of squashing model for detectors [86, 90–92, 156]
which relates a measurement on optical modes to a target measurement on a low-dimensional
space. As will be explained below, these two measurements are equivalent in the sense that
they produce the same statistics for any input states. The initial squashing model [90–92, 156]
typically maps to a qubit space or a direct sum of a qubit space and the vacuum space (although
it is not restricted to be so). However, this method is not universal for any DVQKD since it is
proven by Beaudry et al. [90] that the six-state protocol does not admit an exact qubit-based
squashing model. Another variant of the squashing model to overcome this drawback is the flag-
state squasher [86] that is general for any DVQKD. For CV protocols, it is currently an open
question whether this idea of squashing model can be extended to CV systems. One method
to deal with infinite-dimensional systems is the dimension reduction method developed in [85],
which connects the target infinite-dimensional problem with a solvable finite-dimensional problem
via some small correction term that is typically obtained by a continuity bound of the relevant
entropic quantity. We briefly review some key ideas of these methods and more details can be
found in the corresponding references. Finally, for a general semidefinite program (SDP) problem,
one can apply some preprocessing procedure such as facial reduction to reduce the problem size.
We briefly summarize the idea of facial reduction in the context of the QKD key rate calculation
at the end of this section.
4.2.1 Qubit-based squashing model
While early security proofs of QKD protocols like BB84 were based on qubit systems, optical
implementations of these protocols typically use weak coherent pulses, states of which have a
natural representation in the infinite-dimensional Fock space. The idea of squashing model was
motivated to establish a connection between optical implementations and qubit-based security
proofs, thereby enjoying the ease of implementation as well as simplicity in the security proof.
The idea of squashing model was first mentioned by GLLP [136] to prove the security of BB84
protocol with imperfect devices. This idea was formalized in [90, 91] and subsequently developed
in [92, 156].
The main idea of the qubit-based squashing model can be explained with Figure 4.2. In a QKD
protocol, the measurement device labeled as B in this figure is described by a POVM FB that
acts on optical modes. This measurement is called the basic measurement in previous literature
[90, 92]. Since optical modes have a natural infinite-dimensional representation, one can represent
elements of FB by positive operators in the infinite-dimensional Hilbert space. The measurement
outcomes from the basic measurement can undergo a classical post-processing procedure. The
overall effective measurement process is called the full measurement and is associated with the
POVM FM . On the other hand, security proofs based on qubit systems assume that the detectors
are described by a POVM FQ = {F (i)Q : i ∈ Σ} for some alphabet Σ, which we call a target
measurement for the squashing model. The target measurement is usually on a low-dimensional
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Hilbert space such as a qubit space or a three-dimensional space consisting of a qubit and the
vacuum in many applications (although not necessarily a qubit). A requirement for the squashing
model is that for any input state ρin to the measurement devices, Figure 4.2a and Figure 4.2b are
equivalent in the sense that the output statistics are identical. This requirement also implicitly
demands that the full measurement and the target measurement to have the same number of
outcomes, which can be guaranteed by choosing a suitable classical postprocessing procedure.
(a) Full measurement
(b) Target measurement
Figure 4.2: Illustration of the qubit-based squashing model [90]. (a) A schematic description
of the full measurement with its POVM FM . The full measurement consists of a POVM FB
that describes the measurement device followed by a postprocessing procedure. (b) A schematic
description of the target measurement with its POVM FQ. A squashing map is first applied to
an input state before the target measurement. This squashing map will be given to Eve in the
security analysis.
Before one can apply the qubit-based squashing model, one needs to show the existence of
a squashing map Λsquash. Formally, a squashing map is a quantum channel such that Λsquash













∀ρ ∈ D(H), ∀i ∈ Σ. (4.40)
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This requirement can be translated to the requirement on the adjoint map Λ†squash, which is a CP







Q ) ∀i ∈ Σ . (4.41)
In order for the squashing model to be useful in the QKD security proofs, it is also natural to
demand that the squashing map is not entanglement-breaking. The existence of this type of
squashing map also depends on the postprocessing procedure. Once the existence of a squashing
map is verified, we can give the squashing map to Eve since it only enhances Eve’s power. Then
our security analysis can assume that Eve gives the squashed state to Bob. Our analysis proceeds
with the target measurement.
The verification of existence of a squashing map can be formulated as a convex optimization
problem with linear constraints and semidefinite constraints with the help of Choi representation
of the channel. More details can be found in [90, 92].
4.2.2 Flag-state squasher
The flag-state squasher is based on the observation that in many DVQKD protocols, Bob’s
measurement POVM elements are block-diagonal with respect to the subspaces associated with
total photon numbers across all modes. Because of the block-diagonal structures of Bob’s POVM,
we can assume without loss of generality that Eve performs a quantum non-demolition (QND)
measurement of the total photon number after her interaction with the signals and before their
arrivals at Bob’s side. Thus, the state of ρAB can be assumed to have the same block-diagonal







The weight of each subspace carrying a total number of n photons is given by the corresponding
probability pn, and the corresponding normalized conditional state is denoted by ρ
(n)
AB. By choosing















where pn≤k is the probability that no more than k photons arrive at Bob. In general, one can find
a flag-state squasher if the measurement POVM has a finite number of outcomes and all POVM
elements are block-diagonal in some basis. The following theorem [86, Theorem 1] finds a target
measurement such that a squashing map always exists.
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Theorem 4.2.1 (Flag-state squasher, [86, Theorem 1]). Suppose that we have a POVM with
elements My, where y ∈ {1, . . . , J}, such that each element can be written in a block-diagonal
form MBy,n≤k
⊕
MBy,n>k, with an associated Hilbert space structure given by Hn≤k
⊕
Hn>k. Then




HJ where dim(HJ) = J , such







M̃y = My,n≤k ⊕ |y〉〈y| , (4.44)
where the states {|y〉} form an orthonormal basis of HJ .
The idea of the theorem is illustrated in Figure 4.3. To use this theorem in a security proof,
Figure 4.3: Illustration of the flag-state squasher [86]. The squashing map Λsquash leaves the
states in the subspace Hn≤k untouched while measuring states in the subspace Hn>k and out-
putting classical states that flag the measurement outcomes.
one also needs to bound the weight in the subspace Hn>k since the squashing map maps any
input state in this subspace to a classical state that gives Eve complete information about the
measurement outcomes. This means no keys can be distilled from this subspace. If the state
mostly lives in the orthogonal subspace Hn≤k, then it remains possible to generate positive
keys. Otherwise, we expect the secure key rate to be zero as the squashing model would be an
entanglement-breaking channel in that case.
4.2.3 Dimension reduction method
As mentioned previously, squashing models are not known for CVQKD protocols. The dimension
reduction method looks at the infinite-dimensional key rate problem at a different perspective and
connects it with a finite-dimensional problem. Thus, it can be used for some CVQKD protocols.
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While the framework in [85] is more general than it is needed for QKD, for the purpose of QKD
security proofs, we restrict our discussion to the application of the framework to QKD. The











f (Πρ̃∞Π)−∆ (W ) ≤ f (ρ̃∞)






Figure 4.4: Illustration of the dimension reduction method [85]. Pictorial representation of
Theorem 4.2.4. ρ̃∞ and ρ̃N represent the optimal solutions to the infinite- and finite-dimensional
optimization problem, respectively. The set SN is chosen to contain the projection Πρ̃
∞Π, which
is used to relate f(ρ̃∞) and f(ρ̃N ).
Let H∞ be a separable Hilbert space, which may be infinite-dimensional. Let S∞ be the
feasible set of a QKD key rate problem, which is a convex subset of D(H∞). Since our problem
is linked to a physical scenario and we are typically interested in parameter regimes where the
feasible set is nonempty, we assume without loss of generality that the set S∞ is nonempty.
Otherwise, we simply set the key rate to be zero if the problem is infeasible. The presumably




where f is the our convex objective function for QKD key rate calculation. Because f is continuous
and S∞ is typically chosen to be compact, there exists a feasible operator ρ̃
∞ that achieves the
minimum.
Let HN be a finite-dimensional subspace of H∞ that one chooses to use in a security proof.
Let Π be the projector onto this subspace and define Π̄ = 1−Π. One then chooses SN wisely
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such that it is a nonempty convex subset of D≤(HN ) with the requirement that
ΠS∞Π ⊆ SN , (4.46)
where ΠS∞Π := {ΠσΠ : σ ∈ S∞}. We note that it is always possible to choose such a set SN




Moreover, it is assumed that there exists a feasible operator ρ̃N that reaches this optimum. This
assumption holds whenever we choose SN to be compact.
One key ingredient of this theorem is an entropy continuity bound as stated in the following
lemma, which is a generalized version of [157, Lemma 2] to subnormalized states. Its proof follows
essentially the proof of [157, Lemma 2] by considering subnormalized states. See [85, Appendix
A] for a complete proof.
Lemma 4.2.2 ([85, Lemma 1]). Let HA and HB be two Hilbert spaces, where dim(HA) = |A| <
∞ while HB can be infinite-dimensional. Let ρ̃AB, σ̃AB ∈ D≤(HA ⊗HB) be two subnormalized,
classical-quantum states with Tr(ρ̃AB) ≥ Tr(σ̃AB). If 12‖ρ̃AB − σ̃AB‖1 ≤ ε, then




where h(x) is the binary entropy function.
Another useful result is to bound the trace distance between a state ρ and its projected
state under Π. This is given in [89, Lemma A.2.8]. This lemma can be easily generalized to
infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces by the same arguments.







Combining these two results, we give a slightly improved version of [85, Theorem 2] combined
with [85, Theorem 1].
Theorem 4.2.4. Let ρ̃N be an optimal solution to the finite-dimensional problem in Eq. (4.47)
and ρ̃∞ be an optimal solution to the possibly infinite-dimensional problem in Eq. (4.45). Let W









then for the QKD problem with its objective function f , it is the case that













and |Z| is the size of alphabet for the key.
Proof. Since ΠS∞Π ⊆ SN , it follows that Πρ̃∞Π ∈ SN . Thus,
f(ρ̃N ) ≤ f(Πρ̃∞Π) (4.53)
as ρ̃N achieves the minimum of the finite-dimensional optimization. Because Tr(ρ̃∞) = 1 and
















Because the trace distance is non-increasing under a CPTP map, after applying the postprocessing









Let τZ[E] := ΦPP(ρ̃
∞) and τΠZ[E] := ΦPP(Πρ̃









Lemma 4.2.2 with ε =
√
W , it is the case that
f(Πρ̃∞Π)− f(ρ̃∞) = H(Z|[E])τZ[E] −H(Z|[E])τΠZ[E] ≤ ∆(W ) (4.56)
with ∆(W ) given in Eq. (4.52). Combining Eq. (4.55) with Eq. (4.53), we have Eq. (4.51).
The remaining task is to choose an appropriate set SN before we solve Eq. (4.47). Since the
requirement is that for any σ ∈ S∞, the state σ̃Π := ΠσΠ must be in the set SN , we loosen each
constraint in S∞ under the projection of Π to guarantee that ΠS∞Π ⊆ SN . We note that S∞ for
QKD problems can be written in terms of linear equality and inequality constraints in addition
to semidefinite ordering constraints as explained in Section 4.1.1.
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Determining of those bounds is tractable in practical scenarios. For example, Ref. [158] derives
tight bounds for noncommuting, nonpositive and unbounded observables Γi’s. In the following
discussion, we restrict to an interesting special case where Γi ≥ 0 with [Π,Γi] = 0 for every
constraint. This restriction is not too limiting since by a clever choice of the projection Π, this
condition holds for many protocols where the linear constraints are from POVM. For example,
one may satisfy this requirement for DVQKD protocols by choosing Π to be the projection onto
the subspace where the total number of photons is less than a cutoff value. Such a projection
commutes with all measurements from threshold detectors. An example of a CVQKD protocol
can be found in Section 6.10, which is one of the examples in [85].





Tr(ρΓi) = γi, then
γi −W‖Γi‖∞ ≤ Tr(ΠρΠΓi) ≤ γi. (4.58)






























































≥ γi −W‖Γi‖∞ .
(4.61)
We note that this lower bound is trivial for unbounded observables. By applying this theorem
or directly by the definition of W in Eq. (4.50), it is easy to see the trace constraint Tr(σ) = 1 in

















W for the reduced density operator constraint in Eq. (4.4). In summary,




subject to γi −W‖Γi‖∞ ≤ Tr(ρ̃ΠΓiΠ) ≤ γi
‖TrB(ρ̃)− ρA‖1 ≤ 2
√
W
1−W ≤ Tr(ρ̃) ≤ 1
ρ̃ ≥ 0 .
(4.62)
By the construction, we satisfy the requirement in Eq. (4.46). Thus, we can solve this optimization
and apply Theorem 4.2.4 to obtain key rates of an infinite-dimensional protocol. We remark that
the determination of W in Eq. (4.50) may require some additional work. Reference [85] provides
two concrete examples where W can be determined analytically. We discuss one of the examples
in Section 6.10. We also note that when the POVM elements for the key map have some additional
structure like block-diagonal structures, one can tighten up the correction terms and even make
the correction term ∆(W ) to be zero. We direct readers to [85] for more discussions.
4.2.4 Facial reduction
We provide only a brief high-level description about facial reduction, which is a general technique
to preprocess an optimization problem. In our context, facial reduction is a process of identifying
the minimal face (see Definition 2.4.6) of the positive semidefinite cone Pos(H) containing the
affine subspace (defined by linear constraints) {ρ : Tr(Γiρ) = γi ∀i}. The general idea is to
regularize the problem in Eq. (4.25) by removing redundant constraints and redundant unknown
variables that always take a fixed value (in particular zero) in the entire feasible set. For example,
if the reduced density operator ρA is singular (i.e., it has the zero eigenvalue), then we know that
any feasible ρ must have the zero eigenvalue. Effectively, we can solve a smaller problem by
restricting to the eigenspaces with nonzero eigenvalues. Similarly, while our construction of the
postprocessing map G is physically motivated, this canonical representation typically unavoidably
introduces zero eigenvalue to the resulting state G(ρ) even if we start with a positive definite ρ.
It then creates a numerical challenge for defining the gradient of the objective function since the
gradient is ill-defined for singular matrices. While the two-step procedure based on the Frank-
Wolfe method chooses to introduce perturbation to avoid this issue, it may lead to numerical
instability. By finding a mathematically equivalent way of defining G, we can avoid introducing
zeros. Facial reduction provides us such a mathematical tool to transform a physically motivated
construction of the postprocessing map G to an equivalent optimization-friendly representation
of the map. Through a sequence of facial reduction steps, the regularized problem for QKD key
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rate problem turns out to also be in the form of Eq. (4.25) but with fewer constraints and a
smaller space where ρ lives. Since the running time of an optimization algorithm typically scales
with the size of problem, it is always beneficial to apply such a preprocessing procedure to reduce
the problem size. We direct readers to [87] for technical details about the application of facial
reduction to our QKD key rate calculation problem.
4.3 Finite key rate optimization via a canonical approach
In this section, we discuss a finite key rate calculation method based on Ref. [84]. This method
uses the framework developed in [89, 117, 126] and extends the asymptotic numerical method
[144] to the finite-key scenario. In particular, our discussion focuses on the collective attacks since
main ideas of the method remain the same when it is applied to general attacks via either the
quantum de Finetti theorem (Section 3.5) or the postselection technique (Section 3.6).
4.3.1 Collective attacks
In the finite-key rate calculation problem, there are two types of constraints: constraints that are
not subject to statistical fluctuations and ones that are. We refer to the set of constraints that are
not subject to statistical fluctuations as certainty constraints and denoted by {Γi : i ∈ Λ}.We refer
to the set of constraints that are subject to statistical fluctuations as uncertainty constraints and
denoted by {Γ̃j : j ∈ Σ}. Certainty constraints are usually from the source-replacement scheme
(see Section 2.5.2) since there is an additional promise that the reduced density operator is
unchanged. Under the assumption of collective attacks, one can directly require all states in the
feasible set to satisfy the reduced density operator constraint [Eq. (4.4)] exactly. We define a




Tr(ρΓi) |i〉〈i| . (4.63)
We use ΦM to refer to a similar CPTP map when the uncertainty constraints are used. The
feasible set in the case of collective attacks is given in Eq. (3.25) which is defined in terms of the
set in Eq. (3.23). Since there are constraints in the form of trace norm, it is useful to note that
the trace norm of a Hermitian matrix A admits the following SDP:
minimize Tr(Q) + Tr(R)





This SDP satisfies the strong duality [94]. This property is useful to show the tightness of the
method in the sense that if an algorithm can solve the finite-key rate convex optimization problem
precisely, the lower bound from the algorithm is precisely the primal optimal value. Our algorithm
for the finite-key analysis is similar to the algorithm for the asymptotic key rate in Algorithm 4.1
with some modifications.
Unique acceptance
To illustrate main ideas, we start with a simple scenario where the set of acceptable frequency
distribution contains only a single point, that is, Q = {f} for some f ∈ P(X ). We use F to
denote the diagonal matrix version of f . In this case, the feasible set is
SUAPE = {ρ ∈ D(HA⊗HB) : ‖ΦM(ρ)− F‖1 ≤ µ,Φ0(ρ) = γ}. (4.65)
We use Eq. (4.64) to rewrite the trace norm constraint. At each iteration of the first step, we
solve a linear SDP which follows from a linearization of the objective function at a point ρ with
the feasible set SUAPE :
minimize 〈∇f(ρ), σ〉
subject to: Φ0(σ) = γ,
Tr(G) + Tr(H) ≤ µ,
G ≥ ΦM(σ)− F,
H ≥ −[ΦM(σ)− F ],
σ, G, H ≥ 0.
(4.66)
The dual of this problem (see Definition 2.4.13) after some straightforward simplification is








− a1 ≤ z ≤ a1
a ≥ 0, y ∈ R|Λ|, z ∈ R|Σ|.
(4.67)
This dual problem which replaces Eq. (4.27) is solved in the second step of the algorithm for
finite-key analysis.
Acceptance set Q with a single coarse-graining
Next, we consider the case with a more general acceptance set Q, that is, Q = {F ∈ P(Σ) :∥∥N (F )−N (F )
∥∥
1
≤ t} according to Eq. (3.21), where F ∈ P(Σ) is a preferred frequency distri-
bution and N is a classical-to-classical channel for coarse-graining. The measurement channel
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ΦM may use a coarse-grained POVM with a smaller alphabet Σ
′ instead of the fine-grained al-
phabet Σ [see Eq. (3.20)]. It means that there is an additional classical-to-classical channel N
that models the coarse-graining from the alphabet Σ to the new alphabet Σ′. The feasible set
SPE in this scenario is
SPE = {ρ ∈ D(HA⊗HB) : ‖ΦM(ρ)−N (F )‖1 ≤ µ,Φ0(ρ) = γ,
∥∥N (F )−N (F )
∥∥
1
≤ t, F ∈ P(Σ)}.
(4.68)
We note that F is a free variable subject to some constraints. Since there are two trace norm
constraints, we apply Eq. (4.64) to each of the constraints. Then at each iteration of the first
step, we solve the following linear SDP problem:
minimize 〈∇f(ρ), σ〉
subject to: Φ0(σ) = γ,
Tr(G) + Tr(H) ≤ µ,
G ≥ ΦM(σ)− F,










G ≥ F − F,
H ≥ −(F − F ),
Tr(F ) = 1,
G,H,G,H, F ≥ 0
σ ≥ 0.
(4.69)
The dual of this problem is
maximize
y,a,ā,b,z,z̄










(z̄)−N †(z) ≤ b1
− a1 ≤ z ≤ a1
− a1 ≤ z̄ ≤ a1
a, ā ≥ 0
y ∈ R|Λ|, z, z̄ ∈ R|Σ′|,
(4.70)
where we abuse the notation N to denote the version of the map that outputs vectors instead of
diagonal matrices, and f̄ is the vector version of F .
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Acceptance set Q with multiple coarse-grainings
We now consider the general case where we allow multiple coarse-grainings. The feasible set is
defined in Eq. (3.25):
SPE = {ρ ∈ D(HA ⊗HB) :‖ΦMk(ρ)−Nk(Fk)‖1 ≤ µk,Φ0(ρ) = γ,∥∥Nk(Fk)−Nk(F )
∥∥
1
≤ tk, Fk ∈ P(Σ) ∀k}.
For each trace norm constraint labeled by k, we introduce two slack variables Gk and Hk (or
Gk and Hk). In each iteration of the first step of the algorithm, we solve
minimize 〈∇f(ρ), σ〉
subject to: Φ0(σ) = γ,
Tr(Gk) + Tr(Hk) ≤ µk,
Gk ≥ ΦM (σ)− Fk,










Gk ≥ F k − Fk,
Hk ≥ −[F k − Fk],
Tr(Fk) = 1,
Gk, Hk, Gk, Hk, Fk ≥ 0 ∀k,
σ ≥ 0.
(4.71)
The dual of this problem is
maximize
y,a,ā,b,zk,z̄k
γ · y +
∑
k
















k(zk) ≤ bk1 ∀k
− ak1 ≤ zk ≤ ak1 ∀k
− ak1 ≤ z̄k ≤ ak1 ∀k
a, ā ≥ 0




where each vector x consists of entries xk for x = a, ā,µ, t, b and we abuse the notation Nk to
denote the version of the map that outputs vectors instead of diagonal matrices.
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4.3.2 Coherent attacks
We can easily adapt this numerical method to handle coherent attacks using either the finite
quantum de Finetti theorem [89] (see Section 3.5) or the postselection technique [112, 120] (see
Section 3.6).
In the case of using the finite quantum de Finetti theorem, for entanglement-based protocols,
we only need to calculate each µk according to Eq. (3.38) instead of Eq. (3.22). The numerical
algorithm for the optimization part of the finite-key rate calculation stays the same. After the
algorithm, we then use the key length formula in Eq. (3.37) instead of Eq. (3.30). For prepare-
and-measure protocols, we need to remove the certainty constraints about the reduced density
matrix ρA and treat the reduced density matrix constraint in terms of trace norm constraint as
suggested in Eq. (3.43).
If we use the postselection technique for entanglement-based protocols, we first calculate the
security parameters ε’s for collective attacks from the desired security parameters for coherent
attacks. Then, we can directly use our finite-key solver to calculate the key rate. For the prepare-
and-measure protocols, see the discussion in Section 3.6 for the complication that is different from
entanglement-based protocols.
4.4 Finite key rate optimization via the entropy accumulation
theorem
As mentioned in Section 3.7, we can apply the EAT to prove the security against general attacks.
To do so, we need to guarantee the Markov chain condition [see Eq. (3.55)] as well as providing a
valid min-tradeoff function (see Definition 3.7.2). In this section, we present numerical methods
to find min-tradeoff functions.
We require any min-tradeoff function to be an affine function in order to apply EAT. Any




f(x)q(x) + a (4.73)
where a ∈ R,f ∈ R|X |. Moreover, we can without loss of generality consider only linear functions
since
∑
x∈X q(x) = 1 and one can absorb the constant a into coefficients f(x). Thus, a min-
tradeoff function f is fully specified by a vector f . It leads to
f(q) = f · q. (4.74)
Moreover, Min(f) = minx∈X (f(x)) =: min(f) and Max(f) = maxx∈X (f(x)) =: max(f).
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4.4.1 Algorithm for the min-tradeoff function: first attempt
Our first algorithm is similar to the algorithm used in the asymptotic key rate problem. Recall













feasible set S(q) := {ρ ≥ 0 : Tr(Γiρ) = q(i) ∀i}. Then any real-valued affine function f such that
f(q) ≤ g(q), ∀q ∈ P(X ) is a valid min-tradeoff function. Note that the optimization in Eq. (4.75)
admits an exactly same formula for the asymptotic key rate computation whose evaluation can
be divided into two steps [144]. First, one finds a near optimal solution for Eq. (4.75) via a
certain convex optimization algorithm (e.g. Frank-Wolfe algorithm). Then one builds an SDP
by considering the linearization of W (·) at the feasible point we get. Finally the dual SDP will
lead to a reliable lower bound for Eq. (4.75). A key observation here is that the dual SDP in
the second step gives not only the lower bound for the asymptotic key rate but also a valid
min-tradeoff function.
As the algorithm involves the gradient ∇W , we need to work with a slightly perturbed version
of the objective function to make the gradient always well-defined. For simplicity of writing, we
denote the corresponding perturbed maps Kεzp := Dε ◦ Kzp and Kεp(·) := Dε ◦ Kp where Dε is the

















and the corresponding optimal value gε(q) = minρ∈S(q)Wε(ρ). Then the gradient ∇Wε(ρ) always
















By Lemma 4.1.6, W (ρ)− ηε ≤ Wε(ρ) ≤ W (ρ) + ηε with ηε = (|Z|+ 1)|P |ε(d− 1) log2 dε(d−1) .
Taking minimization over ρ ∈ S(q), we have g(q)− ηε ≤ gε(q) ≤ g(q) + ηε. Equivalently,
|g(q)− gε(q)| ≤ ηε. (4.78)
This indicates that the optimal value of Eq. (4.75) is continuous around ε = 0 when we consider
the perturbed objective function.
The explicit algorithm for finding a min-tradeoff function is given below in Algorithm 4.2.
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Algorithm 4.2 Algorithm for constructing the min-tradeoff function
Inputs:
q0 A given probability distribution in P(X )
Wε Objective function with a perturbation error ε ∈ (0, 1/(e(d− 1))]
Γi Observables
Output:
y? A vector in R|X | which defines a min-tradeoff function by fε(q) := 〈q,y?〉 − ηε.
Algorithm:
1. Consider the convex optimization gε(q0) = minρ∈S(q0)Wε(ρ) with the true optimal
solution ρ?ε,opt. Solve the optimization (e.g. by Frank-Wolfe algorithm) and obtain a near
optimal solution ρ?ε .
2. Let Wε,lin(ρ) := Wε(ρ
?
ε ) + Tr[∇Wε(ρ?ε ) · (ρ− ρ?ε )] be the linearization of Wε(·) at the point
ρ?ε . This can be equivalently written as






∇Wε(ρ?ε ) · ρ?ε
])
1+∇Wε(ρ?ε ). (4.79)
Since Wε(ρ) is a convex function in ρ, we know that Wε,lin(ρ) ≤Wε(ρ), ∀ρ, and
Wε,lin(ρ
?
ε ) = Wε(ρ
?
ε ).
3. Consider the SDP minρ∈S(q?)Wε,lin(ρ) whose dual SDP is given by
max 〈q?,y〉 such that
∑
i∈X
y(i)Γi ≤Mε, y ∈ R|X |. (4.80)
Solve the dual program and obtain the optimal solution y?.
4. Construct the min-tradeoff function by fε(q) := 〈q,y?〉 − ηε.
Remark 4.4.1 (Slater’s condition for Eq. (4.80)). Since S(q0) corresponds to a set of valid
density matrices, without loss of generality we may take Γ1 = 1 and γ1 = 1. Let λmin be the
smallest eigenvalue of Mε. Then it follows that (λmin − 1)Γ1 < Mε. So y = (λmin − 1, 0, · · · , 0)T
is a strictly feasible solution for Eq. (4.80). With Slater’s condition satisfied, the strong duality
holds for Eq. (4.80) as long as S(q0) is nonempty.
6Here we use the fact that ρ is a normalized density matrix. Sifting is handled by assigning a ⊥ symbol to the
discarded rounds.
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Remark 4.4.2. Note that our construction of min-tradeoff function is not unique and it depends
on the input q0 ∈ P(X ). Thus, a smart choice of q0 is required to get a relatively tight key rate
in the end. For this we can numerically test a bunch of q0 and pick the best one, or we can try to
optimize over q0 to get the best key rate possible if the dimension of q0 is not too large (similar
to [43, Eq. (32)]).
4.4.2 Algorithm for the min-tradeoff function: second attempt
We notice that the objective function in Algorithm 4.2 is essentially the leading-order term in
the key rate. It does not take into account the second-order correction terms in the construction
of the min-tradeoff function. We optimize the choice of min-tradeoff functions by heuristically
picking different starting points. As such, while it can reproduce asymptotic key rate, it may
behave poorly in the small block-size regime. Therefore, it motivates us to include second-order
correction terms related to f in the objective function when we search for optimal min-tradeoff
functions. In particular, we focus on the version of EAT in Theorem 3.7.4. For a min-tradeoff
function f , we collect all terms that depend on f after dividing the number of rounds N from
both sides of Eq. (3.63). This leads to a function of min-tradeoff functions:
L(f, α) := min
q∈Q
f(q)− (α− 1) ln 2
2
√
Var(f) + 2− (α− 1)2Kα, (4.81)
where V is defined in Eq. (3.64) and Kα is defined in Eq. (3.66) with α ∈ (1, 2).
One difficulty in optimizing this function L(f, α) is that the parameter α needs to be optimized
in addition to optimizing the choice of f and all frequency distributions q ∈ Q. For simplicity, we
consider the process to optimize them independently. We first optimize the choice of min-tradeoff
function f with the specific choice of α that leads to Eq. (3.67) and a fixed frequency distribution
q ∈ Q (typically the preferred frequency distribution that defines the set Q). For the min-tradeoff
function found in the previous optimization, we then optimize α and optimize q ∈ Q. We note
that this way of optimization is not necessarily optimal and we leave it for future work to optimize
all of the parameter α, the frequency distribution q ∈ Q and the choice of min-tradeoff function f
simultaneously. From Eq. (3.67), after collecting all terms that involve the min-tradeoff function







2 + Var(f)− 1
N
c′, (4.82)
where c′ is defined in Eq. (3.69). For a general min-tradeoff function f , Var(f) can be upper





We note that the dependence of c′ on the min-tradeoff function f is more complicated. However,
its contribution to the key rate is much smaller than the first two terms of Eq. (4.82) due to the
1/N dependence. Therefore, for simplicity of our method, we focus on an objective function that
maximize the first two terms in Eq. (4.82). We verify that in practice, the term c′/N is much
smaller than other terms; that is, c′ does not have a dependence on N that would be greater than√
N .
As we see previously in Eq. (4.74), a min-tradeoff function f is fully specified by a vector f
as f(q) = f · q. Moreover, Min(f) = min(f) and Max(f) = max(f). Moreover, in order for f to
be a valid min-tradeoff function, it also needs to satisfy the constraint that
∑
x f(x) Tr(ρMx) ≤
W (ρ) ∀ρ ∈ D(H).
In principle, we would like to consider the following optimization:
maximize
f






f(x) Tr(ρMx) ≤W (ρ) ∀ρ ∈ D(H),
(4.84)













, corresponds to the optimization of Eq. (4.82) after
dropping the term c′/N .
The reason that we introduce two constants c0 and c1 is to make our algorithm general enough
to allow the construction of crossover min-tradeoff function as well as the normal min-tradeoff
function in the statements of EAT. If our algorithm is used to find a crossover min-tradeoff
function h (see Definition 3.7.5), which can be used to reconstruct a min-tradeoff function f
by Eqs. (3.73) and (3.74), then Var(f) is upper bounded by 1γ [Max(h) − Min(h)]
2 according to
Eq. (3.78). Moreover, h(q′) = f(q) for every q ∈ Q where q′ is renormalized after removing
the position corresponding to the ⊥ symbol. Thus, it is the case that the problem for finding
a crossover min-tradeoff function still has the form of Eq. (4.84). For crossover min-tradeoff










The optimization problem in Eq. (4.84) has an infinite number of constraints that we cannot
really handle. However, we can use the Fenchel duality (see Section 2.4.2) to show it is the
dual problem of some primal problem that we can actually solve. Let {Mj} denote the relevant
bipartite POVM of a protocol. Appendix D.1 presents a detailed derivation of the primal-dual
7When EAT is used for QKD security proofs, the parameter ρ[Ω] is replaced by a security parameter εEA for
the EAT subprotocol as explained in Theorem 8.2.1 and Remark 8.2.2.
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subject to Tr(ρ) = 1
− ξj ≤ Tr(ρMj)− q0(j) ≤ ξj∑
j
ξj ≤ 2c0c1
































Algorithm 4.3 Improved algorithm for constructing min-tradeoff function
Inputs:
q0 A given probability distribution in P(X )
c0, c1 Two constants related to EAT correction term
W Quantum conditional entropy function
{Mj} Bipartite POVM
Output:
y? A vector in R|X | which defines a min-tradeoff function by f(q) := 〈q,y?〉.
Algorithm:
1. Use either the Frank-Wolfe method or an interior-point method to solve Eq. (4.85) and
obtain a near optimal solution ρ?.
2. Solve the dual SDP problem of the linearization in Eq. (4.88) with ρ? to obtain y? = f .
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The dual problem of the linearization at a point ρ? ∈ D(H) is
maximize
f






f(j)Mj ≤ ∇W (ρ?) .
(4.87)
We rewrite this problem as an SDP by introducing slack variables u, v, t:
maximize
f ,u,v,t




f(j)Mj ≤ ∇W (ρ?)
v1 ≤ f ≤ u1
(
t− c0 c0c1(u− v)






Asymptotic security analysis of
PM-MDI QKD
A bottleneck for QKD applications, be it as individual link or as part of a network, is the scaling
of the generated secret key rate with the loss in the channel represented by the single-photon
transmissivity η. The best known QKD protocols have a scaling of their key rate in the limit of
infinite channel uses (infinite key limit) as R∞ = O(η), and by now we have bounds on repeaterless
optical channels that show that this is the optimal rate scaling that can be achieved [64, 65]. The
tight bound on the performance of QKD in terms of secret key rate per employed optical mode
is given by R∞ ≤ log2 11−η [65]. In principle, inserting intermediate stations performing some
operations can improve the performance, and quantum repeaters [159] aim at this. The field
of quantum repeater research is very active and made conceptual and practical advances over
the recent years, but as of today, no quantum repeater has been demonstrated yet that would
outperform the direct use of optical channels, and thus breaking the repeaterless bounds.
While proposals have been made for simplest possible devices that allow a demonstration
of quantum repeater action by beating repeaterless bounds using a simple single node layout
[160], the corresponding quantum advantage has not been experimentally demonstrated yet.
In a pleasant surprise to the field, the TF-QKD protocol [62] was recently shown to beat the
repeaterless bound when using suitable test states with the phase-encoding MDIQKD protocols
[161, 162]. This important observation justifiably creates quite an interest in the community. In
the original paper [62] it has been argued that the asymptotic secret key rate scales as
√
η, where
we keep η as the single-photon transmissivity of the total distance, rather than that of a segment.
It is interesting to see that an MDI protocol can achieve that performance without the use of any
quantum memory or similar advanced components. Remarkably, the only difference to previous
MDI QKD protocols that show an η scaling of R∞ is the change from single-photon signals (or
mixture of photon number states) with two-photon interference events at the beamsplitter, to
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coherent states as signal states and single-photon interference events at the beamsplitter.
Before our work, the security analyses [63, 69] of the TF-QKD protocols were done in a frame-
work based on the quantum error correction inspired approach by Shor-Preskill [132], which is
improved by Koashi [133]. The goal of our work is two-fold: we propose a variant of the TF-QKD
protocol that clearly distinguishes between test states, meant to probe potential eavesdropping
activities, and signal states, which are meant to establish secret keys. For this modified protocol
we then execute a security analysis which is expected to be tight as it uses the framework by
Renner [89]. This framework is known to be flexible in terms of error correction and privacy
amplification methods, and is general to be adaptable to any generic QKD protocol.
We analyze the security of the protocol in a setting with infinitely many different test states,
similar to the initial discussion of decoy states in weak coherent pulse BB84 protocols [66]. In
this setting, we can derive an analytical key rate formula for the scenario where Alice and Bob
observe correlations coming from a loss-only scenario. We derive the general framework that
includes also the noisy case, for which we then resort to numerical evaluations to demonstrate
the stability of the proposed protocol. We also briefly review a related follow-up work [93] that
proves the security of a protocol in a setting with a few test states.
This chapter is mostly based on the work [71].
5.1 Protocol description
This protocol uses the setup of MDI protocol and thus the protocol description is similar to
Protocol 2.3.
Protocol 5.1 PM-MDI QKD
1. Key-generation vs. test mode selection.— Alice (Bob) randomly chooses a random bit mA
(mB) according to a priori probability distribution {pA, 1− pA} ({pB, 1− pB}). If
mA = 0, Alice then labels this round as in the key-generation mode. If mA = 1, Alice
labels this round as in the test mode. Similarly for Bob.
2. State preparation.— If the test mode is chosen, Alice (Bob) then randomly chooses a
phase θA (θB) ∈ [0, 2π) and randomly chooses an intensity µA (µB). Then she (he)






) and sends it to the untrusted third
party Charlie through the quantum channel.
If the key-generation mode is chosen, Alice (Bob) randomly generates a bit value kA ( kB)
∈ {0, 1} with a uniform probability distribution. Alice (Bob) chooses the pre-agreed








3. Measurements.— For each round, Charlie performs a joint measurement on the signals
received from Alice and Bob, and then makes an announcement about the measurement
outcome. If Charlie is honest, he is supposed to perform the measurement as shown in
Figure 5.1a and announces one of the following outcomes {“Only detector D+ clicks”,
“Only detector D− clicks”, “No detectors click”, “Both detectors click”}, which, for the
later convenience of notation, we abbreviate as {+,−, ?, d}, respectively. We denote
Charlie’s announcement as γ throughout this chapter.
After steps 1-3 are repeated for many times, and after Charlie has made all the
announcements, Alice and Bob then proceed with the following steps.
4. Sifting.— Alice and Bob use an authenticated classical channel to communicate and sort
all rounds into two disjoint sets, where one set is used for the key generation and the other
is for the parameter estimation. To do so, they disclose the choices of mA and mB for
each round and also use the announcement γ. If mA = mB = 0, that is, they both selected
the key-generation mode for a given round, and Charlie announced γ ∈ {+,−}, they save
their data corresponding to this round for the key generation. All remaining rounds are
used for parameter estimation.
5. Parameter estimation.— To perform parameter estimation, Alice and Bob disclose the
choices of µA, µB, θA, θB (also kA, kB if they have chosen one for that round) for the
rounds in the set labeled for parameter estimation and also use the announcement result γ
for each of these rounds to estimate how Eve has interacted with the signals during their
exchange in the protocol. If, from their analysis, they find out that Eve has learned too
much about the signals and no secret keys can be generated, then they abort the protocol.
Otherwise, they continue.
6. Key map.— Alice forms a raw key using her bit value kA from each of the rounds saved
for the key generation. (In principle, Bob does not need to do anything in this step since
he can correctly determine Alice’s key by the error correction. In practice, depending on
the choice of error correction code, it might be convenient for Bob to flip his bit value
when the announcement is γ = “− ”.)
7. Error correction and privacy amplification.— Alice and Bob then apply the procedures of
error correction and privacy amplification as in a typical QKD protocol to generate a
secret key.
We remark that since this protocol uses an MDI setup, it is inherently immune to all side
channels in the measurement devices once its security is proven. However, Alice’s and Bob’s
sources have to be trusted and protected. In our security analysis, we assume that Alice’s and
Bob’s devices are fully characterized and Eve has no access. This assumption needs to be justified
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in the experimental implementations of the protocol. In particular, we want to remark that the
choices of mA and mB (also kA and kB) should not be leaked to Eve by side channels before
Charlie’s announcement is made. In the implementation of the protocol, Alice and Bob need to
make sure that Eve cannot distinguish the key-generation mode from test mode by any classical
side information leaked from their devices before Charlie’s announcement. Just like other MDI
QKD protocols, this protocol can be vulnerable to side-channel attacks on the sources.
We also comment on the the choices of parameters pA, pB. While values of pA, pB need to be
optimized in the finite-key regime, in the infinite key limit, we can choose pA and pB arbitrarily
close to 1 so that the sifting factor is asymptotically 1, like the efficient BB84 protocol [163].
Finally, we remark on the choices of µA and µB and their corresponding probability distribu-
tions. Since states in the test mode essentially are used to perform a tomography on Eve’s attacks
on the subspace of signal states in the key-generation mode, for the purpose of this chapter, we
initially use coherent states whose complex amplitudes cover the entire complex space. In the
infinite key limit, the probability distribution (with no zeros) does not matter. We then remark
on how a finite number of choices of test states can approximately accomplish the same task and
the choices of µA and µB is closely related to the value of µ.
5.2 Security proof detail
5.2.1 Applying the source-replacement scheme















pxqy |x, y〉AB |ϕx, ϕy〉A′B′ ,
(5.1)
where register A records the choices of states prepared in register A′ and similarly register B
records the choices of states in register B′. We introduce an orthonormal basis {|x〉A} for register
system A corresponding to states {|ϕx〉}, and an orthonormal basis {|y〉B} for register system B
corresponding to states {|ϕy〉}. It is crucial that Eve has no access to registers A and B. Alice
keeps register A and sends system A′ to Charlie, and similarly, Bob keeps B and sends B′. To
learn their choices of states sent to Charlie for each round, Alice performs a local measurement
described by a POVM MA = {|x〉〈x|} on her register A and likewise, Bob applies his POVM
MB = {|y〉〈y|} to his register B.
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Importantly, we only apply the source-replacement scheme for the signal states in the key-
generation mode since the test states in the test mode are only used to put constraints on how Eve
acts in the subspace spanned by signal states. We denote the set of states in the key-generation
mode as S, that is,
S ={|+√µ,+√µ〉 , |−√µ,−√µ〉 , |+√µ,−√µ〉 , |−√µ,+√µ〉}, (5.2)
where each state is a two-mode coherent state coming from both Alice and Bob, and we dropped
the subscript A′B′ for the ease of writing. Since finitely many coherent states are linearly inde-
pendent, we want to point out that S is indeed a basis of span(S).
5.2.2 Description of Eve’s attack
As an MDI QKD protocol, Eve has a full control of both the quantum channels connecting Alice,
Bob and the intermediate node Charlie, and the measurement devices at the intermediate node.
Since measurement devices are neither characterized nor trusted, Eve is assumed to play the role
of Charlie to perform the measurement. Therefore, in the PM-MDI QKD protocol, we can view
the protocol in an alternative and equivalent picture, as shown in Figure 5.1b. In order to make
an announcement strategy, Eve performs some measurement, which can be described by a POVM
F , directly on the states from Alice and Bob in the registers A′ and B′. Moreover, without loss
of generality, we can assume that F only has four elements since only {+,−, ?, d} outcomes are
meaningful for Alice and Bob, and all other outcomes are simply discarded in the protocol. (Even
though Alice and Bob may only keep {+,−} outcomes to distill keys, we are allowed to include
{?, d} outcomes for parameter estimation.) We write this POVM F as F = {F+, F−, F ?, F d},
or abbreviate it as {F γ} for γ ∈ {+,−, ?, d}. The probability of announcing the outcome γ is
Tr(F γσA′B′) for an input state σA′B′ .
From Alice and Bob’s point of view, they can only know the probability of each announce-
ment, not the post-measurement states in Eve’s hand. They can infer what POVM F that Eve
applied from their observed correlations. However, Eve can perform a nondestructive measure-
ment and keep her post-measurement states for further analysis. That is, Eve applies a CPTP
map EA′B′→EC on the input quantum states in registers A′ and B′. Her announcement about the
measurement outcome is stored in the classical register C and she keeps the post-measurement
state in register E. Here, we introduce an orthonormal basis {|γ〉} for register C, each of which





Eγ(X)⊗ |γ〉〈γ|C , (5.3)
where each Eγ is a completely positive trace non-increasing map and X is an arbitrary linear
operator on the systems A′B′.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.1: (a). Schematic setup of the PM-MDI QKD protocol. Alice and Bob send coher-
ent states to the untrusted third party Charlie in the middle, who performs measurements and
broadcasts outcomes. BS: 50-50 beamsplitter. D+, D−: single-photon detectors. (b). Equivalent
view of the protocol. Eve is assumed to perform the measurements in the middle. Effectively,
Eve performs a 4-element POVM, denoted as {F+, F−, F ?, F d}, corresponding to four possible
announcements {D+ clicks, D− clicks, no detectors click, both detectors click}, which are abbre-
viated as {+,−, ?, d}.














γ and the summation going over some index set I(γ) that depends on γ.
Without loss of generality we can use maps Eγ(X) with a single Kraus operator Kγ =
√
F γ . The
reason for this is that the general case of Eqs. (5.3) and (5.4) can be represented as a concatenation
of two maps, the first one using the case of Kγ =
√
F γ , followed by a second channel operation




see this we need only to verify two things: (a) the concatenation of both operations gives the
general form, and (b) the Kraus operators K̃γj for each value of γ define a valid CPTP map. The






K̃γj = 1γ , where 1γ is
the identity on the support of F γ and (F γ)−1/2 is the pseudoinverse of
√
F γ with respect to 1γ ,
110


























=(F γ)−1/2F γ(F γ)−1/2
=1γ
(5.5)
Clearly, since the general case can thus be considered a two-step procedure, where the first step
gives rise to the announcement γ and the second step acts only on Eve’s conditional states, it
can only strengthen Eve’s position by not forcing her to do this second step. Without loss of
generality, we can thus assume that Eve’s optimal strategy performs only the first step.
Since we assume the sources are protected, Eve cannot have the access to registers A and B
and cannot modify the states in those registers. Therefore, when Eve directly acts on the state
|Ψ〉ABA′B′ shown in Eq. (5.1) from the source-replacement scheme, the joint state ρABEC shared
by Alice, Bob and Eve along with the classical register C for announcements is as follows:




















∣∣√F γ)E ⊗ |γ〉〈γ|C (5.6)
5.2.3 Key rate evaluation with Devetak-Winter formula
To distill keys from ρABEC , Alice and Bob perform measurements using POVMs MA on the regis-
ter A and MB on the register B, respectively. Upon measurements, Alice stores her measurement
outcomes in a classical register X and Bob stores his in a classical register Y . Alice then applies
a key map that maps her measurement result in register X to a raw key bit in register K. We
want to point out that the key map step is necessary, but the key map can be trivial, as it is in
this PM-MDI QKD protocol. The key map here is an identity map from the register X to the
register Z. Let G denote the effective CPTP map that transforms ρABEC to ρZY EC . In the end,
we generate keys from the state ρZY EC , which has the form
ρZY EC =G(ρABEC) =
∑
z,y,γ
p(γ)p(z, y|γ) |z〉〈z|Z ⊗ |y〉〈y|Y ⊗ ρ
(z,y,γ)




E is Eve’s conditional state conditioned on Alice holding z in the register Z, Bob
having y in the register Y and the central node announcing γ. Here, p(γ) is a marginal probability
of the joint probability distribution p(z, y, γ) and p(z, y|γ) = p(z,y,γ)p(γ) is a conditional probability.
Under collective attacks, we can evaluate the secret key generation rate using Devetak-Winter
formula [145], which is expressed in terms of a single-copy state ρZY EC shared by Alice, Bob and
Eve.
As is typical in the MDI protocols, we can choose to generate keys from each announcement
outcome γ independently as the announcement is available to all parties. We rewrite ρABEC by





p(z, y|γ) |z〉〈z|Z ⊗ |y〉〈y|Y ⊗ ρ
(z,y,γ)
E , (5.8)




ZY E ⊗ |γ〉〈γ|C .
We adapt the Devetak-Winter formula to a general case where the error correction is not
necessarily performed at the Shannon limit. In that case the number of secret bits that we can
distill from the state ργZY E is r(ρ
γ
ZY E), which is defined as
r(ργZY E) = max(1− δ
γ
EC − χ(Z:E)ργZY E , 0), (5.9)
where δγEC is the amount of information leakage per signal during the error correction step for






is the Holevo information, where H(ρ) = −Tr(ρ log2 ρ) is the von Neumann entropy (Defini-
tion 2.2.31). The states ργE and ρ
(z,γ)



















In the Shannon limit, we have H(Z) − δγEC = I(Z :Y )ργZY E and thus we recover the original
Devetak-Winter formula in Eq. (5.9). Another important observation is that δγEC is directly
determined from the experimentally observed correlations.






















F γ |ϕz, ϕy〉√
〈ϕz, ϕy|F γ |ϕz, ϕy〉
. (5.14)
Then, by substituting Eq. (5.13) into Eq. (5.11), we can calculate the conditional states ργE and
ρz,γE , and evaluate χ(Z:E)ργZY E
in Eq. (5.10) to obtain r(ργZY E) in Eq. (5.9).
From the relation between ρABEC and {F γ} shown in Eq. (5.6), we notice that a full knowledge
of {F γ} gives us a full knowledge of ρABEC and thus we can determine the key rate using
Eq. (5.12). However, if we cannot uniquely determine F γ , then we cannot uniquely determine
ρABEC . In that case, we have a set of compatible density operators ρABEC , that is,
S = {ρABEC : TrEC(ρABEC) = ρAB,Tr(ρABEC |x〉〈x|A ⊗ |y〉〈y|B ⊗ 1E ⊗ |γ〉〈γ|C) = p(x, y, γ)}.
(5.15)
Thus, we need to consider the worst-case scenario by taking the minimum of r̃ over the set S, or
equivalently, over the set S′ = {ρZY EC : ρZY EC = G(ρABEC), where ρABEC ∈ S}.
In this situation, the asymptotic key rate R∞ should be expressed as
R∞ = min
ρZY EC∈S′
r̃(ρZY EC) = min
ρABEC∈S
r̃(G(ρABEC)). (5.16)
The essential part of the optimization is to optimize the Holevo information χ(Z:E) by finding
the all possible Eve’s conditional states, which are needed to evaluate Eq. (5.10).
We remark that most of the discussion so far is general to a generic MDI QKD protocol. In
the next subsection, we adapt this procedure to our specific PM-MDI QKD protocol.
5.2.4 Determination of Eve’s POVM for PM-MDI QKD
As discussed in the previous subsections, knowing Eve’s POVM elements allows us to calculate
the key rate, since the minimization in Eq. (5.16) is now over a set containing only one element.
We will now explain how our choice of test states (coherent states with a continuum of complex
amplitudes) allows in principle to determine Eve’s POVM elements.
For simplicity, let us concentrate on the case of testing a measurement device acting on a
single mode (rather than the two-mode case of our protocol). Knowing some POVM element F̃ is
equivalent to being able to predict the probability p(F̃ ) of the associated outcome for any input




. We can now use the phase-space formalism of quantum mechanics
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(see for example [103, 104]) where we use the P -function representation of ρ =
∫
d2α P (α) |α〉〈α|
so that we have
p(F̃ ) =
∫
d2α P (α) 〈α| F̃ |α〉 . (5.17)
As we see from this equation, knowledge of the function p(F̃ |α) := 〈α| F̃ |α〉 allows the prediction
of p(F̃ ) for all input states for which the P -function of the density matrix ρ exists. So testing
the measurement device with all possible coherent states |α〉 and observing the corresponding
probabilities p(F̃ |α) is equivalent to knowing F̃ .
Actually, using results from [103, 104] one can reconstruct the operator F̃ explicitly also in
cases where the P -function of ρ may not exist. Let us go through the arguments directly for the
POVM elements F γ for the outcome γ in the two-mode case. We adapt [104, Eqs. (3.4)-(3.6)] to
our scenario.
By substituting [104, Eqs. (3.4) and (3.6)] into [104, Eq. (3.5)], we obtain a power series for



















where α1, α2 and their complex conjugated counterparts ᾱ1, ᾱ2 are treated as independent vari-
ables, and a1, a1
†, a2, a2
† are the annihilation and creation operators of the two modes. Since
F γ is a POVM element and thus has bounded eigenvalues, such series exist and converge [103].
Using the two-mode test states |α1, α2〉 and the associated observed probabilities p(γ|α1, α2) =
〈α1, α2|F γ |α1, α2〉 thus uniquely determines F γ .
Note that a full description of F γ as shown above is more than what we actually need since
we are only interested in how F γ acts on the subspace span(S), which is only a four-dimensional
space.
For this, we need to be able to calculate off-diagonal elements of the form 〈α1, α2|F γ |β1, β2〉.
It is an interesting question whether we can estimate these elements well enough with just a few
number of coherent states. (The diagonal elements are directly accessible.) We present now the
handle to attack this question.
We first notice that characterizing F γ on span(S) is equivalent to the question whether the
operator |β1, β2〉〈α1, α2| can be approximated to arbitrary precision in the Hilbert-Schmidt norm
by the discrete diagonal coherent state representation [164, 165]:



















and complex numbers λi ∈ C.
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}Ni=1, we will be able to get a good approximation by
terminating the summation at N . From the approximation, we will then determine a set of
POVMs compatible with experimental correlations, which is a neighborhood of the POVM that
Eve actually performed. When we calculate the key rate in this case, we need to perform the
minimization in Eq. (5.16). In that case, we may apply numerical methods [144, 146] to perform
the desired optimization. If such an approximation makes this set of compatible POVMs small
enough, then the key rate with several choices of test states would be close to the key rate with
infinite choices of test states. We leave the detailed analysis of finite choices of test states scenario
to the future work.
In Appendix B, we will discuss how to represent F γ in the four-dimensional subspace span(S)
after knowing 〈α1, α2|F γ |β1, β2〉 for |α1, α2〉 , |β1, β2〉 ∈ S.
5.3 Simulation
We perform simulations to study the loss scaling of this PM-MDI QKD protocol and also the
stability of the protocol.
5.3.1 Loss-only scenario
To show that the key rate of this protocol has a scaling of
√
η with the single photon transmis-
sivity η between Alice and Bob, we first study the loss-only scenario. We simulate the quantum
channel as a lossy channel and we consider the normal situation where Charlie (Eve) performs the
measurements so that the observed statistics during the parameter estimation step is compatible
with Charlie performing the measurement shown in Figure 5.1a. That is, we calculate the POVM
F corresponding to the real setup. Our protocol can verify via test states in the test mode that
this is the actual POVM performed by Eve in the loss-only scenario. For the purpose of our
presentation, we consider a symmetric setup, that is, Charlie is at an equal distance from Alice
and Bob, and the loss in each path is the same. For a total transmissivity η between Alice and
Bob, each path has a transmissivity
√
η.
In this situation, when Alice sends a coherent state |αA〉 and Bob sends a coherent state |αB〉











µ −√µ,−√µ +√µ,−√µ −√µ,+√µ



















P (d|αA, αB) 0 0 0 0
Table 5.1: Conditional probability distribution of announcement outcomes given the states from
S in the loss-only scenario. η is the single photon transmissivity between Alice and Bob and µ is
the intensity of coherent states in the key-generation mode.
Charlie performs the measurement on this state, the probability for each announcement outcome
γ can be calculated as follows:





























Specifically, the conditional probability of each announcement outcome for each state in the
set S is summarized in Table 5.1. From this table, we can directly evaluate the classical mutual
information I(K : Y ) as
I(K : Y )ρ+KYE
= I(K : Y )ρ−KYE
= 1,
I(K : Y )ρ?KYE
= I(K : Y )ρdKY E
= 0.
(5.22)
Clearly, we cannot distill keys from γ = “?” and γ = “d” announcements. So, we will only
evaluate χ(K : E) for γ = “ + ” and γ = “− ”. We first find conditional states ρk,y,+E and ρ
k,y,−
E
defined in Eq. (5.13).
As we can notice from Table 5.1, in the loss-only scenario, whenever Alice and Bob prepare
coherent states with a π phase difference, Charlie will never announce γ = “ + ” and whenever
they prepare coherent states with the same phase, Charlie will never announce γ = “−”. Because
p(0, 1,+) = p(1, 0,+) = 0 and p(0, 0,−) = p(1, 1,−) = 0, each of the states ρk,+E and ρ
k,−
E ∀k ∈
{0, 1} is a pure state so that H(ρk,+E ) = H(ρ
k,−
E ) = 0.
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Therefore, we only need to evaluate H(ρ+E) and H(ρ
−

































〉∣∣∣) and thus H(ρ+E) = h(
1−|〈Θ+0,0|Θ+1,1〉|
2 ). Similarly,







〉∣∣∣) and thus H(ρ−E) = h(
1−|〈Θ−0,1|Θ−1,0〉|






























































2 ). We provide explicit expressions of
F γ for this loss-only scenario in Appendix B.2.1, using which the reader can check the result
directly.
Finally, we obtain the expression of secret key generation rate as a function of η and the
intensity µ in this loss-only scenario as








When we optimize µ, we find optimal µ = O(1). After substituting the optimal µ, we can
easily verify R∞ scales as
√
η.
In Figure 5.2, the blue dashed line is the asymptotic key rate of this loss-only scenario as a
function of the transmission distance L, where we take η = 10−
0.2L
10 and µ is optimized for each
distance L. The red solid line is the fundamental repeaterless bound − log2(1−10−
0.2L
10 ) [65]. This
calculation gives an intuitive understanding on how the PM-MDI QKD can beat the repeaterless
key rate bound. We see that this PM-MDI QKD protocol beats the repeaterless bound at around
150 km. Our key rate expression in Eq. (5.25) is tight for the loss-only scenario. Therefore, we
expect this is the loss limit for PM-MDI QKD.
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5.3.2 Realistic Imperfections
It is of practical interests to study how stable this protocol is in noisy scenarios. In particular,
we simulate the scenario with realistic imperfections in experimental devices, including the dark
counts of detectors, mode mismatch and phase mismatch, detector inefficiency, and error correc-
tion inefficiency. In this section, we briefly introduce sources of imperfections and corresponding
simulation parameters, then explain the correlations that Alice and Bob would observe in our
simulation model, and finally present the results of our key rate calculation. In Appendix B.2.2,
we provide more detailed explanations for the physical model of each imperfection.
For the purpose of presentation, we assume that both detectors have the same detector ef-
ficiency ηd and the same dark count probability pd. We remark that the simulation method
described in Appendix B.2.2 is also applicable to more general situations.
In the ideal implementation of this protocol, Alice and Bob should prepare coherent states in
the same optical mode, that is, with the same spectral, temporal profiles and the same polariza-
tion, in order to have single-photon interference at the beam splitter. In reality, since their states
may come from different lasers and pass through different optical components before reaching
the central node, the modes of their states are not necessarily perfectly matched. Thus, we con-
sider the relative mode mismatch between their states with a simulation parameter V . In our
simulation, if without any mode mismatch, the state arriving at the central node from Alice and










in a second mode. Both modes enter Charlie’s devices
independently.
Another source of imperfection considered in our simulation model is the phase mismatch.
In the key-generation mode, Alice and Bob are supposed to prepare states in the set S, which
are coherent states with the same global phase and with the encoding information in the relative
phases. In reality, the global phase is not guaranteed to be the same when states reach the
detectors. Therefore, we consider the situation where there is a relative phase mismatch between
Alice’s signal state and Bob’s signal state. If without any phase mismatch, the state is supposed





Table 5.2 lists the choice of parameters in our simulation. In particular, We choose the same
values for the efficiency of a detector ηd and the dark count probability of a detector pd as those
used in the Ref. [63] for comparison purpose. We also select pessimistic values for the mode
mismatch and phase mismatch to demonstrate the feasibility of beating the repeaterless bound
with currently available devices.
We give the expressions for the probability of each announcement outcome γ given each choice
of the input state in terms of the simulation parameters V , δ, ηd, and pd. We define the total
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Detector efficiency ηd 14.5%
Detector dark count probability pd 8× 10−8
Mode mismatch (1− V ) 5%
Phase mismatch δ π60
Error correction efficiency fEC 1.15
Table 5.2: Values for simulation parameters. They are experimentally feasible and might be
pessimistic values. See main text for more explanations.
transmissivity as η = ηtη
2
d, where ηt is the channel transmission probability between Alice and
Bob.
〈αA, αB |F+ |αA, αB〉 = (1− pd)(1− ξ1ξ2)ξ2ξ3 + (1− pd)pdξ1ξ22ξ3
〈αA, αB |F− |αA, αB〉 = (1− pd)ξ1ξ2(1− ξ2ξ3) + (1− pd)pdξ1ξ22ξ3
〈αA, αB |F ? |αA, αB〉 = (1− pd)2ξ1ξ22ξ3
〈αA, αB |F d |αA, αB〉 = pd(1− ξ1ξ2)ξ2ξ3 + pdξ1ξ2(1− ξ2ξ3)
+ p2dξ1ξ
2
2ξ3 + (1− ξ1ξ2)(1− ξ2ξ3),
(5.26)























From Eq. (5.26), it is straightforward to derive the conditional probability of each announce-
ment outcome given the state in S. Similarly to the loss-only scenario, we also discover that the
mutual information I(K :Y ) is zero for γ = “?” and γ = “d” since the probability of making those
outcomes is independent from the signal states sent by Alice and Bob. Thus, we only generate
keys from γ = “ + ” and γ = “− ” outcomes.
We define error rates e+ and e− given the announcement outcome γ = “ + ” and γ = “ − ”,
respectively.
e+ := p(0, 1|+) + p(1, 0|+) =
ζ2 − (1− pd)ζ1ζ2
ζ1 + ζ2 − 2(1− pd)ζ1ζ2
e− := p(0, 0|−) + p(1, 1|−) = e+,
(5.28)
where we define ζ1 = e
−√ηµ(1−
√





The rest of the task is to find each of ρk,y,+E and ρ
k,y,−
E . In Appendix B.2.3, we give explicit
expressions for F in this scenario. Using Eqs. (B.3) and (B.21), we can again find the four-
dimensional representation of each of ρk,y,+E and ρ
k,y,−
E . We numerically evaluate the Holevo
information χ(K:E) for γ = “ + ” and γ = “− ” (even though it is still possible but non-trivial
to evaluate χ(K:E) analytically).
Figure 5.2: A log-linear plot for the key rate as a function of the transmission distance. The
red solid line is the fundamental repeaterless secret key capacity bound − log2(1 − 10−
0.2L
10 ) for
a transmission distance L (in kilometers) [65]. The blue dashed line is the loss-only key rate for
PM-MDI QKD after optimizing µ in Eq. (5.25). The orange solid line is the key rate for PM-MDI
QKD with experimentally feasible parameters listed in Table 5.2. The green dash-dotted line is
the key rate for phase-matching QKD [63] with similar parameters.
In Figure 5.2, the orange solid line shows the result of our simulation. With those experi-
mentally feasible parameters, we see this PM-MDI QKD protocol can still beat the repeaterless
bound and this crossover happens at around 250 km.
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5.4 About finite test states
As briefly mentioned in Section 5.2.4, the purpose of using test states is to determine each F γ in
the four-dimensional subspace span(S) by determining 〈α1, α2|F γ |β1, β2〉 for each |α1, α2〉 , |β1, β2〉 ∈
S. While it remains an open question how to choose optimal test states, we discuss some obser-
vations and ideas. One observation is that due to the symmetric setup between Alice and Bob,
it seems enough to consider only a single-mode scenario. Alice and Bob would then use the same









∣∣. These two are related by Hermitian conjugation. Therefore, our














∣∣ and the diagonal approximation with N coherent states at each step,
where N may start with 3 (or 1) and may increase during the execution of the algorithm. (We










∣∣ or start without them.)
The difference may be quantified by Hilbert-Schmidt norm, which is a natural choice that makes
calculation simple. Once the set of test states is determined, we can then apply the numerical
method [144] presented in Section 4.1 to calculate key rates. A main obstacle is the dimension of
the problem is quite large if we do it in a canonical way. Since this protocol is an MDI protocol,
we need to optimize ρABC where C is a register that stores classical announcements made by
Charlie. If N test states are used, then dim(HA) = dim(HB) = 2 + N . Even if Charlie makes
only two announcements: successful or unsuccessful events, the size of ρABC is 2(2 + N)
2. The
constraint that ρAB is fixed gives (2 + N)
4 linear constraints. Thus, this optimization problem
becomes numerically challenging even for small N (say 4 test states). On top of each key rate
calculation, we need to optimize protocol parameters and choices of test states to find regimes
where the protocol can overcome the repeaterless bound. While it might be still possible to do
the calculation, it requires a lot of computational resources to do so. We leave it as a future work
to explore this direction.
Interestingly, we notice that shortly after our work [71], Primaatmaja et. al. [93] investigates
this protocol with finite test states using a different numerical security proof method. This
method is based on characterizing the Gram matrix G for Eve’s quantum side information in the
MDI setup. In particular, this Gram matrix G is positive semidefinite and its entries are related
to the probability of successful measurement outcomes at the middle station as well as bit and
phase error rates. It formulates an SDP problem to find the maximal phase error given observed
statistics. Then it uses the phase error correction framework to find the asymptotic key rate
against collective attacks. In particular, from their simulations, they show that two test states
are sufficient to overcome the PLOB bound in the noiseless scenario; four test states are enough
in a noisy scenario. In summary, they find that the repeaterless bound can be overcome with
only a few test states. Their approach has an advantage in running time since the SDP problem
is a standard linear SDP where our problem is nonlinear SDP. In principle, we can improve upon
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their key rates using our method as our method can typically give tight key rates while the phase
error correction approach usually introduces looseness in finding the phase error rate. Therefore,
an interesting direction is to combine our approach with theirs. We can use their approach to
search for optimal parameters and with the fixed parameters, we then use our method to calculate
key rates.
5.5 Other protocol variants
Many variants of the PM-MDI QKD protocol have been proposed and investigated. Different
names have been assigned to different variations, such as, phase-encoding scheme for MDI [161],
MDI-B92 [162], TF-QKD[62] and PM-MDI QKD [63]. However, they all have the essential
components needed to achieve the rate scaling of R∞ = O(
√
η), namely, they all use coherent
states as signal states and rely on single-photon interference events at the beam splitter of an
untrusted intermediate node, even though not all variations can indeed achieve this scaling.
We first describe the common features of all those protocols and then discuss how each varia-
tion differs in the following two aspects: choices of signal states used for establishing secret keys
and choices of test states used to probe Eve’s attacks.
In an ideal PM-MDI QKD protocol, Alice and Bob will only establish keys from the rounds
where each of them has selected a state from the set {|+α〉 , |−α〉}, where α can be an arbitrary
complex number. In other words, Alice and Bob will only establish keys from the rounds that
satisfies the phase-matching condition, that is, they have chosen the same global phase and same
intensity for their states. We call two coherent states {|+α〉 , |−α〉} with only a π phase difference
as a phase-matching pair. In addition, Alice and Bob may decide to send some states as test states
to probe eavesdropping activities for randomly selected rounds and those rounds will be used in
the parameter estimation step only. Alice and Bob will send their states to an untrusted party
Charlie at the intermediate node for measurements. An honest Charlie will use the single-photon
inference events at the beam splitter for his announcement.
Since this type of protocol is measurement-device independent and generates keys when Alice
and Bob use the same phase-matching pair of coherent states, phase-matching measurement-
device independent QKD is in our view a more descriptive name that captures important features
of this type of protocol. In the literature, many authors prefer to use either TF-QKD following
the proposal [62] or phase-matching QKD [63] as the name.
Now, we compare some variations of PM-MDI QKD. Different variations may use different
number of phase-matching pairs as signal states and may use different types of states as test states,
such as a mixture of photon number states (phase-randomized coherent states), partially phase-
randomized coherent states, and coherent states without phase randomization. Some variations
may use the same number of phase-matching pairs as signal states, but differ in how to handle
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them. We present those variations just for the comparison purpose. We note that the following
list is not an exhaustive list of all variants and we mention only these works that appeared around
the similar time as our work. In the next section, we discuss some recent progresses that appear
after our work.
1. The variant proposed in [161] is called phase encoding scheme I for MDI. This protocol
essentially uses two phase-matching pairs of coherent states. In the original description of
the protocol, these two pairs are labeled as two bases, similar to a BB84-type protocol,
due to the proof technique adopted. In an abstract description, we can view this protocol
as essentially using one phase-matching pair of coherent states as signal states and an
additional pair as test states. Due to the proof technique and a limited number of test
states, the
√
η scaling of the asymptotic key rate R∞ was not found.
2. The variant studied in [162] is called MDI-B92 protocol. Ref. [162] analyzes different
types of measurements for the intermediate node. Under the investigation of unambiguous
state discrimination attacks, it basically proposes a variation of PM-MDI protocol with
exactly one phase-matching pair of coherent states as the signal states and no test states.
Because there are no test states, this protocol is not expected to have the
√
η scaling for
the asymptotic key rate R∞.
3. The variant proposed in [62] has the name of TF-QKD protocol. This protocol uses infinitely
many phase-matching pairs of coherent states (phase-randomized coherent states) as signal
states. In addition, for the purpose of security analysis, each round is assigned to one of
two bases to mimic a BB84-type protocol. Instead of achieving the perfect phase-matching
conditions, this protocol allows some small errors in identifying whether Alice and Bob have
chosen the same phase-matching pair. To distill keys, Alice and Bob disclose some partial
information about the global phases. If their global phases only differ by a small amount,
they assume they have used the same phase-matching pair. In this protocol, states used as
test states are effectively the same as states used for signal states at a cost of introducing a
sifting loss. These test states are partially phase-randomized coherent states as Eve knows
some partial information about the global phase. Ref. [62] argued that this type of protocol
can have the
√
η scaling for the asymptotic key rate R∞.
4. The variant investigated in [63] uses the name PM-QKD protocol. Similar to TF-QKD
[62], it also uses infinitely many phase-matching pairs of coherent states as signal states
and adopts a similar procedure as [62] in identifying whether Alice and Bob have chosen
the same phase-matching pair for each round. It also uses partially phase-randomized
coherent states as test states. The difference from TF-QKD is that there is no assignment
of basis choice for each round. The security analysis does not use the standard decoy state
methods. It confirms with the
√
η scaling for the asymptotic key rate R∞.
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5. The variant studied in [69] is called TF-QKD∗ protocol. This protocol, similar to the
original TF-QKD protocol, uses infinitely many phase-matching pairs as signal states and
later post-selects on rounds where the global phases are different by less than a small
amount. Effectively, by allowing some errors, Alice and Bob assume that they have chosen
the same phase-matching pair when the difference in their global phases is small. This
protocol also has an assignment of basis choice for each round in order to apply a BB84-
type security argument. Different from the original TF-QKD protocol, this protocol uses a
mixture of photon number states as test states. The security analysis applies the standard
decoy state methods and also confirms the
√
η scaling for the asymptotic key rate R∞.
6. The variant proposed in [72] was initially called PM-QKD protocol and then renamed as
TF-QKD. It uses exactly one phase-matching pair as signal states and uses a mixture of
photon number states as test states. The
√
η scaling is verified.
7. The variant studied in [73, Protocol 3] is referred as a TF-QKD type protocol. This variation
essentially is the same as in [72]. It uses exactly one phase-matching pair as signal states
and uses a mixture of photon number states as test states. These two works [72, 73] differ
by the security proof methods. The
√
η scaling is confirmed.
8. The variant proposed in [70] is called sending-or-not-sending TF-QKD. This variant is
quite different from other variants since it does not use phase-matching pairs of the form
{|+α〉 , |−α〉}. Instead, it uses {|0〉 , |α〉}. To guarantee security, Alice (Bob) needs to send
the vacuum state with a high probability (much close to 1). Instead of distinguishing the
phase differences between Alice’s and Bob’s signals, the immediate node is supposed to
detect presence or absence of photons. The security analysis of the work [70] is based on
the phase error rate approach. It also shows the
√
η scaling for the asymptotic key rate
R∞.
In the end, we remark that the advantages of different types of test states. Using a mixture
of photon number states as test states allows the standard decoy state analysis, which has been
investigated and well understood. In addition, using a small number of decoy states as test states
has been investigated in many other protocols and might be readily adapted to some variations of
PM-MDI QKD protocol. On the other hand, using coherent states as test states has the potential
to give tighter key rates, as we will demonstrate in this paper when using infinitely many coherent
states. Also, it does not require the phase randomization in the experimental implementations.
5.6 Recent progress
PM-MDI QKD (or TF-QKD or PM-QKD) has been a hot topic in the QKD community since
its initial proposal [62, 63] to overcome the repeaterless bound. Soon after early theory works
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mentioned in the previous section, there have been quite a few experimental demonstrations [166–
169] that overcome the repeaterless bound. Since early theory papers focus on the asymptotic
key rates, there have been many papers on the finite key analysis of the protocol and they
aim at providing tighter and tighter finite key rates [170, 171]. The initial works focus on the
symmetric scenario where Alice and Bob are at an equal distance from the intermediate node for
simplicity of calculation. It was expected that these security proofs could be generalized to the
asymmetric scenario where Alice-Charlie and Bob-Charlie channels have different losses. Explicit
calculation was done in two independent works about asymmetric TF-QKD [172, 173]. Initial
experimental (proof-of-principle) demonstrations use a single laser for both Alice and Bob since
it is quite challenging to lock phases of two independent lasers and phase-locking is needed in
those protocol variants. Experimental demonstrations based on two independent lasers are done
in Refs. [174, 175]. In Ref. [174], they implement the sending-or-not-sending variant of TF-QKD
and apply a remote frequency-locking technique to lock two independent lasers. They are able
to reach over 500 km and beat the repeaterless bound in the absolute limit, which is the PLOB
bound that uses the channel transmittance as η instead of the overall transmittance that includes
the efficiency of imperfect detectors. In Ref. [175], they implement the phase-matching protocol
[63, 176] and employ the laser injection technique and the phase post-compensation method to
match the modes of two independent lasers. They are able to overcome the repeaterless bound
via 302 km and 402 km commercial-fiber channels.
In many variants (except our variant [71, 93]), while the signal states are non-phase-randomized,
they require the test states to be fully phase-randomized in order to apply the decoy-state analysis
[66, 68]. In practice, continuous phase randomization might not be possible. Failure to satisfy
this assumption can open up security loopholes. There have been several works to study the dis-
crete phase randomization for TF-QKD [177–179], which has previously been studied for BB84
[180]. We note that Ref. [93] prior to these works has already studied a practical version of the
protocol without the need of continuous phase randomization. This variant is in some sense a
discrete-phase-randomized protocol.
There are many interesting directions inspired by TF-QKD. For example, Ref. [181] studies
a conference key agreement protocol that is based on the single-photon interference, a key idea
for TF-QKD. TF-QKD can also be used in the quantum digital signature schemes based on the
work [17].
5.7 Future directions
For our protocol variant, it is interesting to explore the scenario with finite test states using the
numerical method [144] presented in Section 4.1. The current main challenge that prevents us
from doing such an analysis is that the dimension of the problem is relatively large and for a fixed
choice of parameters (e.g. choices of test states, signal state intensity, and probability of testing),
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the optimization problem takes a significantly amount of computer time (even with the improved
algorithm in [87]). The parameter regimes for this situation are not well investigated. The
exploration of parameter regimes seems computationally challenging if we just use the canonical
treatment of the problem setup and current best algorithm. A meaningful exploration along this
direction requires a dimension reduction for the representation on the source sides. We may use
the approach from [93] to search for optimal parameters and then apply ours to get tighter key
rates. It is also desirable to perform the finite-key analysis for a practical version of the protocol.
Moreover, it is worth studying the source imperfections in this protocol and take into account
potential side channels in a revised analysis.
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Chapter 6
Asymptotic security analysis of
DMCVQKD with heterodyne
detection
CVQKD protocols with a discrete modulation are interesting due to their experimental simplic-
ity and their great potential for massive deployment in the quantum-secured networks, but their
security analysis is less advanced than that of Gaussian modulation schemes. We apply our nu-
merical method to analyze the security of discrete-modulation protocols against collective attacks
in the asymptotic limit, paving the way for a full security proof with finite-size effects. While our
method is general for discrete-modulation schemes, we focus on two variants of the CVQKD pro-
tocol with quaternary modulation. Interestingly, thanks to the tightness of our proof method, we
show that this protocol is capable of achieving much higher key rates over significantly longer dis-
tances with experimentally feasible parameters compared with previous security proofs of binary
and ternary modulation schemes and also yielding key rates comparable to Gaussian modula-
tion schemes. Furthermore, as our security analysis method is versatile, it allows us to evaluate
variations of the discrete-modulated protocols, including direct and reverse reconciliation, and
postselection strategies. In particular, we demonstrate that postselection of data in combination
with reverse reconciliation can improve the key rates.
A main security proof technique for CVQKD is the optimality of Gaussian attacks [182, 183]
for protocols with Gaussian modulation. In fact, there are many security proofs for CVQKD
with a Gaussian modulation and some protocols have been proved to be secure against general
attacks (see [20] for a review). However, this type of protocol puts a lot of demands on the
modulation devices and classical error-correction protocols. In addition, the effect of a finite
constellation needs to be taken into account carefully [184, 185]. In probing quantumness of
devices using coherent states, we notice that even a small number of coherent states have the
127
same quantumness verification power as a Gaussian modulation of states [186]. We thus expect
that a DMCVQKD protocol will approach the performance of Gaussian-modulated CVQKD with
just a few different modulation amplitudes. However, the corresponding security proof is more
involved due to missing analytical tools. The binary [187] and ternary modulation schemes [188]
have been proved secure against collective attacks. Unfortunately, the key rates obtained are
not tight, and the proof technique is not expected to be generalizable to discrete-modulation
schemes with more states. For the quaternary modulation scheme, also known as the quadrature
phase-shift keying (QPSK) scheme, its security was previously analyzed under the assumption of
linear bosonic channels8 [189] or Gaussian attacks [38, 190], which restricts Eve’s ability.
We apply a versatile numerical method to study the security of discrete-modulated schemes
with a focus on the quaternary modulation scheme. Specifically, we analyze two variants of the
QPSK modulation scheme: one with heterodyne detection in this chapter and the other one
with homodyne detection in Chapter 7. Our method enables us to obtain tight key rates against
collective attacks in the asymptotic limit. During the preparation of our work [81], we noticed
an independent work [191] that analyzes the asymptotic security of the quaternary modulation
scheme with heterodyne detection. In this security analysis [191], Ghorai et al. use a reduction
to the Gaussian optimality proof method and apply an SDP technique with a photon-number
cutoff assumption. We emphasize here that our proof technique is quite different from their work,
and, in particular, we do not invoke the arguments of Gaussian optimality. For this reason, we
also directly compare our results with their results in this work. Remarkably, compared with the
similar heterodyne scheme considered in Ref. [191], we obtain higher key rates. Furthermore, our
approach can be extended to variants of the protocol using homodyne measurements. Since our
method does not rely on the arguments of Gaussian optimality, it also allows us to investigate the
effects of the postselection of data [192, 193], which is not considered in Ref. [191] due to their
proof technique. Postselection is commonly done for the classical telecommunication protocols
and DVQKD protocols to discard noisy data and to improve the performance of the protocols.
However, postselection strategies are currently not compatible with the Gaussian optimality proof
technique, since the relevant states are non-Gaussian and Gaussian attacks are not expected to
be optimal in the presence of postselection. Previously, postselection for discrete-modulation
schemes was considered under a restricted class of attacks [38, 194]. We show that postselection
can improve the key rates under collective attacks. Finally, we remark that our security proof
method works for both direct reconciliation and reverse reconciliation protocols. However, we
focus on reverse reconciliation in this work, since reverse reconciliation is known to have better
performance than the direct reconciliation in terms of transmission distances.
For our security analysis, we rely on the numerical key rate optimization methods developed
in Refs. [144, 146], and we use the version of Ref. [144] (Algorithm 4.1) to prove the security
8While a security analysis with additional assumptions usually can serve as an upper bound for the true key
rate, unfortunately, the analysis [189] with the additional linear channel assumption is not expected to be tight
and, thus, cannot be used as an upper bound of the key rate.
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against collective attacks in the asymptotic limit. As we further develop the framework to handle
the classical postprocessing for the numerical method presented in Ref. [144], this development
makes it easier for us to study the postselection strategies and also simplifies some aspects of
the numerical calculation. In order to perform such an optimization numerically, we impose the
photon-number cutoff assumption, which is the same assumption considered in Ref. [191]. Al-
though, ultimately, one would like to prove the security without this assumption, this assumption
is numerically reasonable because we numerically verify that our key rate results do not depend on
the choice of cutoff when the cutoff photon number is much larger than the mean photon number
of each received state. It is also interesting to point out that even though we demonstrate our
proof method only on the QPSK scheme here, our approach can be easily generalized to other
discrete-modulation schemes beyond four coherent states.
After our initial work [81], we consider the trusted detector noise scenario where detector
imperfections (detector inefficiency and electronic noise) are not accessible to Eve in [82]. We
remark that Gaussian modulation schemes have been analyzed in the trusted detector noise sce-
nario [29, 195–197] and it is known that the effects of electronic noise and detector inefficiency
on the key rates are not very significant in the trusted detector noise scenario under realistic ex-
perimental conditions compared to the ideal detector scenario. As we show here, this observation
also holds for discrete modulation schemes. However, we emphasize that our analysis is not a
trivial application of the method used for Gaussian modulation protocols and instead we adopt
a different approach. The reason is that the previous method used in the Gaussian modulation
protocols relies on the fact [182, 183] that the optimal Eve’s attacks for Gaussian modulation
schemes correspond to Gaussian channels which make it easy to decouple the trusted detector
noise from the channel noise when one looks at the covariance matrix. However, we cannot as-
sume Gaussian channels here since Gaussian attacks are not expected to be optimal for discrete
modulation schemes. In our analysis, based on a (commonly used) quantum optical model of the
imperfect detector, we find its corresponding mathematical description in terms of POVM and
then use this POVM to construct observables corresponding to quantities that are measured ex-
perimentally. These observables are then used in our security proof. We also point out the crucial
difference between our analysis and Ref. [198] for discrete modulation schemes: Our asymptotic
analysis is valid against arbitrary collective attacks while Ref. [198] uses the Gaussian channel
assumption and thus its security analysis [198] is restricted to Gaussian collective attacks.
By developing a dimension reduction method, our recent work by Upadhyaya et. al. [85]
removes the photon-number cutoff assumption. We summarize the main idea of the general
framework in Section 4.2.3 and we briefly present its application of this framework to DMCVQKD
with the heterodyne detection in Section 6.10. More details can be found in [85].
This chapter is based on [81, 82, 85].
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6.1 Protocol description
In the following description, let [N ] denote the set of positive integers from 1 to N . A coherent
state with an amplitude α or γ is denoted by |α〉 or |γ〉. While our proof method is general for
discrete modulation schemes, our focus is on the QPSK scheme.
Protocol 6.1 DMCVQKD with quadrature phase-shift keying scheme and heterodyne detection
(1). State preparation.—Alice randomly selects x ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} with a uniform probability
distribution (px =
1






sends it to Bob.
(2). Measurement.—Upon receiving Alice’s state, Bob performs a heterodyne measurement on
the state, which can be described by a POVM {Eγ = 1π |γ〉〈γ| : γ ∈ C}. After applying this
POVM, he obtains the measurement outcome yk ∈ C.
(3). Announcement and sifting.—After N rounds of first two steps, Alice and Bob determine a
small subset Itest ⊂ [N ]. Rounds indexed by the set Itest are used for parameter
estimation. They use the remaining rounds indexed by Ikey = [N ]/Itest to generate keys.
Let m denote the size of the index set Ikey and let f be a bijective function from [m] to
Ikey. After sifting, Alice obtains her string X = (x1, . . . , xm) by the following rule:





















(4). Parameter estimation.—Alice and Bob perform the parameter estimation by disclosing all
the information in the rounds indexed by the test set Itest. To perform such an analysis,
they process the data by computing quantities like the first and second moments of q and
p quadratures conditioned on each of four states that Alice sends. These quantities allow
them to constrain their joint state ρAB. They then calculate the secret key rate according
to the optimization problem in Eq. (6.11). If their analysis shows that no secret keys can
be generated, then they abort the protocol. Otherwise, they proceed.
(5). Reverse reconciliation key map.—Bob performs a key map to obtain his raw key string.
This key map discretizes his measurement outcome yk to an element in the set





























⊥ if θf(j) and
∣∣yf(j)
∣∣ are none of the above.
(6.2)
∆a ≥ 0 and ∆p ≥ 0 are two parameters related to postselection of data. A protocol
without postselection can set ∆a = ∆p = 0. This key map is depicted in Figure 6.1.
Positions with the symbol ⊥ are deleted from their strings. Again, we use X,Z to mean
the strings after removing the positions related to ⊥. Z is called the raw key string.
(6). Error correction and privacy amplification.—They perform error correction and privacy
amplification to generate a secret key.
Alice and Bob may decide to recast their strings to binary strings before or during the error-
correction step depending on their choice of error-correcting code. For the consistency of our
presentation, we use the alphabet {0, 1, 2, 3} in the following discussion.
6.2 Detector modeling: noisy heterodyne detection
In this section, we present one physical model for a noisy heterodyne detector and give the
corresponding POVM description. We start with a slightly more general model and then we
make a simplification for the ease of calculation at the end of this section. This simplified model
then reduces to a model commonly used in the literature.
6.2.1 Trusted detector noise model
As a heterodyne detector consists of two homodyne detectors and a beam splitter, we consider
imperfections in each homodyne detector. A homodyne detector may have non-unity detector
efficiency and also have some amount of electronic noise which is the additional noise introduced
to the measured data by its electronic components. In an experiment, one is able to measure the
amount of electronic noise and the value of detector efficiency by a calibration routine. To model
a realistic homodyne detector with non-unity detector efficiency and some amount of electronic
noise, we use a quantum optical model which is used in Refs. [29, 195–198], although the source










Figure 6.1: Key map for this protocol. When Bob has a measurement outcome γ ∈ C, if γ is
in one of the four shaded areas, then Bob maps the measurement outcome to the corresponding
value of that area for his key string. If γ is not in the shaded areas, Bob obtains the symbol ⊥.
∆a and ∆p are two parameters related to postselection.
electronic noise is that we can think about the detector as being a perfect detector followed by
some classical postprocessing of the data, which adds noise. One should note that in a trusted
device scenario, the characterization of the actual noise should be experimentally verified. Our
physical model is chosen for convenience of calculating the POVM of the actual measurement.
We depict this physical model of a noisy heterodyne detector in Figure 6.2. In this diagram,
we consider a more general case where two homodyne detectors have different imperfections.
We label the efficiency of the homodyne detector used for q quadrature measurement as η1 and
its electronic noise as ν1 [expressed in shot noise unit (SNU)]. Similarly, the efficiency of the
homodyne detector used for p quadrature measurement is labeled as η2 and its electronic noise
is labeled as ν2.
Since our treatment for each homodyne detector in this heterodyne setup is the same, we
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take one homodyne detector (shown in each dashed box in Figure 6.2) as an example and treat
the other one similarly by using its corresponding efficiency and electronic noise. An imperfect
homodyne detector with its efficiency ηj < 1 and electronic noise νj ≥ 0 (for j = 1 or 2) can
be modeled by a beam splitter placing before a perfect homodyne detector with the following
specification. (1) The ratio of transmission to reflection of this beam splitter is ηj : 1 − ηj . (2)
One input port of this beam splitter is the signal pulse and the other input port is a thermal
state used to model electronic noise, which is equivalent to sending one mode of a two-mode
squeezed vacuum state (EPR state) to the beam splitter. Each quadrature’s variance of this
ancillary thermal state is related to the value of electronic noise νj . More specifically, it is
[1+νj/(1−ηj)]N0 [29], where N0 = 1/2 denotes the shot-noise variance. In Figure 6.2, we choose
to parametrize the thermal state in terms of its mean photon number as n̄j =
νj
2(1−ηj) instead of
the variance of each quadrature, which is convenient for writing of expressions in later sections9.
We note that this way of modeling electronic noise is valid when ηj 6= 1. Furthermore, we will
assume ηj 6= 0. That is, we consider the case ηj ∈ (0, 1), which is the case of a realistic detector
of our interest.
In the next subsection, we derive the POVM corresponding to this detector model. We then
choose to consider a simplified scenario where these two homodyne detectors are identical for the
purpose of illustration and the ease of numerical calculation. That is, we will later assume they
both have the same detector efficiency η1 = η2 =: ηd and the same electronic noise ν1 = ν2 =: νel.
6.2.2 POVM description
We use the Wigner function formulation to find the POVM {Gy : y ∈ C} corresponding to this
noisy heterodyne detector model. When two homodyne detectors give two real numbers qs and
ps for q and p quadrature measurements, we label the outcome as y = qs + ips. By considering
Tr(ρGy) for an arbitrary input density operator ρ to the noisy heterodyne detector, we are able
9The electronic noise νj is the thermal noise added by the detection electronics. In the quantum mechanical
model of the detector shown in each dashed box of Figure 6.2 , the electronic noise is modeled by an ancillary
thermal state added to the second input port of the beam splitter that models the detector efficiency. Since the
value of electronic noise is unaffected by the detector efficiency, to simulate the desired amount of noise before this
beam splitter, one then needs to scale it by the reflectance of the beam splitter which is 1− ηj . As the variance of
a thermal state with a mean photon number n̄ is (1 + 2n̄)N0, one can easily see that the mean photon number of





Figure 6.2: A physical model for a noisy heterodyne detector. The homodyne detector for the
q quadrature measurement has detector efficiency η1 and electronic noise ν1. The homodyne
detector for the p quadrature measurement has detector efficiency η2 and electronic noise ν2.
The notation ρth(n̄) stands for a thermal state with a mean photon number n̄. In particular,
n̄1 =
ν1
2(1−η1) and n̄2 =
ν2
2(1−η2) (see main text for more explanations). Beam splitters are 50:50
unless specified otherwise. Each homodyne detector inside a gray box is ideal. Each dashed box
encloses the physical model for a noisy homodyne detector. LO stands for local oscillator.





























By comparing this Wigner function with that of a displaced squeezed thermal state [see
Eq. (2.81)], we can identify that the POVM element Gy is a projection onto a displaced squeezed
thermal state up to a prefactor 1√η1η2π . We give a full derivation of this Wigner function and the
explicit parameters for displacement, squeezing and thermal state mean photon number in terms
of detector parameters η1, η2, ν1 and ν2 in Appendix C.2.3.
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We restrict our discussion to a simpler scenario where we assume both homodyne detectors
have the same imperfection for the ease of numerical calculation and for the illustration purpose.
We discuss how to perform the calculation in the general case in Appendix C.2. In this simple


















One can observe that it is the Wigner function of a displaced thermal state [see Eq. (2.79)] apart
from the prefactor 1/(ηdπ). Therefore, the POVM element Gy in this case is a scaled projection






























Later in Section 6.3.2, we need to express operators defined in terms of POVM elements Gy’s in
the photon-number basis for the numerical key rate calculation. Analytical expressions of matrix
elements 〈m|Gy |n〉 are known in the literature [199] and shown in Appendix C.2.
Let us end this section with a few remarks about the simplification considered here. Firstly, as
we later define operators involving integrals of POVM elements Gy’s and need to find their matrix
representations in the photon-number basis for the numerical key rate calculation, we are able
to find efficiently computable analytical expressions for these operators under this simplification.
Without this simplification, one may need to perform some numerical integration. We emphasize
that the principles presented in this work also hold for the general case and we choose to present
results based on this simplified case for the ease of calculation. Secondly, with this simplification,
our detector model is then optically equivalent to the detector model used in other works [195,
197]. Thirdly, if two homodyne detectors in the heterodyne detection scheme do not have the
same imperfection, one can instead use the POVM in the general case by following the procedure
outlined in Appendix C.2.3 despite being more numerically challenging.
We remark on the generality of our method for treating trusted detector noises. If a different
physical model of a detector is adopted (which needs to be verified experimentally), we expect
that a similar method as described here can be used to find a correct POVM description for the
given physical model and then this POVM can be used in the security analysis.
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6.3 Key rate optimization
The first step of the security proof is to apply the source-replacement scheme (see Section 2.5.2)
to recast the protocol into its equivalent entanglement-based protocol. In the entanglement-based
version, Alice applies a POVM {MAx }.
We discuss the key rate calculation problems in the ideal (or untrusted) detector and trusted
detector noise scenarios in this section.
6.3.1 Ideal detector scenario
We can obtain expectation values of the first and second moments of the quadrature operators
〈q̂〉, 〈q̂2〉, 〈p̂〉, and 〈p̂2〉. We can calculate the mean photon number of each conditional state ρxB
from the n̂ = 12(q̂
2 + p̂2−1) = â†â. In addition to n̂, we define an operator d̂ = q̂2− p̂2 = â2 +(â†)2
to utilize the second moment observations 〈q̂2〉 and 〈p̂2〉 to constrain ρAB.
For an input state ρ, heterodyne measurements give us the Husimi Q function Q(γ) =
1
π 〈γ| ρ |γ〉 = Tr(ρEγ), where {Eγ =
1
π |γ〉〈γ| : γ ∈ C} is the POVM description of heterodyne
detection. From the Q function, we can obtain values of 〈q̂〉, 〈p̂〉, 〈n̂〉, and 〈d̂〉, whose operators





= 〈f̂ (A)(â, â†)〉 :=
∫
d2γQ(γ)f (A)(γ), (6.7)
where f̂ (A)(â, â†) is the antinormally ordered operator of an operator f̂ written in terms of â
and â†, f (A)(γ) is the corresponding expression by replacing â by γ and â† by γ∗, and d2γ =
dRe(γ)d Im(γ).
To write out the Kraus operator for the postprocessing map G including postselection, we
define region operators that tell us in which region in Figure 6.1 Bob’s measurement outcome



































































The area of integration for each operator corresponds to the relevant region shown in Figure 6.1.
Again, ∆a and ∆p are parameters related to postselection.




|z〉R ⊗ 1A ⊗ (
√
Rz)B. (6.9)
The pinching quantum channel Z is given by the projections Zj = |j〉〈j|R⊗1AB for j = 0, 1, 2, 3,




(|j〉〈j|R ⊗ 1AB)σ(|j〉〈j|R ⊗ 1AB). (6.10)






Tr[ρAB(|x〉〈x|A ⊗ q̂)] = px〈q̂〉x,
Tr[ρAB(|x〉〈x|A ⊗ p̂)] = px〈p̂〉x,











pipj 〈ϕj |ϕi〉 |i〉〈j|A ,
ρAB ≥ 0,
(6.11)
where x ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} and 〈q̂〉x, 〈p̂〉x, 〈n̂〉x, and 〈d̂〉x denote the corresponding expectation values
of operators q̂, p̂, n̂, and d̂ for the conditional state ρxB, respectively.
We remark that we make an additional simplification for the Kraus operator K. Unlike the
general discussion in Section 4.1.2 or in Ref. [144], we do not introduce the registers Ã, B̃, A,
and B in the postprocessing map G for this protocol. The aim of such a simplification is to
reduce the total dimension of the quantum states in the key rate optimization without affecting
the calculated key rates. We provide a detailed analysis in Appendix A to explain why such a
simplification can be made. Here, we discuss the ideas behind this simplification.
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i) The quantum register A is Alice’s private register that stores her measurement outcome
after she performs her POVM {MAx } on register A in a coherent fashion. Since Eve has
no access to register A, Alice can choose to first perform a coarse-grained measurement
that introduces only the announcement register Ã and then perform a refined measurement
conditioned on the announcements, which is described by a local isometry. Moreover, in
the reverse reconciliation scheme, since the key map isometry V does not depend on Alice’s
measurement outcome, the isometry for the refined measurement commutes with both the
key map isometry V and the pinching map Z. As our objective function is invariant under
this type of local isometries, we can choose not to apply this isometry and, thus, we do not
introduce register A.
ii) In the announcement step, Alice and Bob each announce whether a given round is kept
for the key generation. Then the sifting process keeps only one announcement outcome,
that is, when they both decide to keep the round. So, both classical registers Ã and B̃
after applying the sifting projection Π are effectively one dimensional. We then use another
property of the quantum relative entropy regarding quantum-classical states to show that
the calculated key rates remain the same if we omit registers Ã and B̃.
iii) The key map in this protocol uses only the coarse-grained information about Bob’s mea-
surement outcomes, that is, in which interval Bob’s measurement outcome lies. As with the
previous discussion about register A, we can view Bob’s measurement in two steps. At the
first step, Bob performs a coarse-grained measurement in a coherent fashion to store the
desired coarse-grained outcomes in register B. At the second step, Bob performs a refined
measurement conditioned on the coarse-grained information to update register B, which is
described by a local isometry (denoted by W ). Since the key map uses only the coarse-
grained information, the key map isometry V effectively needs to first undo the isometry
W . So, we can choose not to perform the isometry W and let the key map isometry V use
the coarse-grained information directly. The calculated key rates remain the same after we
ignore the isometry W . In this case, the key map isometry V simply copies register B to
register R in the standard basis. Thus, we combine these two registers and retain the name
of R. The calculated key rates are unaffected, because copying register B to register R in
the standard basis is done by a local isometry, which we can omit.
Finally, we explain how we derive the Kraus operator shown in Eq. (6.9). First, since we consider
the reverse reconciliation schemes, we can omit the measurement outcome register A. Second,
since the key map of each protocol only uses the coarse-grained measurement outcomes, instead
of using Bob’s fine-grained POVM corresponding to heterodyne measurements, we use the coarse-
grained POVM ({R0, R1, R2, R3,1−
∑3
j=0Rj}). Since the set K contains only one element, we
are left with only one term in the summation of Eq. (A.8) after removing registers Ã and B̃.
Finally, the key map in this case is the identity map. Thus, we combine registers R and B and
retain the name R for this combined register.
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6.3.2 Revised optimization problem in the trusted detector noise scenario
We reconsider the key rate optimization problem in the untrusted detector noise scenario by
rewriting region operators in Eq. (6.8) and observables in Eq. (6.11) in terms of the POVM of an
ideal heterodyne detector {Ey}. In the case of ideal heterodyne detection, the POVM description
of Bob’s measurement {MBy } is MBy = Ey = 1π |y〉〈y|, the projection onto a coherent state |y〉.
By writing y = reiθ in the polar coordinate and integrating over the corresponding region Aj , we







where the region of integration Aj in the complex plane corresponds to the region with value j
shown in Figure 6.1 and d2y = dRe(y)d Im(y).
In general, one may be interested in a quantity like
∫
f(y, y∗)P (y)d2y where f(y, y∗) is a real-
valued function on y and y∗ such that the integral converges. Such a quantity can be described


















d2y f(y, y∗)P (y).
(6.14)
In other words, operators constructed in this way correspond to expectation values
∫
f(y, y∗)P (y)d2y
obtained in an experiment.
In the previous subsection (also in Ref. [81]), we chose observables {Ô} = {q̂, p̂, n̂, d̂} by using
MBy = Ey in Eq. (6.13) for the untrusted detector noise scenario. In the trusted detector noise
scenario, we change to a new set of observables {q̂, p̂, n̂+ d̂/2 + 1, n̂− d̂/2 + 1}, which gives the
same key rates as the old one since the last two observables in this new set are linear combinations
of observables n̂ and d̂ as well as the identity operator. This new set of observables corresponds




2 Im(y), 2 Re(y)2, 2 Im(y)2}10. The sole purpose of this
change compared with the previous subsection is to make the data postprocessing in an agreement
with the typical classical postprocessing in an experiment. That is, in an experiment, when a
heterodyne detection gives two real numbers qs and ps which we set Re(y) = qs and Im(y) = ps,
10Due to our definition of quadrature operators, we include the factor
√
2 so that we can simply enter values
reported in an experiment using shot noise units as expectation values of corresponding observables.
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one usually computes variances of Re(y) and Im(y) by computing the expectation values of Re(y)2
and Im(y)2 in addition to expectation values of Re(y) and Im(y).
In the trusted detector noise scenario, we need to substitute MBy in Eqs. (6.12) and (6.13) by
Gy. To distinguish operators defined in this way from first- and second-moment of quadrature
operators q̂ and p̂, we shall call first-moment observables as F̂Q and F̂P and second-moment



























































pipj 〈αj |αi〉 |i〉〈j|A ,
ρAB ≥ 0,
(6.16)
where the index x runs over the set {0, 1, 2, 3} and the Kraus operator for the postprocessing
map G has the same form as in Eq. (6.9) but now with the region operators defined in terms of
Gy’s in Eq. (6.12).
In Appendix C.2, we discuss how to represent these operators in the photon-number basis.
Combining with the photon-number cutoff assumption (i.e. ρAB = (1A ⊗ ΠN )ρAB(1A ⊗ ΠN ),
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where N is the cutoff photon number and ΠN is the projection onto the subspace spanned by
the photon-number states from 0 to N photons), we can directly solve this key rate optimization
problem in Eq. (6.16) numerically.
6.4 Simulation method
To understand how the protocols behave in a realistic scenario, we simulate the quantum channel
as a realistic physical channel in the absence of Eve. Such a channel in the context of optical
fiber communication can be described by a phase-invariant Gaussian channel with transmittance







2 is the variance of q quadrature for the vacuum state and (∆qobs)
2 is the variance
of q quadrature observed for the signal state. Here we consider the case where both q and p
quadratures have the same variance. With our definition of quadrature operators, (∆qvac)
2 = 12 .
In the literature, the value of excess noise is usually reported in a couple of different ways,
depending on who makes the observation of (∆qobs)
2. To avoid possible confusion when discussing
the value of excess noise, we clarify these definitions. We use ξ to mean the excess noise in the
case where Alice measures (∆qobs)
2 at the output of her lab and use δ in the case where Bob
measures (∆qobs)
2 for the received signal state.
A natural way to simulate this phase-invariant Gaussian channel is that, when Alice prepares
a coherent state |α〉 and sends to Bob via this channel, the output state from the channel becomes
a displaced thermal state centered at
√
ηα with the variance 12(1 + δ) for each quadrature. An
alternative but equivalent way is that, when Alice wants to prepare a coherent state |α〉, the state
after preparation becomes a displaced thermal state centered at α with the variance 12(1 + ξ) for
each quadrature at the output of her lab. Then, the state is transmitted via a pure-loss channel,
and the final output state that reaches Bob’s lab is a displaced thermal state centered at
√
ηα
with the variance 12(1+ηξ) for each quadrature. Therefore, we see that, for this physical channel,
δ = ηξ. In this work, we use the definition of ξ when we discuss the value of excess noise. Readers
should be able to translate between these two definitions by the relation δ = ηξ.
Given a displaced thermal state centered at
√
ηα with the variance 12(1+ηξ) for each quadra-
ture, we can then calculate our simulated values for 〈q̂〉, 〈p̂〉, 〈n̂〉, and 〈d̂〉 (by either using
quasiprobability distribution like the Wigner function or Q function of the final state or ex-
panding the final state in the photon-number basis). These values can then be supplied to the
optimization problem in Eq. (6.11), which, in turn, can be solved numerically.
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6.5 Photon-number cutoff assumption
The key rate optimization problem in Eq. (4.2) involves optimizing over all possible bipartite
states ρAB in the feasible set S. The number of free variables depends on the size of ρAB.
In order to numerically perform the optimization by computer optimization packages, we can
deal only with finite-dimensional ρAB. In our optimization problem, as we can see from the
source-replacement scheme, the dimension of Alice’s system A is determined by the number of
different signal states that she prepares. For the QPSK scheme, the dimension of register A is
four. However, since each state that Bob receives is an optical mode and, in principle, can be
manipulated by Eve, Bob’ state lives in an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space HB. A basis for this
Hilbert space is the photon-number states {|n〉 : n ∈ N}. We immediately see that Bob’s POVM
elements are infinite-dimensional operators and ρAB is also infinite dimensional. For DVQKD,
one method to reduce the dimension of the system is to apply a squashing model [90, 92, 156] for
the protocol to obtain a lower-dimensional representation of his POVM. This reduction is possible
for many DVQKD protocols, since one can explicitly formulate the squashing model. However,
it is not clear how one can formulate a squashing model for CV systems. Instead, we have to
impose an additional assumption in this work in order to perform the numerical optimization.
This additional assumption is what we call the photon-number cutoff assumption. We impose
the assumption that Bob’s system lives in the Hilbert space HB = span{|0〉 , |1〉 , . . . , |Nc〉} for
some cutoff photon number Nc. Namely, if we define ΠNc =
Nc∑
n=0
|n〉〈n| with a suitable choice
of photon-number cutoff parameter Nc on Bob’s system, we assume ρ = ΠNcρΠNc for the state
ρ under consideration. This assumption allows us to truncate the infinite-dimensional Hilbert
space. If Nc is chosen to be large enough, this assumption is a reasonable working assumption
based on the following observations.
(i) Bob can obtain the mean photon number nx := Tr(ρ
x
Bn̂) of each conditional state ρ
x
B via
homodyne or heterodyne measurements, where n̂ denotes the number operator.
(ii) Since nx is known, we can pick Nc ∈ N such that Nc is much larger than nx for each
x ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. For such a choice of Nc, the probability of finding the state to have a photon
number n ≤ Nc is close to 1. This probability suggests that the contribution from n > Nc
photon subspace becomes negligible. Similarly, the off-diagonal blocks (1−ΠNc)ρΠNc and
ΠNcρ(1−ΠNc) also have vanishing contributions.
(iii) We can increase Nc to have a numerical verification that the key rate is unchanged after
we choose a large enough Nc.
This photon-number cutoff assumption renders our numerical optimization of the key rate
problem feasible. Although this assumption sounds numerically reasonable as our numerical
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verification suggests, we emphasize that one has to deliver an exact analysis to remove this
assumption for a watertight security proof. In this sense, our proof is restricted. Nevertheless,
we expect this working assumption to have minimal effects on the key rates of these protocols
when the cutoff is chosen suitably, and this expectation is confirmed by the results in our recent
work [85]. The choice of the cutoff value depends on the observed statistics as mentioned in (i)
above. For our simulations in the ideal detector scenario presented in this thesis, we find that
choosing Nc ≥ 10 can produce numerically stable results. For our simulations in the trusted (and
untrusted) detector scenario, we choose to use a slightly larger cutoff due to a larger mean photon
number of the state received and we use Nc ≥ 14.
We now provide some insights for removing this assumption and also for extending our current
analysis to include finite-size effects and general attacks. To remove the photon-number cutoff
assumption, one needs to combine our numerical optimization approach with some appropriate
analytical tools. One possible approach is to develop a CV version of the squashing model. If such
a squashing model exists, the key rate optimization problem then becomes a finite-dimensional
problem even without the photon-number cutoff assumption. Since the effective dimension is
finite, it might also be possible to apply existing tools (which are valid for finite-dimensional
systems) such as the quantum de Finetti representation theorem [201] or the postselection tech-
nique [112] to obtain the composable security [89] of the protocol against general attacks in the
finite-size regime.
Another possible method for removing the photon-number cutoff assumption is to adopt a
similar idea used in Ref. [185], that is, using the entropy continuity bounds [202] to provide
a tight error analysis of the key rate due to the truncation of Bob’s Hilbert space. After one
can tightly bound the trace distance between the optimal state in the truncated subspace and
the optimal state in the original infinite-dimensional space, the continuity bound for the relevant
entropic quantities allows us to obtain a small correction term due to the photon-number cutoff.
Then, one obtains a full security proof against collective attacks in the asymptotic limit. In
Section 6.10, we discuss the dimension reduction method introduced in Ref. [85]. Reference
[85] has successfully applied this method to DMCVQKD to remove the photon-number cutoff
assumption. To reach a full composable security proof along this path, one may first manage to
include the finite-size effects with collective attacks and then apply appropriate tools similar to
the quantum de Finetti representation theorem for CVQKD [111] to take the general attacks into
consideration.
6.6 Evaluation of loss-only key rates
We discuss how to evaluate the Devetak-Winter formula in the loss-only scenario in the absence
of postselection. When Alice sends |αx〉A′ to Bob, in the absence of noise, Bob can verify that he
receives a pure coherent state via homodyne or heterodyne detection. In the case of homodyne
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detection, Bob can verify that the received state is a minimum uncertainty state with the same
variance for both quadratures, which implies it is a pure coherent state. In the case of heterodyne
detection, Bob performs a tomography to verify that the received state is a pure coherent state.
In particular, if Bob verifies his state to be an attenuated coherent state
∣∣√ηαx
〉
, it is shown [194]
that Eve’s optimal attack is the generalized beam-splitting attack for this pure-loss channel. Thus,







after this channel. Because of
the product state structure of Bob and Eve’s joint state, Bob’s measurement outcome does not
influence Eve’s state. Therefore, conditioned on the value x of Alice’s string X and the value z






:= |εx〉 , (6.18)
which is independent from z and, thus, we call it |εx〉 for simplicity.











, which span only a four-dimensional subspace. There-
fore, we can find an orthonormal basis {|f0〉 , |f1〉 , |f2〉 , |f3〉} for this subspace similar to the basis
{|e0〉 , |e1〉} and find a four-dimensional matrix presentation for each of Eve’s conditional states
(see Ref. [203] for an explicit expression). With a four-dimensional matrix representation of
Eve’s conditional states |εx〉 in the basis {|f0〉 , |f1〉 , |f2〉 , |f3〉}, it is also straightforward to di-
rectly evaluate the Devetak-Winter formula.
6.7 Simulation results in the ideal detector scenario
6.7.1 Loss-only scenario: Comparison to analytical results
We first present the results for the loss-only scenario, that is, ξ = 0. For this scenario, we can
also obtain an analytical result to have a direct comparison with our numerical result. A direct
evaluation of the Devetak-Winter formula is possible in this scenario since we can determine Eve’s
relevant conditional states (up to irrelevant unitaries). As shown in Ref. [194], in the loss-only
case, we need only to consider the generalized beam-splitting attack. When Alice sends |αx〉A′







after the pure-loss channel. Eve’s conditional
states conditioned on Alice’s string value x and Bob’s raw key string value z effectively live in
a four-dimensional subspace for this protocol. This result makes the direct analytical evaluation
possible. The procedure of this analytical evaluation is discussed in Section 6.6. For the numerical
key rate optimization, the loss-only scenario follows as a special case of the noisy scenario (using
ξ = 0), which we discuss in later subsections.
A pure-loss channel is characterized by its transmittance η = 10−(αattL/10) for each distance L
in kilometers with the attenuation coefficient αatt, which is 0.2 dB/km for the relevant communi-
cation fiber. One may take the quantum efficiency of realistic homodyne and heterodyne detectors
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into account. A simple but pessimistic way to deal with the detector efficiency is that the loss due
to the imperfect detector is also attributed to Eve. In such a worse-case scenario, we can define
the total transmittance as η = ηd10
−0.02L, where ηd is the quantum efficiency of the detectors. If
one defines an effective distance L0 for the detector inefficiency, that is, ηd = 10
−0.02L0 , then L0
is less than 13 km for practical homodyne and heterodyne detectors with the quantum efficiency
≥ 55% [30]. For the ease of presentation and convenience of comparison with other works using
different values of detector efficiency, we set ηd = 1 in this section unless noted otherwise. One
may obtain the key rate value corresponding to a realistic value of efficiency by subtracting the
effective distance L0 from all relevant figures.






























First step (approximate upper bound)
Second step (reliable lower bound)
Figure 6.3: Secure key rates versus the transmission distance for the pure-loss channel to
demonstrate the numerical behavior of our two-step key rate calculation procedure and to compare
with the analytical results (direct evaluation of the Devetak-Winter formula). The transmittance
is η = 10−0.02L for each distance L in kilometers, and the reconciliation efficiency is β = 0.95.
The curve with circle markers is the approximate upper bound from the first step, and the curve
with star markers is the reliable lower bound obtained from the second step. The curve with
square markers is the analytical results presented in Section 6.6. The solid line with no markers
is the repeaterless secret key capacity bound [65]. The coherent state amplitude α is optimized
via a coarse-grained search in the interval [0.6, 0.95].
We plot the key rate of this protocol versus transmission distance in the loss-only scenario in
Figure 6.3. We also plot both the numerical key rate calculation results and the key rate that can
be obtained by a direct evaluation of the Devetak-Winter formula. Interestingly, we see that our
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numerical results are close to the analytical results for both protocols up to a distance around 120
km. Above 120 km, we notice that there is a visible gap between our approximate upper bound
and the reliable lower bound, which indicates there is room for improvement on the numerical
algorithm. We also notice that our first-step result is slightly lower than the analytical result
as the feasible set S might be enlarged due to constraint violation and coarse-graining of data.
We note that the new method developed in Ref. [87] allows us to reproduce the analytical result
exactly with the numerical method. This result is shown in Figure 6.4.
We also include the repeaterless secret key capacity bound for the pure-loss channel [65] in
Figure 6.3, that is, R∞ ≤ − log2(1 − η). With the reconciliation efficiency βEC = 0.95, and the
key rate for the this protocol is approximately 1/10 of the bound. Since Gaussian modulation
schemes with the perfect reconciliation efficiency can reach 1/2 of the PLOB bound [65], we see
that the performance of the QPSK modulation scheme is not far away from that of the Gaussian
modulation schemes in the loss-only scenario.
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Figure 6.4: Comparison of key rate for DMCVQKD among the Gauss-Newton method [87], the
Frank-Wolfe method (Algorithm 4.1) and analytical key rate for the loss-only case (ξ = 0).
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6.7.2 Noisy scenario
Simulated statistics and error-correction cost
From the heterodyne measurements, for each conditional state ρxB with αx ∈ {α, iα,−α,−iα},










































Note that those values are exactly the same as from the homodyne measurements, since we have
the same state after the simulated quantum channel. We obtain those values here indirectly via
the Q function.
We also present the procedure to calculate δEC for this protocol. For the error correction
performed at the Shannon limit, we have δEC = H(Z|X) = h(e), where h(x) is the binary
entropy function. To take into account the inefficiency of error correction, we first write δEC =
H(Z|X) = H(Z)− I(X :Z) in terms of I(X :Z) and then scale I(X :Z) to be βECI(X :Z) where
βEC is the reconciliation efficiency whose value is usually reported in the CVQKD literature.
Therefore,
δEC = H(Z)− βECI(X :Z)
= (1− βEC)H(Z) + βECH(Z|X)
(6.21)
We can numerically evaluate H(Z|X) via the probability distribution:

























where j, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, Rj ’s are the region operators defined in Eq. (6.8), and the conditional
state ρkB is defined in Eq. (2.103). In the case of postselection, we renormalize this probability
distribution by the probability of being postselected. Then, δEC can be calculated by Eq. (6.21) as
we take into account that we have an alphabet of four symbols on both sides in the error-correction
step. Throughout this thesis, we choose to use the error-correction efficiency βEC = 95% for
DMCVQKD unless stated otherwise11.
Key rates
We start by investigating the optimal choice of coherent state amplitude α for this protocol. In
Figure 6.5, we plot the key rates versus α for selected distances when the excess noise ξ is 0.01.
Comparing to Figure 7.2, we see that the optimal choice of α for this protocol is around 0.7 for
those selected distances, corresponding to a mean photon number around 0.49. We observe that
the optimal value of α does not change significantly for a wide range of distances12. From the
observation here, we limit our search for optimal choice of α in a restricted interval.
In Figure 6.6, we plot the secure key rate versus the transmission distance for different values
of excess noise ξ. We optimize the coherent state amplitude α via a coarse-grained search over
the interval [0.6, 0.92]. We observe that the heterodyne protocol can reach around 200 km even
with an excess noise ξ = 0.02.
We then compare our results with an independent security analysis in Ref. [191] for a similar
protocol. In addition to different proof methods, we differ from that protocol by how the error
correction is done, which affects the calculation of the error-correction cost term δEC. In par-
ticular, our error-correction cost is higher because we discretize Bob’s measurement results and
consider only binary or quaternary error-correcting codes. In Ref. [191], the mutual information
I(X :Z) is obtained by the channel capacity of the binary additive white Gaussian noise channel,
which is approximated by the capacity of an additive white Gaussian noise channel







11This choice of value has been claimed by some experimentalists and theorists for the symmetric binary channel
that is relevant for our situation. However, the author of this thesis is not aware of a specific construction of the
error correction code that achieves this efficiency in the DMCVQKD parameter regime. The work [204] appears to
give a similar value in the high error rate regime. In this sense, all key rates reported in this chapter and the next
chapter are based on the assumption that this efficiency or a similar efficiency can be achieved in practice.
12The optimal amplitude α changes more significantly for small distances (less than 25 km). See [85, Figure 6].
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(c) L = 80 km
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(d) L = 100 km
Figure 6.5: Secure key rate for the QPSK protocol with heterodyne detection versus the coherent
state amplitude α for selected choices of distances (a) L = 20 km, (b) L = 50 km, (c) L = 80
km, and (d) L = 100 km with the excess noise ξ = 0.01 and reconciliation efficiency βEC = 0.95.
Detectors are assumed to be ideal.
This result leads to a smaller value of δEC by the conversion formula in the first line of
Eq. (6.21). In Figures 6.7 and 6.8, we plot the key rate results from both our work and Ref. [191]
with a fixed choice of the coherent state amplitude α = 0.35 for all distances plotted and with two
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different values of excess noise. As we can see, our security proof approach provides remarkably
higher key rates compared with the approach with a reduction to the Gaussian optimality. Our
security analysis shows that this protocol has a good tolerance on the excess noise and can extend
to significantly longer distances. We emphasize that this choice of α = 0.35 is not optimal for
both works. While this value is closer to the optimal value found in Ref. [191], the optimal value
of the coherent state amplitude found in our work is around 0.7 (for ξ = 0.01), as mentioned
before. Thus, we also include two curves from Figure 6.6, where the coherent state amplitude α
is optimized via a coarse-grained search in the interval [0.6, 0.92] for comparisons.
As we can see from Figures 6.7 and 6.8, the key rate can be significantly improved after we
optimize α. We summarize two factors that can boost the key rates. First, our security proof
technique gives a tighter estimation of Eve’s information compared with the reduction to the
Gaussian optimality approach. Second, the key rate can be improved by using a slightly larger
value of α than what is investigated in Ref. [191]. This regime of α is not explored in Ref. [191],
because the reduction to the Gaussian optimality approach for discrete-modulation schemes gives
tight key rates only in the limit of α → 0 and can give quite loose key rates for large values of
α. In the same figure, we also compare our results for this protocol with a Gaussian-modulated
CVQKD protocol using heterodyne detection [26], where the modulation variance is optimized
for each distance. We observe that this quaternary modulation scheme has key rates comparable
to the Gaussian modulation scheme.
6.8 Simulation results in the trusted detector noise scenario
6.8.1 Simulated statistics
From our simulation, the simulated state σxB conditioned on the choice of x is a displaced thermal
















When Bob applies his heterodyne measurement described by the POVM {Gy}, the probability
density function P (y|x) for the measurement outcome y conditioned on Alice’s choice x is
P (y|x) = 1














































Figure 6.6: Secure key rate versus the transmission distance for the protocol with het-
erodyne detection for different values of the excess noise ξ, from top to bottom, ξ =
0.002, 0.005, 0.01, 0.015, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04. The coherent state amplitude is optimized via a coarse-
grained search over the interval [0.6, 0.92], the transmittance is η = 10−0.02L for each distance L
in kilometers and the reconciliation efficiency is βEC = 0.95.
















6.8.2 Comparison between trusted and untrusted detector noise scenarios
For this comparison, we supply the same set of simulated data from Eq. (6.26) to the optimization
problem for the untrusted detector noise scenario in Eq. (6.11) and the one for the trusted detector
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This work, optimal α
This work, α=0.35
Ghorai et. al. (2019), α=0.35
Figure 6.7: A comparison of key rates between our work and Ref. [191] for the heterodyne
scheme with two different values of excess noise ξ = 0.005. The curve with triangle markers is
from Ref. [191] with a fixed (not optimal) coherent state amplitude α = 0.35, and the curve with
diamond markers is from this work with the same value of α. The curve with circle markers is also
from this work with an optimal value of α for each distance. The curve with no markers is the
key rates of a Gaussian-modulated CVQKD protocol [26] with an optimal modulation variance
for each distance. All curves use the reconciliation efficiency βEC = 0.95.
noise scenario in Eq. (6.16). For simulation, we choose parameters ηd = 0.719, νel = 0.01 from
[32] for illustration. The result is shown in Figure 6.9.
As we can see from this figure, the key rate of the untrusted detector noise scenario drops
quickly at a short distance less than 20 km even though the electronic noise is only 0.01 SNU,
which is a low value compared to detectors used in many other CV experiments. On the other
hand, the key rate in the trusted detector noise scenario extends to much longer distances, which
exhibits a similar behavior as the results shown in Ref. [81] when the detector is treated as ideal.
One explanation for this behavior is that in Ref. [81], we have observed that the key rate for
the QPSK scheme drops quickly when the channel excess noise ξ is large. Since the value of ξ is
reported at the input of the quantum channel while the value of νel is measured at Bob’s side, to
treat νel as a part of channel excess noise in the untrusted detector noise scenario, one needs to
define the effective value of ξ to include the value of νel. For the effective value ξeff, the electronic
noise νel needs to be scaled by a factor of 1/ηt (in addition to 1/ηd), which is large for slightly
long distances as ηt becomes small. As a result, the redefined value ξeff of ξ is quite large as shown
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This work, optimal α
This work, α=0.35
Ghorai et. al.(2019), α=0.35
Figure 6.8: A comparison of key rates between our work and Ref. [191] for the heterodyne
scheme, similar to Figure 6.7 but with an excess noise ξ = 0.01.
in Figure 6.9 and this behavior of key rate is then expected. By the observation made from this
figure, it is not surprised that for a larger value of electronic noise, the key rate in the untrusted
detector noise scenario would drop to zero at an even shorter distance.
6.8.3 Detector imperfection in the trusted detector noise scenario
To guide the experimental implementation of the QPSK scheme, we may be interested in the
robustness of the protocol in the presence of detector inefficiency and electronic noise in the
trusted detector noise scenario. For this purpose, we investigate the effects of different levels of
detector efficiency and electronic noise on the key rate. For curves in Figures 6.10 and 6.11, our
simulation uses the same channel model but different detector imperfections, that is, in Eq. (6.26),
the same values of channel parameters ηt and ξ but different values of detector efficiency ηd and
electronic noise νel (as specified in the captions) for different curves.
In Figure 6.10, we choose values of ηd and νel for a homodyne detector from two experiments
[30, 32] and compare these results with the ideal detector. For the comparison, we optimize α
via a coarse-grained search for each distance. We see that with a noisy heterodyne detector, the
key rate drops moderately from the key rate of using an ideal detector. The amount of decrease
is like a constant prefactor in the key rate. As the detector is noisier, the key rate becomes lower
as expected.
153


























) Untrusted detector noise
Trusted detector noise
































Figure 6.9: Secure key rate versus the transmission distance for untrusted detector noise (black
diamonds) and trusted detector noise (red stars) scenarios. The excess noise is ξ = 0.01 at the
input of the quantum channel. Parameters for detector are ηd = 0.719, νel = 0.01[32]. The
error correction efficiency is βEC = 0.95. The coherent state amplitude is optimized via a coarse-
grained search over the interval [0.5, 0.9] with a step size of 0.05 and the channel transmittance
is ηt = 10
−0.02L for each distance L in kilometers. The effective channel excess noise in the
untrusted detector scenario is shown with the y-axis on the right. At 20 km, the effective channel
excess noise ξeff is roughly 0.045.
To show that different values of electronic noise have little impacts on the secure key rates in
the trusted noise scenario, we compare key rates with two choices of the electronic noise value in
Figure 6.11a while we fix the value of detector efficiency ηd to be 0.7. As the key rate difference
is relatively small between the curve with νel = 0.05 and that with νel = 0.08, we also plot the
difference of key rate (that is, the key rate with νel = 0.05 minus the key rate with νel = 0.08) in
the same figure. (Note that the non-smoothness in the curve of difference is due to the coarse-
grained search for the coherent state amplitude in the presence of the numerical performance
issue discussed in Ref. [81].) We observe that when the electronic noise is trusted, its impact on
the secure key rates is insignificant. This result eases the requirements of a detector in a CVQKD
experiment with the QPSK scheme. Similarly, we investigate the effects of detector efficiency
in Figure 6.11b. In particular, we fix the value of electronic noise νel to be 0.05 SNU and plot
four choices of detector efficiency between 0.5 and 0.8. We see the key rate curves are close to
each other.
In Figure 6.12, we investigate the tradeoff between trusting the detector efficiency and lumping
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ηd =1, νel =0
ηd =0. 719, νel =0. 01
ηd =0. 552, νel =0. 015
Figure 6.10: Secure key rate versus the transmission distance for different detector imperfections
reported in experiments in a comparison to the ideal detector. Other parameters are the excess
noise ξ = 0.01, error-correction efficiency βEC = 0.95 and the transmittance ηt = 10
−0.02L for
each distance L in kilometers. For each distance, the coherent state amplitude α is optimized via
a coarse-grained search in the interval [0.5, 0.9] with a step size of 0.05. Black curve with diamond
markers is for the ideal heterodyne detector; red curve with star markers is for the detector used
in Ref. [32]; cyan curve with square markers is for the detector used in Ref. [30].
it together with the channel transmittance, similar to a scenario studied in Ref. [86] for discrete-
variable systems. For the fixed amount of total transmittance η := ηtηd, it is interesting to see
how trusting different values of detector efficiency affects the key rate. We observe that when
the value of the product of channel transmittance ηt and detector efficiency ηd is fixed, if the
detector efficiency ηd is lower, meaning that if more contribution to the total transmittance η
is trusted, then the key rate is higher. This observation is similar to the observation made for
discrete-variable systems in Ref. [86].
To summarize, in a discrete modulation experiment, if one is able to obtain accurate values
of ηd and νel by a suitable calibration procedure and able to maintain a low level of the effective
channel excess noise ξ to a value like 0.01, then the QPSK scheme is able to extend to a distance
beyond 100 km in the asymptotic regime. We remark that the optimal amplitude for the QPSK
scheme in the trusted detector noise scenario is around 0.75 corresponding to a mean photon
number of around 0.56, similar to the optimal amplitude in the ideal or untrusted detector noise
scenario reported in our previous work [81]. This mean photon number is much lower than that
for Gaussian modulation schemes.
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Figure 6.11: Secure key rate versus transmission distance for different detector imperfections
with the excess noise ξ = 0.01. For both plots, the coherent state amplitude is optimized via
a coarse-grained search over the interval [0.5, 0.9] with a step size 0.05 and βEC = 0.95. (a)
Comparison of key rates between two values of the electronic noise when the detector efficiency is
set to be ηd = 0.7 for both curves. The difference of two curves is also plotted with the secondary
y-axis on the right. (b) Comparison of key rates for different values of detector efficiency when
the electronic noise is νel = 0.05.
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Figure 6.12: Secure key rate versus the detector efficiency ηd for a fixed value of total transmit-
tance η := ηtηd = 0.3155. This figure studies the tradeoff between the key rate and the amount of
trusted loss. Other parameters are the excess noise ξ = 0.01, the electronic noise νel = 0.01 and
the error-correction efficiency βEC = 0.95. We include two curves for different choices of coherent
state amplitude α.
6.9 Postselection of data
Postselection is simple to implement in an experiment. It not only improves the key rate but
also reduces the required volume of data postprocessing. Thus, it is advantageous to include a
postselection step in the protocol. Postselection of data can improve the key rate of the QPSK
scheme in both the untrusted and trusted detector noise scenarios.
6.9.1 Ideal detector scenario
We present the results on the effects of postselection. Our coarse-grained search for values of ∆p
suggests that the optimal value is ∆p = 0; that is, we do not postselect the data based on the
phase. For the postselection parameter ∆a related to the amplitude of the measured complex
value from heterodyne detection, we then perform a coarse-grained search for its optimal value.
In Figure 6.13, we consider the scenario with an excess noise ξ = 0.04 and with a fixed coherent
state amplitude α = 0.6 as an example. In Figure 6.13a, we plot the key rate versus this
parameter ∆a at the distance L = 20 km with the reconciliation efficiency βEC = 0.95. From
this plot, we observe that the optimal value of ∆a is around 0.6 at this distance. We also obtain
157
similar plots for various choices of the distance and find that the optimal value roughly falls in
the interval [0.4, 0.7]. In Figure 6.13b, we compare key rates with or without postselection for
two different values of reconciliation efficiency at different transmission distances, and, for this
plot, we optimize the values of ∆a via a coarse-grained search in the interval [0.4, 0.7]. We again
notice that postselection with reverse reconciliation can improve the key rates. We remark that
the improvement due to postselection in the reverse reconciliation scheme is more visible for less
efficient error-correcting codes, larger excess noise, and longer transmission distances. This result
agrees with the observation made in Ref. [194] under a restricted class of attacks.



















































) β=0. 95, ∆a =0
β=0. 95, ∆a > 0
β=0. 9, ∆a =0
β=0. 9, ∆a > 0
(b)
Figure 6.13: Secure key rate for the QPSK protocol using heterodyne detection with postselection
in the ideal detector scenario. The excess noise is ξ = 0.04, the coherent state amplitude is α = 0.6,
and one of the postselection parameters is ∆p = 0. (a) Secure key rate versus the postselection
parameter ∆a at the distance L = 20 km. The reconciliation efficiency is βEC = 0.95. (b) Secure
key rate versus the transmission distance with or without postselection for two different values of
reconciliation efficiency βEC. Solid lines have βEC = 0.95 and dashed lines have βEC = 0.9. Lines
with (red) circle markers have ∆a = 0, and lines with (black) triangle markers have ∆a optimized
via a coarse-grained search in the interval [0.4, 0.7].
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6.9.2 Trusted detector noise scenario
In this subsection, we investigate the effects of postselection in the trusted detector noise scenario.
As demonstrated in our previous analysis [81]. As expected, we show here that this advantage
also exists in the trusted detector noise scenario.
In Figure 6.14, we search for the optimal postselection parameter for different transmission
distances and take the distances L = 50 km and L = 75 km as examples. For this figure, we
also optimize the choice of coherent state amplitude via a coarse-grained search. The x axis in
each plot is the postselection parameter ∆a. We observe the optimal value of the postselection
parameter ∆a is around 0.6 for both L = 50 km and L = 75 km. We also observe that the optimal
choice of the postselection parameter ∆a does not change significantly for different distances.


















































Figure 6.14: (a) Secure key rate versus postselection parameter ∆a for L = 50 km. (b) Secure
key rate versus postselection parameter ∆a for L = 75 km. For both plots, we study the trusted
detector noise scenario. The channel excess noise is ξ = 0.01 and the error-correction efficiency
βEC = 0.95. The coherent state amplitude is optimized via a coarse-grained search in the interval
[0.6, 0.8] with a step size of 0.05. Parameters for detectors are ηd = 0.552 and νel = 0.015 from
Ref. [30].
In Figure 6.15, we show the key rate as a function of transmission distance for two scenarios:
with or without postselection. Since the optimal postselection parameter does not change signif-
icantly for different distances, we optimize the postselection parameter ∆a via a coarse-grained
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search in a restricted interval. For this figure, we fix the coherent state amplitude to be 0.75 and
the channel excess noise ξ to be 0.01. We see postselection can indeed improve the key rate. The
percentage of improvement compared to the key rate without postselection is roughly between
5% to 8% and the probability of being postselected is around 70% to 80%. Thus, postselection
can reduce the amount of data for postprocessing by around 20% to 30% while improving the
key rate.



























































Figure 6.15: Comparison of key rates with or without postselection in the trusted detector noise
scenario. Detector parameters are from Ref. [30] where ηd = 0.552 and νel = 0.015. The difference
of two curves is also plotted with the secondary y axis on the right. Other parameters are the
channel excess noise ξ = 0.01, the coherent state amplitude α = 0.75, and the error-correction
efficiency βEC = 0.95. The postselection parameter is optimized via a coarse-grained search in
the interval [0.45,0.7] with a step size 0.05.
We end this section with a remark on the postselection pattern. The postselection pattern
(see Figure 6.1) studied in this work is a simple, intuitive, and convenient choice when we evaluate
the region operators. However, it is not necessarily the optimal way to postselect data [192, 194].
It is an interesting future work to investigate other patterns of postselection.
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6.10 Application of dimension reduction method to remove the
photon-number cutoff assumption
Finally, we discuss the application of the dimension reduction method (Section 4.2.3) in [85] to
the heterodyne protocol to remove the photon-number cutoff assumption. To obtain a tight key
rate and to ease the numerical computation, it is important to choose the subspace HN carefully.
In our work [85], we choose the displaced Fock space. Specifically, for each possible choice of
states |αx〉 sent by Alice, we choose a displacement βx ∈ C and consider the displaced Fock
space {|nβx〉 := D̂(βx) |n〉 : 0 ≤ n ≤ N} for a cutoff photon number N . The basis for Alice
and Bob’s joint subspace HN is given by {|x〉 ⊗ |nβx〉 : x ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, 0 ≤ n ≤ N}. A main
observation that leads to this choice of subspace is that if the quantum channel is a pure-loss
channel, then each state that Bob receives is a coherent state with an amplitude
√
ηα for the
total transmittance η. This state is the displaced vacuum state with the displacement β =
√
ηα.
Thus, for any N ≥ 0, the chosen subspace HN captures all the information about the state.
This means the finite-dimensional optimization problem with this choice of HN solves exactly
the original infinite-dimensional problem in this special case. When the quantum channel is a
lossy and noisy Gaussian channel, the expected state in an honest implementation is a displaced
thermal state. Then there is some weight leaked into displaced Fock states with n > 0. We can
use observed statistics from heterodyne detection to bound the weight outside the subspace HN
as we will discuss shortly.
As we work in the displaced Fock space, we use operators that are under conjugation of
displacement operators. For any operator X, we use the short-hand notation Xγ := D̂(γ)XD̂
†(γ)
where γ ∈ C is the amount of displacement. We choose the following set of constraints
{Γi} = {|x〉〈x| ⊗ n̂βx , |x〉〈x| ⊗ n̂2βx : x ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}}. (6.27)
The reason for this choice is that we use n̂βx , n̂
2
βx
to bound the weight W outside the subspace
as sufficiently small as we desire. It might be possible to choose other constraints that achieve a
similar goal. We leave it as future work.




















ρ ≥ 0 ,
(6.28)
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where 〈n̂βx〉x and 〈n̂2βx〉x denote the expectation values of the operator n̂βx and the operator n̂
2
βx
when Alice sends the state labeled by x, respectively. To apply the dimension reduction method,













|nβx〉〈nβx | . (6.30)
One can bound the weight W outside the subspace by the dual problem of Eq. (4.50). Specif-
ically, it is given in [85, Theorem 5].
Theorem 6.10.1 ([85, Theorem 5]). For the DMCVQKD protocol with ΠN defined in Eq. (6.29),








The proof of this theorem consists of two parts. The first part is to show that W =
∑
x pxWx




. The second part is to show Wx =
〈n̂2βx 〉x−〈n̂βx 〉x
N(N+1) by looking
at the dual problem of the optimization problem in Eq. (4.50) for ρxB. A specific dual feasible
solution gives the desired upper bound of Wx. We direct readers to [85] for the proof.
















ρ̃ ∈ Pos(HB) ,
(6.32)
where W is given in Eq. (6.31).
We use the same simulation method as in the ideal detector scenario. The result for this
scenario is shown in Figure 6.16. In particular, we can write the asymptotic key rate R∞ as
R∞ = Cnum −∆(W ), where ∆(W ) is given in Eq. (4.52) with |Z| = 4 for this protocol. In the
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Figure 6.16: Key rate versus distance for comparing results obtained by the dimension reduction
method and the one from Ref. [81] based on the photon-number cutoff assumption. Uncorrected
value, i.e. Cnum, is also plotted for comparison. Results are in the ideal detector scenario and
with the channel excess noise ξ = 0.01. Postselection parameters and signal-state intensities from
Ref. [81] are used: α = 0.6,∆p = 0, and ∆a is optimized with a coarse-grained search over the
interval [0.5, 0.65]. The subspace dimension parameter is N = 20.
same plot, we also show the uncorrected value Cnum, and we can see the correction term ∆(W )
does not affect the key rate much. It is interesting to note that the key rate obtained by the
dimension reduction method is close to the key rate obtained under the photon-number cutoff
assumption in previous sections [81]. In other words, all qualitative observations made in this
chapter with the photon-number cutoff assumption remain valid after removing this assumption.
In the case of trusted detector noise scenario, we need to change Bob’s POVM from the ideal
detector POVM { 1π |γ〉〈γ| : γ ∈ C} to the trusted noisy detector POVM {Gy : y ∈ C}. This
change affects both the objective function and the observables used for constraints. In particular,
for the set of constraints used in Eq. (6.27), one can show [85, Appendix D] that the ideal and
noisy observables are related by linear combinations. Following the notation used in Ref. [85],
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we denote the noisy counterpart of an operator A by [A]′. It can be shown that
[n̂√ηdβx ]





+ ηd(4νel + 1− ηd)n̂βx(2ν2el + νel)1 . (6.34)
This means if we replace region operators used in the objective function of Eq. (6.32) and the




x , which can be
obtained by the reverse relationship between the ideal and noisy observables as follows:
〈n̂βx〉effx =














then the finite-dimensional optimization problem in the trusted detector noise scenario is also in
the form of Eq. (6.32). As expected, the key rate obtained in the trusted detector noise scenario
is also close to the key rate obtained under the photon-number cutoff assumption in previous
sections [81]. More results can be found in Ref. [85].
6.11 Future directions
We note that a recent work [205] applies our numerical approach to investigate the postselection
patterns for DMCVQKD. It shows that the postselection based on the phase can improve the key
rate for long distances. This observation is different from ours. While it is possible that we missed
this result due to the looseness introduced by some numerical instability or due to our exploration
of different parameter regimes, we have not been able to reproduce their results by the time of
writing. It remains an ongoing effort to validate their results. Interestingly, they investigate
an alternative postselection pattern: cross-shape in the phase space. They show that the cross-
shape can perform similarly as the postselection with both amplitude and phase. Moreover, it
can give better key rates in some scenarios. Investigation of optimal postselection patterns is an
interesting direction to explore. Moreover, a recent work by Denys, Brown and Leverrier [206]
gives an analytical solution for general discrete-modulation schemes. Their method is based on
finding an analytical solution to the SDP in Ref. [191], which is based on the optimality of
Gaussian attacks [182, 183]. Since numerical methods become more computationally challenging
as the constellation size increases due to the fact that the dimension of the optimization problem
depends on the number of signals sent by Alice, it is desirable to obtain analytical solutions for
large constellation sizes. Despite that the key rate obtained by the analytical approach [206] is
not tight for smaller constellation sizes, it approaches the key rate of Gaussian modulation as the
size increases (around 64 states). It is also interesting to investigate along this direction and to
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try to find analytical solutions of our optimization problem. However, solving our nonlinear SDP
problem analytically seems much more challenging. To improve the applicability of our numerical
method to higher constellation sizes, one possible way is to improve the optimization algorithm
as it is done in our work [87] by invoking a preprocessing technique to transform the optimization
problem to a lower-dimensional one and applying an efficient algorithm. When the algorithm
is generalized to include inequality constraints and semidefinite ordering constraints in a future
work, we expect that our numerical method can handle much large constellation size than we
currently can. However, it may remain challenging for this approach to analyze 64 states, which
is done analytically in [206]. Another possible direction to explore is whether one can invent
another dimension reduction method to reduce Alice’s dimension.
We also note that the error correction protocol used in our security analysis does not use
soft information such as the amplitude of Bob’s measurement outcomes. As such, we do not
use the channel capacity of binary additive white Gaussian noise channel that is used in Refs.
[191, 206] for the mutual information between Alice and Bob. Instead, our estimation of the
mutual information is related to the binary symmetric channel. While many error correction
codes have been studied to achieve higher and higher reconciliation efficiency for the binary
additive white Gaussian noise channel, the study of codes for the binary symmetric channel
is usually outside the parameter interests in CVQKD. Unfortunately, the study of the error
correction protocols is beyond the scope of this thesis. It remains an interesting future work to
investigate how to use soft information in our current security proof method so that we can obtain
higher mutual information and enjoy better reconciliation efficiency. It is also interesting to see
concrete code constructions for the binary symmetric channel in the parameter regimes relevant
for DMCVQKD.
Finally, our current analyses are all restricted to the asymptotic scenario. We notice that
there is a recent work on the finite-key analysis of binary modulation protocol [207]. However,
the key rate obtained was very pessimistic due to the poor performance of the binary modulation
scheme. One expects that the QPSK scheme will have much better performance. It remains
an open question to provide a finite key analysis of general discrete modulation beyond binary
modulation. As we have extended the underlying numerical method used in this security analysis
to finite-key regime [84] recently, we hope to perform the finite key analysis for discrete modulation
schemes, especially the protocol studied here. However, there remain technical challenges to solve




Asymptotic security analysis of
DMCVQKD with homodyne
detection
Similarly to the heterodyne scheme discussed in Chapter 6, one can consider a homodyne scheme.
For this protocol, we consider only the ideal detector scenario under the photon-number cutoff
assumption (see Section 6.5). In principle, the extension to the trusted detector noise can be done
in a similar way as the heterodyne scheme. The removal of the photon-number cutoff assumption
based on the dimension reduction method requires some work to bound the weight outside the
desired subspace. We leave these extensions for future work. This chapter is based on [81].
7.1 Protocol description
(1). State preparation.—For each round k ∈ [N ] (where N is sufficiently large), according to the






2 ), Alice prepares a coherent state |ψk〉 from the
set {|α〉 , |−α〉 , |iα〉 , |−iα〉}, where α ∈ R is predetermined. Alice sends this state to Bob
through an insecure quantum channel.
(2). Measurement.—After receiving Alice’s state, Bob performs a homodyne measurement on
the state. Bob first generates a random bit bk according to the probability distribution
(pB, 1 − pB). If bk = 0, he measures the q quadrature and if bk = 1, he measures the p
quadrature. He obtains the measurement outcome yk ∈ R.
(3). Announcement and sifting.—After N rounds of first two steps, Alice and Bob communicate
via the authenticated classical channel to partition all the rounds [N ] into four subsets
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defined as
Iqq = {k ∈ [N ] : |ψk〉 ∈ {|α〉 , |−α〉}, bk = 0},
Iqp = {k ∈ [N ] : |ψk〉 ∈ {|α〉 , |−α〉}, bk = 1},
Ipq = {k ∈ [N ] : |ψk〉 ∈ {|iα〉 , |−iα〉}, bk = 0},
Ipp = {k ∈ [N ] : |ψk〉 ∈ {|iα〉 , |−iα〉}, bk = 1}.
(7.1)
Then Alice and Bob randomly select a small test subset Iqq,test ⊂ Iqq. This selection allows
them to define Ikey as the subset of Iqq after removing Iqq,test and to define Itest = Iqq,test∪
Iqp ∪ Ipq ∪ Ipp. Let m denote the size of the index set Ikey and let f be a bijective function
from [m] = {1, 2, . . . ,m} to Ikey. After sifting, Alice sets her string X = (x1, x2, . . . , xm)
according to the rule











(4). Parameter estimation.—Alice and Bob perform the parameter estimation by disclosing all
the information in the rounds indexed by the test set Itest. To perform such an analysis,
they process the data by computing quantities like the first and second moments of q and
p quadratures conditioned on each of four states that Alice sends. These quantities allow
them to constrain their joint state ρAB. They then calculate the secret key rate according
to the optimization problem in Eq. (7.4). If their analysis shows that no secret keys can be
generated, then they abort the protocol. Otherwise, they proceed.
(5). Reverse reconciliation key map.—Bob performs a key map to obtain his raw key string.
This key map discretizes his measurement outcome yk to an element in the set {0, 1,⊥} for





0 if yf(j) ∈ [∆c,∞),
1 if yf(j) ∈ (−∞,−∆c],
⊥ if yf(j) ∈ (−∆c,∆c).
(7.3)
Note that ∆c ≥ 0 is a parameter related to the postselection of data. A protocol with-
out postselection can set ∆c = 0. At the end of this process, Bob has a string Z =
(z1, z2, . . . , zm). In communication between Alice and Bob, positions with the symbol ⊥ are
deleted from their strings. With a slight abuse of notation, we use X,Z to mean the strings
after removing the positions related to ⊥. Z is called the raw key string.
(6). Error correction and privacy amplification.—Bob chooses a suitable error-correction proto-
col and a suitable privacy-amplification protocol according to the security analysis done in
the parameter estimation step and communicates the choices to Alice. Alice and Bob then
apply the chosen error-correction protocol and privacy-amplification protocol to generate a
secret key.
167
We remark on the asymmetric roles of these four states and asymmetric choices of quadra-
ture measurements considered here. In this specific setup, Alice and Bob use only signal states
{|α〉 , |−α〉} and q quadrature measurement data to generate keys and use all other combinations
to probe eavesdropping activities. In the asymptotic limit, we can set pA and pB arbitrarily close
to 1 so that the sifting factor of the protocol is 1 (in the absence of postselection) [163]. However,
for a finite number N , it is unlikely that pA and pB can be arbitrarily close to 1, since one needs
to balance the trade-off between the sifting factor and the accuracy of parameter estimation. In
this case, one needs to optimize the choices of pA and pB for a given choice of N . The reason that
we choose this asymmetric version here is to simplify some numerical calculation and to maximize
the sifting factor. We may also consider another variant of this protocol, that is, allowing Alice
and Bob to generate keys from both Iqq and Ipp. Then for pA = pB = 12 , the protocol has
1
2
sifting factor (in the absence of postselection). However, we point out that the essential idea of
our security proof in the asymptotic limit is the same for these different variations.
7.2 Key rate optimization
From the homodyne measurement, we can obtain expectation values of the first and second
moments of the quadrature operators 〈q̂〉, 〈q̂2〉, 〈p̂〉, and 〈p̂2〉. We can calculate the mean photon
number of each conditional state ρxB from the homodyne measurement outcomes, since n̂ =
1
2(q̂
2 + p̂2 − 1) = â†â. Since d̂ = q̂2 − p̂2 = â2 + (â†)2, we also calculate the expectation value of d̂
to constrain ρAB.






Tr[ρAB(|x〉〈x|A ⊗ q̂)] = px〈q̂〉x,
Tr[ρAB(|x〉〈x|A ⊗ p̂)] = px〈p̂〉x,











pipj 〈ϕj |ϕi〉 |i〉〈j|A ,
ρAB ≥ 0,
(7.4)
where x ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} and 〈q̂〉x, 〈p̂〉x, 〈n̂〉x, and 〈d̂〉x denote the corresponding expectation values
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of operators q̂, p̂, n̂, and d̂ for the conditional state ρxB, respectively. In Appendix C.2, we discuss
how we make these operators finite dimensional under the photon-number cutoff assumption.
We remark that one can add more fine-grained constraints using the POVM description of
homodyne measurements or using the interval operators I0 and I1, which we define shortly.
Additional constraints can only improve the key rate, as they reduce the size of the feasible set
S. Nevertheless, we observe that this set of constraints already gives us quite tight key rates.
We expect that additional constraints will provide only marginal improvements. For the ease of
presentation, we choose this set of coarse-grained constraints.
We now specify the maps G and Z. For the reverse reconciliation, the postprocessing map




|z〉R ⊗ (|0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|)A ⊗ (
√
Iz)B, (7.5)





dq |q〉〈q| , I1 =
∫ −∆c
−∞
dq |q〉〈q| . (7.6)
In the definition of K, we project Alice’s register A onto the subspace spanned by the first
two basis states (which are related to the states |α〉 and |−α〉) and act on Bob’s register by
interval operators from the q quadrature measurement, since secret keys are generated only
from the rounds where Alice sends |α〉 or |−α〉 and Bob performs q quadrature measurements
in this protocol. We remark how the postselection is handled in our security proof. Since ∆c
is a postselection parameter, the effect of postselection is reflected in the definition of interval
operators which are used in the postprocessing map G. Finally, the pinching quantum channel Z
is described by the projections Z0 = |0〉〈0|R ⊗ 1AB and Z1 = |1〉〈1|R ⊗ 1AB.
7.3 Simulated statistics and calculation of error correction cost
We follow the same simulation method as in Section 6.4. From the homodyne measurement, for











〈d̂〉x = η[α2x + (α∗x)2].
(7.7)
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With these values specified, we perform the optimization to bound Eve’s information.
Since we simulate the experimental behavior and the cost of error correction is not a part
of the optimization, we now present the analytical formula to estimate δEC from the simulated
statistics and numerically evaluate the formula. In this protocol, we use only |+α〉 , |−α〉 (α ∈ R)
and the q quadrature measurement to generate keys. After Bob performs his key map, Alice
and Bob effectively communicate via a binary channel for the purpose of error correction. From
the simulation, the probability distributions of Bob’s q quadrature measurement outcomes for
conditional states ρ0B and ρ
1
B are









































From Eq. (6.21), we can calculate the error correction cost δEC by the following expression:
δEC = (1− βEC)H(Z) + βECH(Z|X)
= (1− βEC)H(Z) + βECh(e).
(7.11)
In this chapter, we use βEC = 0.95 in all figures unless mentioned otherwise.
7.4 Simulation results
7.4.1 Loss-only scenario
We first present the results for the loss-only scenario, that is, ξ = 0. We plot the key rate versus
transmission distance in the loss-only scenario for this protocol in Section 7.4.1. As discussed in
Section 6.6, we can also obtain an analytical result for the homodyne scheme to have a direct
comparison with our numerical result. We outline this procedure below.
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The procedure outlined here is similar to the calculation in Ref. [194]. For this protocol, since






, which span only












= c0 |e0〉 − c1 |e1〉 ,
(7.12)
































We now directly evaluate the Devetak-Winter formula
R∞ = βECI(X :Z)− χ(Z :E). (7.14)
We obtain I(X :Z) by a calculation similar to Eq. (7.11). We can directly calculate χ(Z :E) via
χ(Z :E) = H(ρE)−
1∑
j=0
P (z = j)H(ρE,j), (7.15)




P (x = i, z = j)





P (z = j)ρE,j ,
(7.16)
where P (x, z) is the joint probability distribution of x and z and P (z) is the marginal prob-
ability distribution of z. Each of the relevant Eve’s states |εx〉 has a two-dimensional matrix
representation in the basis {|e0〉 , |e1〉}, and, thus, it is straightforward to directly evaluate the
Devetak-Winter formula.
In Section 7.4.1, we observe a similar numerical behavior as in the case of heterodyne detection
in Section 6.7.1. We also include the repeaterless secret key capacity bound for the pure-loss
channel [64, 65], that is, R∞ ≤ − log2(1− η). With the reconciliation efficiency βEC = 0.95, the
key rate for this protocol is roughly 1/15 of the secret key capacity bound.
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First step (approximate upper bound)
Second step (reliable lower bound)
Figure 7.1: Secure key rates versus the transmission distance for the pure-loss channel to demon-
strate the numerical behavior of our two-step key rate calculation procedure and to compare with
the analytical results (direct evaluation of the Devetak-Winter formula). The transmittance is
η = 10−0.02L for each distance L in kilometers, and the reconciliation efficiency is βEC = 0.95.
The curve with circle markers is the approximate upper bound from the first step, and the curve
with star markers is the reliable lower bound obtained from the second step. The curve with
square markers is the analytical results presented in Section 7.4.1. The solid line with no markers
is the repeaterless secret key capacity bound [65]. The coherent state amplitude α is optimized
via a coarse-grained search in the interval [0.36, 0.6].
7.4.2 Noisy scenario
We first investigate the optimal choice of coherent state amplitude α in the absence of postselec-
tion, that is, ∆c = 0. In Figure 7.2, we plot the key rate versus the choice of α for a selected set
of distances in the case of the excess noise ξ = 0.01. The optimal choice of α for each distance
L = 20, 50, 80, 100 km lies around 0.4, corresponding to a mean photon number of 0.16 from
Alice’s source. We also see that the optimal choice does not change significantly for different
distances. This observation allows us to search in a restricted interval when we optimize α to
maximize the key rate for each transmission distance.
In Figure 7.3, we show the secret key rates as a function of the transmission distance for the
QPSK protocol with homodyne detection for different choices of excess noise ξ. For this plot,
we optimize the coherent state amplitude α by a coarse-grained search in the interval [0.35, 0.6].
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(a) L = 20 km
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(b) L = 50 km
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(c) L = 80 km
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(d) L = 100 km
Figure 7.2: Secure key rate for the homodyne protocol versus coherent state amplitude α for
selected choices of distances (a) L = 20 km, (b) L = 50 km, (c) L = 80 km, and (d) L = 100 km
with the excess noise ξ = 0.01 and reconciliation efficiency βEC = 0.95.
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As we can see from the plot, we can reach around 200 km with an experimentally feasible value
of excess noise, say, ξ = 0.01 [30, 34] with the current technology before the key rate becomes
insignificant (say, less than 10−6 per pulse). To put the number in a more concrete and realistic
context, if we consider a system with the repetition rate of 1 GHz and with the detector efficiency
55%, we can obtain 103 bits per second at the distance of around 170 km if the total excess noise
ξ can be made to be 1% or less.



































Figure 7.3: Secure key rate versus the transmission distance for the homodyne protocol for
different values of the excess noise, from top to bottom, ξ = 0.002, 0.005, 0.01, 0.015, 0.02. The
coherent state amplitude α is optimized via a coarse-grained search in the interval [0.35, 0.6], the
transmittance is η = 10−0.02L for each distance L in kilometers and the reconciliation efficiency
is βEC = 0.95.
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) β=0. 95, ∆c =0
β=0. 95, ∆c > 0
β=0. 9, ∆c =0
β=0. 9, ∆c > 0
(b)
Figure 7.4: Secure key rate for the homodyne protocol with postselection. The excess noise is
ξ = 0.02, and the coherent state amplitude is α = 0.45. (a) Secure key rate versus the postselection
parameter ∆c at the distance L = 20 km with the reconciliation efficiency βEC = 0.95. (b) Secure
key rate versus the transmission distance with or without postselection for two different values
of βEC. Solid lines have βEC = 0.95, and dashed lines have βEC = 0.9. Lines with (red) circle
markers have ∆c = 0, and lines with (black) triangle markers have ∆c optimized via a coarse-
grained search in the interval [0.5, 0.7].
We also investigate the effects of postselection. The idea of postselection was initially intro-
duced to CVQKD protocols in order to beat the 3 dB limit [192]. The key rate can be potentially
improved by discarding very noisy data where Eve has more advantages in determining the raw
key than the party (Bob in the case of direct reconciliation and Alice in the case of reverse
reconciliation) who needs to match the raw key via the error correction. Intuitively, if we opti-
mize the postselection parameter ∆c, the key rate can never be lower than the protocol without
postselection since one can always set ∆c = 0 if it is optimal to do so. The important obser-
vation here is that our security proof technique allows us to consider postselection with ∆c > 0
by a simple modification of the postprocessing map G, unlike previous security proofs based on
Gaussian optimality. In Figure 7.4, we take the case with an excess noise ξ = 0.02 and a fixed
coherent state amplitude α = 0.45 as an example to illustrate how the postselection strategy can
improve the key rate in the reverse reconciliation scheme and to what extent it can help. We
first search an optimal value for the postselection parameter ∆c by a coarse-grained search, and
we see, in Figure 7.4a, that the optimal value is around 0.6 at the distance L = 20 km. We also
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obtain similar plots for different choices of distance and find that the optimal value falls roughly
in the interval [0.5, 0.7]. In Figure 7.4b, we compare the key rate with postselection (∆c > 0) to
that without postselection (∆c = 0) for two values of reconciliation efficiency βEC. In this plot,
we optimize the postselection parameter ∆c via a coarse-grained search in the interval [0.5, 0.7].
Since the curves with postselection are above the curves without postselection, we see that the
postselection strategy can improve the key rates. We also notice that, for reverse reconciliation
schemes, the advantage of postselection also depends on the reconciliation efficiency βEC. The
gap between these two scenarios ∆c = 0 and ∆c > 0 is smaller when a more efficient code (larger
βEC) is used.
7.5 Comparison between the homodyne and heterodyne proto-
cols





























Homodyne detection,  ξ=0.01
Heterodyne detection, ξ=0.01
Homodyne detection,  ξ=0.02
Heterodyne detection, ξ=0.02
Heterodyne detection, ξ=0.04
Figure 7.5: Secure key rate versus transmission distance for a direct comparison between the
homodyne and heterodyne protocols. It is important to note that these two protocols have
different protocol descriptions in terms of probability distribution of signal states and key map in
addition to the difference in the detection setup. Curves for the homodyne protocol are plotted
with triangle markers (from Figure 7.3); the excess noise is ξ = 0.01, 0.02 from top to bottom for
curves with triangle markers. Curves for the heterodyne protocol are plotted with circle markers
(from Figure 6.6); the excess noise is ξ = 0.01, 0.02, 0.04 from top to bottom for curves with circle
markers.
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In this section, we compare the heterodyne detection protocol studied in Chapter 6 and the
homodyne detection protocol studied in this chapter. Before we compare results, it is important to
notice that these two protocols have different protocol descriptions in addition to the difference
in the detection setup. In particular, the homodyne protocol here uses a similar idea of the
efficient BB84 protocol [163] and uses only two out of four states for the key generation, while the
heterodyne protocol uses all four states and the probability distribution for choosing each signal
is uniform. With this in mind, we compare these two protocols and discuss issues. We see that
the key rate for the heterodyne protocol is much higher than the homodyne protocol when the
excess noise is large. For a direct comparison, we replot key rates of both protocols for the values
of excess noise ξ = 0.01 and 0.02 from Figure 7.3 and Figure 6.6 in Figure 7.5. We observe that
the heterodyne protocol achieves much higher key rates and reaches longer distances than the
homodyne protocol studied in this chapter for the same amount of excess noise. In this figure,
we also plot the key rate of the heterodyne protocol with the excess noise ξ = 0.04 for a direct
comparison to the key rate of the homodyne protocol with the excess noise ξ = 0.02. We see
that the heterodyne protocol behaves similarly as the homodyne protocol with half of the excess
noise for those values of excess noise considered here. This result is unsatisfying. We believe this
discrepancy comes from our treatment of homodyne protocols. Since we use only two states to
generate keys and two other states purely for the testing purpose, our treatment for this QPSK
scheme is more like a binary modulation scheme, which has worse performances. We note that
a recent work [208] based on our method claims significantly higher key rate for this homodyne
scheme by applying a different key map and using all four states. While we have not verified the
validity of their results, it is not completely surprising that a different key map can significantly
improve the key rate and bring the performance of the homodyne protocol close to the heterodyne
protocol. We aim at trying to reproduce their results in a near future.
7.6 Future directions
We would like first to reproduce the results in a recent work [208] and verify that a change of
key map can significantly improve the performance of this protocol. We also would like to extend
the analysis to the trusted detector noise scenario and also without the photon-number cutoff
assumption. Then we want to perform the finite key analysis for this protocol as well.
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Chapter 8
Finite key analysis via the entropy
accumulation theorem
Finite key analysis is important for practical QKD implementations. As we discussed in Chap-
ter 3, there are several existing methods to calculate the finite key rate for general QKD protocols.
We have extended the numerical framework [144, 146] to the finite key regime (Section 4.3) [84],
which can be easily combined with the quantum de Finetti theorem (Section 3.5) or the postselec-
tion technique (Section 3.6) to prove the security against the general attacks. Another interesting
technique that we mentioned in Section 3.7 is the entropy accumulation theorem. It has been
successfully applied to DIQKD protocols and produced tight key rates [43]. So far, the entropy
accumulation theorem [97, 98] has not been applied to device-dependent QKD protocols beyond
a simple application to single-photon entanglement-based BB84 studied in the first EAT paper
[97]. There are two major obstacles to overcome in applying EAT to device-dependent QKD.
The first one is to guarantee the Markov condition is satisfied by the protocol. This condition
in effect guarantees the protocol is well-behaved in what side-information is leaked to Eve dur-
ing the protocol. This is an important aspect of applying the EAT to device-dependent QKD
protocols, as device-dependent protocols often make use of announcing more information about
each signal than DI protocols. The second challenge is to have a general method to construct the
required min-tradeoff function. This challenge has been addressed for the DI scenario in a recent
work [44], but has not been addressed in the device-dependent scenario in which we have more
structure of which to take advantage. In this chapter, we apply numerical methods described in
Section 4.4 to construct min-tradeoff functions for device-dependent QKD protocols satisfying the
above restrictions. The purpose of this chapter is to use simple examples to illustrate principles
and demonstrate that our method can produce good key rates for various protocols.
Our work here provides a first step along the research direction of applying the EAT to
general device-dependent QKD protocols. Currently, we limit ourselves to entanglement-based
178
protocols. To handle prepare-and-measure protocols, one needs to be able to incorporate the
source-replacement scheme [110] into the EAT subprotocol and to add a promise that Alice’s
reduced density operator is not affected by Eve’s attacks. There remain technical challenges to
do so. We leave it for future work. Another restriction is that in all examples considered here,
all public announcements are based on seeded randomness so that the Markov chain condition
(Definition 2.2.39) required in the EAT is trivially satisfied. In our forthcoming paper [83], we
will report more results regarding the Markov chain condition. We will show that when Alice’s
and Bob’s POVMs related to announcements and results of the key map satisfy a simple block-
diagonal structure, then the protocol satisfies the Markov chain condition. We note that this
block-diagonal structure is satisfied for many practical discrete-variable QKD protocols and it is
a sufficient (probably not necessary) condition.
8.1 EAT subprotocol
To prove the security of QKD protocol, we use the EAT subprotocol to calculate the smooth
min-entropy (or the sandwiched Rényi entropy) rate. A QKD protocol can consist of the EAT
subprotocol followed by error correction and privacy amplification subprotocols. The EAT sub-
protocol is described in Protocol 8.1.
Protocol 8.1 Device-Dependent Entropy Accumulation Subprotocol
Inputs:
{MAa }, {MBb } Alice and Bob’s measurement devices (POVMs)
K Subset of Alice and Bob’s public announcements kept in the general sifting step
N ∈ N+ Number of rounds
γ ∈ (0, 1) Probability of testing
Q Set of acceptable frequency distributions over X
Protocol:
0. State Transmission: Eve distributes the N states, which may be entangled in an




1. For i ∈ [N ], do Steps 2-7:
2. Measurements: Alice and Bob implement their local POVMs {MAa }a, {MBb }b to
measure their respective halves of the state and record their outcomes.
3. Data Partition and Announcement: Alice partitions her data into public register
Ãi, and private register Ai. Likewise, Bob partitions his data into public register B̃i
and private register Bi. Then they announce their public data.
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4. Rounds Labeling: Alice randomly chooses Ti ∈ {0, 1} according to some function
fT : Ã× B̃ → {0, 1}, which only depends on the side information that is randomly
seeded. This is the division of data into testing and non-testing sets.
5. General Sifting: If (Ãi, B̃i, Ti) ∈ KC ×{0} where KC is the complement of the set K,
Alice sets the Ai =⊥. Denote
S = {i ∈ [N ] : (Ãi, B̃i, Ti) ∈ KC × {0}}
and let AS denote the collection of registers that correspond to discarded events.
6. Statistical Tests:
 If Ti = 1, Alice announces Ai publicly. Using this information, Bob generates Xi
using a deterministic function t such that Xi = t(Ai, Bi, Ãi, B̃i).
 If Ti = 0, Bob sets Xi =⊥ and sets Bi =⊥.
Denote T = {i ∈ [N ] : Ti = 1} and denote registers that Alice announces by AT .
7. Key Map: If (Ãi, B̃i, Ti) ∈ K× {0}, Alice updates Ai := fKM(Ai, Ãi, B̃i) where fKM is
the key map.
8. Parameter Estimation: Alice and Bob abort the protocol if freq(XN1 ) 6∈ Q.
We remark that in the EAT subprotocol, for the security proof purpose, we set Bob’s private
register Bi to be the ⊥ symbol when the round is used for key generation. This procedure is not
executed in a real protocol.
8.2 Key length
We may use the EAT (Section 3.7) to bound the smooth min-entropy and then apply the leftover
hashing lemma (Theorem 3.3.2) to bound the key length. Interestingly, we note a recent work
[99] that proves a version of EAT to bound the sandwiched Rényi entropy of order α ∈ (1, 2] and
also a version of leftover hashing lemma based on these sandwiched Rényi entropy directly to
bound the key length. We present two theorems about the key length based on these two results.
We state conversions from registers in EAT statements in Section 3.7 to the QKD scenario as
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E ↔ E .
With these conversions, we state the smooth min-entropy rate of the entropy accumulation sub-
protocol (Protocol 8.1).
Theorem 8.2.1. Consider the entropy accumulation protocol defined in Protocol 8.1 where the
announcement structure satisfies the Markov chain condition. Let Ω = Q and ρ be the output of
the protocol. Let h such that f(q) ≥ h for all q ∈ Q where f is the min-tradeoff function. Then





1 |ÃN1 B̃N1 TN1 E)ρ|Ω > Nh− c
√
N − c′ , (8.1)
where c and c′ are given by Eqs. (3.68) and (3.69), and we replace ρ[Ω] by εEA.























with V defined in Eq. (3.64) and Kα defined in Eq. (3.66) with the classical systems Si = AiBi.
As we simply check that the requirements of EAT are satisfied in Protocol 8.1, the proof is
trivial.
Remark 8.2.2. The statement of the theorem requires that either the protocol aborts with
probability greater than 1 − εEA or else the bound holds. In the language of Renner’s Ph.D.
thesis [89], this says either ρ is εEA-securely filtered or the bound holds. This explains why
parameter estimation goes away and how it is replaced with εEA in the statement of ε-security.
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This leads to the following theorem for the key length if we use the second version of EAT
(Theorem 3.7.4) [98].
Theorem 8.2.3. Consider any entanglement-based QKD protocol which has the testing structure
as in the EAT subprotocol (Protocol 8.1). Let γ be the probability of testing. Let h ≤ f(q) for
all q ∈ Q where f is a min-tradeoff function. The QKD protocol is ε-secure for key length
` ≤ Nh− leakEC −Nγ log2(|A||B|)−
√
Nδ − κ− 2 log2(2/εPA) (8.4)
where A, B are the alphabets of private outcomes Alice and Bob announce in the statistical tests
excluding the symbol ⊥, and
δ = 2 log2(1 + 2dS)
√
1− 2 log2(ε̄/4 · (εEA + εEC)) + c̃







where c̃ is c in Eq. (3.68) with ε = ε̄/4, c̃′ is c′ in Eq. (3.69) with ε = ε̄/4, and dS is the maximum
dimension of Si = AiBi. In particular, ε ≤ εEA+ε̄+εEC+εPA. In other words, either the protocol
aborts with a probability greater than 1−εEA−εEC or the key is (εEC+ε̄+εPA)-correct-and-secure.
Moreover, this result can be further optimized for each specific block-length by optimizing α in
Theorem 3.7.4 instead of the fixed α value that leads to c and c′. That is,
` ≤Nh− leakEC −Nγ log2(|A||B|)− 2 log2(2/εPA)− δEAT
− 2
√
N log2(1 + 2dS)
√






where δEAT is given in Eq. (8.3) with ε̄ replaced by ε̄/4.
Proof. See Appendix D.2.
If we use the result for the sandwiched Rényi entropy and the corresponding leftover hashing
lemma [99], one can show the following:
Theorem 8.2.4. Consider any entanglement-based QKD protocol which has the testing structure
as in the EAT subprotocol (Protocol 8.1). Let γ be the probability of testing. Let h ≤ f(q) for
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all q ∈ Q where f is a min-tradeoff function. Let β ∈ (1, 2), δ ∈ (1/2, 1), and α = −β+δ−1+2δ−βδ . The
QKD protocol is ε-secure for key length
` ≤ Nh− leakEC −Nγ log2(|A||B|)−N
(β − 1) ln 2
2


















where A, B are the alphabets of private outcomes Alice and Bob announce in the statistical tests
excluding the symbol ⊥, dS is the maximum dimension of Si = AiBi, and
V =
√





6(2− β)3 ln 2
2(β−1)[log2 dS+Max(f)−MinΣ(f)] ln3
(




In particular, ε ≤ εEA + εEC + εsec. In other words, either the protocol aborts with a probability
greater than 1− εEA − εEC or the key is (εEC + εsec)-correct-and-secure.
This proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 8.2.3 by adopting results from Ref. [99] instead
of Theorem 3.7.4 [98]. We direct readers to [83] for a full derivation. As we see later, this result
gives tighter key rate for small block sizes.
Remark 8.2.5. By comparing Theorem 8.2.4 with Theorem 8.2.3, we note that εPA and ε̄ are
not introduced in Theorem 8.2.4. Instead they are replaced by a single security parameter εsec.
The reason that εPA is used previously is explained after Theorem 3.3.2, the leftover hashing
lemma. There are two contributing terms to the secrecy trace distance bound in Eq. (3.8).
One of the terms is the smoothing parameter ε̄ as we use the smooth min-entropy to relate the
length of secret keys with the trace distance bound. We then set the other term as εPA so that
εsec = ε̄ + εPA. This separation follows the convention in literature. In contrast, Theorem 8.2.4
uses a version of leftover hashing lemma based on the sandwiched Rényi entropy [99]. Without
the smoothing parameter ε̄, we do not divide εsec to more terms here.
8.3 Overview of examples
One simple way to guarantee the Markov chain condition [see Eq. (3.55)] is to use seeded random-
ness for all public information. That is, each register in the compound register Pi is generated by
a random number. All examples in this chapter use the seeded randomness so that the Markov
chain condition is trivially satisfied.
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We apply the two numerical algorithms described in Section 4.4 to calculate finite-key rates.
For the construction of min-tradeoff function, we use the crossover min-tradeoff function (Def-
inition 3.7.5) since it gives higher key rates than the standard min-tradeoff function (Defini-
tion 3.7.2). We briefly compare these two algorithms in the qubit BB84 protocol example (Sec-
tion 8.4) and the six-state four-state protocol example (Section 8.5) [209]. We also use these two
examples to compare key rates obtained from Theorems 8.2.3 and 8.2.4.
For all examples considered here, we choose the overall security parameter to be ε = 10−8.
For simplicity of calculation, we set all the contributors to the security parameter ε as ε̄ =
εEA = εEC = εPA = 2.5 × 10−9 when applying Theorem 8.2.3. In the case of Theorem 8.2.4,
we set εsec = 5 × 10−9 while keeping εEA = εEC = 2.5 × 10−9. We note that in principle these
parameters can be further optimized although we do not expect the results would be changed
significantly by such an optimization. To illustrate concepts, we consider the idea of the unique
acceptance for simplicity, that is, Q = {F } for some frequency distribution F ∈ P(X ). Our
implementation allows for the consideration of a more general acceptance set Q in the form of
Eq. (3.21). If the acceptance threshold t in the definition of Q is small, results in that case would
be very similar to results reported here with t = 0.
8.4 BB84 with qubit systems
We consider a simple entanglement-based BB84 protocol with qubit systems. In this example,
we assume that Alice and Bob each receive a qubit in each round of the protocol and they
perform Z-basis or X-basis measurements. We note that this assumption is not practical given
current state-of-the-art in experimental implementations. To guarantee this assumption, one may
require that the source emits single photons, detectors are photon-number resolving and there
is no photon loss in the process or alternatively there is a heralding process. Nevertheless, this
example is still interesting to discuss in detail for theoretical purposes.
8.4.1 Protocol details and simulation method
We consider one particular setup for this protocol: (1) Alice chooses the Z basis with a probability
pz and the X basis with a probability 1−pz, Bob chooses to measure the Z basis with a probability
pz and X basis with a probability 1− pz. (2) When they both choose Z basis, the round is used
for key generation; When they both choose X basis, the round is used for parameter estimation
(testing). When they choose different bases, the round is discarded. (3) They perform parameter
estimation before error correction. (4) For parameter estimation, we use the phase error POVM
{EX ,1−EX} where EX is the X-basis error operator. This corresponds to statistics {ex, 1− ex}
where ex is the X-basis error rate.
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We note that the testing probability γ is given by the probability that both Alice and Bob
choose the X-basis, that is, γ = (1− pz)2. The sifting factor for the key rate is p2z. We consider
an efficient version of BB84 [163] by allowing pz to be close to 1. This also corresponds to an
infrequent testing.
In our simulation, we use the simple depolarizing channel model to model noise. The simulated
state is





















where |Φ+〉 , |Φ−〉 , |Ψ+〉 and |Ψ−〉 are Bell states, and Q is the error rate.
8.4.2 Results
For Algorithm 4.2, we optimize the min-tradeoff functions by choosing different q0 = (Q, 1−Q)
where Q is searched over the interval [0.005, 0.07] with a step size 0.005. For each min-tradeoff
function generated from a particular value of Q, we calculate the key rate, which is the key length
` divided by the total number of signals N . We then choose the maximum key rate among all
possible choices of min-tradeoff functions generated in this way.
For Algorithm 4.3, we use the interior-point method from Matlab fmincon function for the
first step and then use CVX for the linearized dual problem [Eq. (4.88)]. We note that we
can also use the Frank-Wolfe algorithm in a similar way as the asymptotic key rate calculation
(Algorithm 4.1).
For both algorithms, we optimize pz by optimizing γ = (1 − pz)2 = 10−k where k is chosen
from the interval [2, 4] with a step size of 0.1. For block size larger than or equal to 1010, we
allow pz to be more closer to 1 by searching k in the interval [3, 7] with a step size of 0.2. We note
that we optimize the choice of α in the statement of Theorem 8.2.3 when we use this theorem,
and similarly we optimize both β and δ in the statement of Theorem 8.2.4.
In Figure 8.1, we compare the key rates obtained from these two algorithms with Theo-
rem 8.2.4. Interestingly, both algorithms give similar results while Algorithm 4.3 seems to be
slightly better in terms of the smallest number of signals for nonzero key rates. Intuitively, we ex-
pect Algorithm 4.3 to behave better as it takes into account some second-order correction terms,
while Algorithm 4.2 only looks for the min-tradeoff function that gives the highest leading-order
term. As we perform an optimization of the choice of min-tradeoff function by different initial q0’s
for Algorithm 4.2, we observe that the optimal finite key rate from Algorithm 4.2 is often given
by a min-tradeoff function that does not give the highest value for the leading-order term. For
this protocol example, this optimization of q0 seems effective even though we search only a single
parameter space instead of the full parameter space P(X ) for the initial point q0. Due to the
optimization of q0, the running time of Algorithm 4.2 is much slower than that of Algorithm 4.3.
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Figure 8.1: Key rate versus the number of signals for the qubit BB84 protocol with the error
rate Q = 0.01 and with different algorithms for the generation of min-tradeoff functions. The
red circle marker corresponds to Algorithm 4.2 while the green star marker corresponds to Algo-
rithm 4.3. Second-order correction terms are based on Theorem 8.2.4. Other protocol parameters
are optimized as described in the main text.
In Figure 8.2, we compare key rates given by Theorems 8.2.3 and 8.2.4 when we use Algo-
rithm 4.3. One can see that Theorem 8.2.4 gives better key rates. This confirms our expectation
that the EAT based on the sandwiched α-Rényi entropy is tighter than the EAT based on the
smooth min-entropy for lower-order correction terms.
8.5 Six-state four-state protocol
In the free space implementation of QKD protocols with polarization encoding, there is naturally
one axis that is stable against turbulence while other axes are slowly drifting. The idea of
reference-frame-independent [210] was motivated to address this issue and it was shown that
such a protocol can be robust to slow drifts. We consider the six-state four-state protocol [209]
which has the reference-frame-independent feature and is simpler in implementation.
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Figure 8.2: Key rate versus the number of signals for the qubit BB84 protocol with the error rate
Q = 0.01 and with different second-order correction terms. The red circle marker corresponds
to Theorem 8.2.3 with the second-order correction terms based on Ref. [98] while the green star
marker corresponds to Theorem 8.2.4 with the second-order terms from Ref. [99]. Other protocol
parameters are optimized as described in the main text.
8.5.1 Protocol details and simulation
We analyze the entanglement-based version of the six-state four-state protocol [209] and assume
that Alice and Bob each receive a qubit in each round for simplicity. In this protocol, Alice
measures the state in one of the X,Y and Z bases according to the probability distribution
((1 − pz)/2, (1 − pz)/2, pz), while Bob measures in one of X and Z bases with the probability
distribution (1 − pz, pz). Similarly to the previous qubit BB84 example, when both Alice and
Bob choose the Z-basis, this round is used for key generation. When Alice chooses X or Y basis
and Bob chooses X basis, this round is used for parameter estimation. We consider an efficient
version by allowing pz to be close to 1.
For the simulation, we assume the Z basis is free of misalignment. The misalignment happens
in the X-Y plane of the Bloch sphere. Thus, on top of the qubit depolarizing channel, we also
apply a unitary rotation along the Z axis to Bob’s qubit in order to model the misalignment. We
choose the angle of rotation to be 11◦ in the simulation. In our security analysis, we use the error
rates in the XX and Y X bases as constraints.
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8.5.2 Results
For Algorithm 4.2, we optimize the min-tradeoff functions by choosing different q0’s. Each q0
is created by choosing a different depolarizing probability Q, which is searched over the interval
[0.005, 0.07] with a step size 0.005. We fix the rotation angle along the Z-axis to be 11◦. For each
min-tradeoff function generated from a particular value of Q, we calculate the key rate and then
choose the maximum key rate among them. For Algorithm 4.3, we use same procedure as for the
qubit BB84 example in Section 8.4 including the optimization over the choice of pz.
In Figure 8.3, we compare key rates for Theorems 8.2.3 and 8.2.4 and observe the same
behavior as the qubit BB84 example in Figure 8.1. This behavior is not surprising since the
sandwiched Rényi entropy was used in the middle step of the proof of Theorems 3.7.3 and 3.7.4 in
Refs. [97, 98] before converting to the smooth min-entropy by an additional inequality. Bypassing
the smooth min-entropy is expected to give tighter key rates [99].






















Figure 8.3: Comparison of two key rate expressions: key rate versus the number of signals for
the six-state four-state protocol [209] with depolarizing probability Q = 0.01. The red circle
marker corresponds to Theorem 8.2.3 [98], the green star marker corresponds to Theorem 8.2.4
[99]. Other protocol parameters are optimized as described in the main text.
In Figure 8.4, we compare Algorithms 4.2 and 4.3 for the six-state four-state protocol [209].
Similar to the behavior of the qubit BB84 example, we observe both algorithms give similar
results while Algorithm 4.3 gives higher key rates for small block sizes. We note that each
tradeoff function given by Algorithm 4.2 does not take into account second-order correction terms
during the construction. Instead, we optimize the second-order correction terms afterwards by
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considering a bunch of different min-tradeoff functions when using this algorithm. The latter
optimization is not done in an efficient way since we apply only a simple coarse-grained search
over a single parameter instead of a more sophisticated algorithm over the full parameter space of
P(X ). In contrast, each min-tradeoff function generated by Algorithm 4.3 uses some information
about second-order correction terms. We do not need to perform an additional optimization of
different min-tradeoff functions for each fixed set of protocol parameters. However, as explained
in Section 4.4.2, we do not use the optimal second-order correction terms when we construct
min-tradeoff functions by Algorithm 4.3. After we obtain a fixed min-tradeoff function, we then
optimize the second-order correction terms by optimizing free parameters in Theorem 8.2.3 or
Theorem 8.2.4. Thus, in principle, Algorithm 4.3 can be further improved. In terms of running
time, Algorithm 4.3 takes less time as there is no need to optimize q0.






















Figure 8.4: Comparison of two algorithms: key rate versus the number of signals for the six-
state four-state protocol [209] with the depolarizing probability Q = 0.01. The red circle marker
corresponds to Algorithm 4.2, the green star marker corresponds to Algorithm 4.3. Second-order
correction terms are from Theorem 8.2.4. Other protocol parameters are optimized as described
in the main text.
8.6 High-dimensional 2-MUB
Another interesting family of protocols that can be analyzed by our numerical method in the
EAT framework are the high-dimensional analogues of the BB84 protocol. In BB84, two mutually
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unbiased bases (MUBs) are used. While two MUBs exist for any dimension, we consider 2-MUB
protocols in prime dimensions only in this section. Our restriction here is mainly due to the
particular simulation method adopted from [211], not because of the limitations in our proof
technique.
8.6.1 Protocol details and simulation




ωsk |s+ j〉〈s| (8.9)
for j, k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , d − 1} where ω = e2πi/d is a dth root of unity. We note that U01 is the
generalized Pauli-Z matrix and U10 is the generalized Pauli-X matrix. We define the qudit






ωsk |s, s+ j〉 = 1⊗Ujk |Φ00〉 . (8.10)
In the 2-MUB protocol, Alice measures in the eigenbasis of either U01 or U10. Bob similarly
measure in the eigenbasis of either U∗01 or U
∗
10. In the classical phase, Alice and Bob announce
their basis choices and discard rounds with mismatched bases. We allow asymmetric basis choice,
i.e., with a probability pz to choose Z basis and a probability 1 − pz to choose X basis. The
eigenbasis of the operator Z := U01 is the computational basis {|s〉 : 0 ≤ s ≤ d − 1}. The
eigenbasis of the operator X := U10 is {
∣∣∣ψXj
〉









In this example, we also consider an efficient protocol by setting pz to be close to 1. For simplicity
of calculation, the testing rounds are those when they both choose X basis and the key generation
rounds are rounds when they both choose Z basis.
It is interesting to note that the state |Φ00〉 = 1√d
∑
s |s, s〉 is invariant under any Ujk ⊗ U∗jk.
In an honest implementation, the source is supposed to prepare the state |Φ00〉, and to distribute
one half to Alice and the other half to Bob. If the channel is ideal, then they are supposed to
obtain perfectly correlated results just like the qubit case.
We follow the simulation in [211] by considering the following observation for the error vector
in each basis Ujk, which is based on the natural generalization of the qubit depolarizing channel:
qjk(Q) := {1−Q,Q/(d− 1), . . . , Q/(d− 1)}. (8.12)
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jk being the ith entry of the vector qjk.
In our security analysis, we use the X basis error rate and X basis correlation as constraints.
8.6.2 Results
We apply Algorithm 4.3 with the Frank-Wolfe method to calculate the key rate for this protocol
example. We optimize the probability of choosing Z-basis in the same way as in the qubit BB84
example. In Figure 8.5, we compare key rates for d-dimensional 2-MUB protocols with d = 2, 3, 5
and 7 using Theorem 8.2.4. We set the depolarizing probability Q to be 0.01 for all curves. This
example demonstrates that our method can work for high-dimensional protocols.
We remark that Ref. [211] claims their analysis is against coherent attacks. However, they only
performed an analysis against collective attacks and did not use any technique like quantum de
Finetti representation theorem or postselection technique. Instead, they argued that by following
the same arguments from [124, 125] for qubit protocols based on their high symmetries, their
analysis is also for coherent attacks for qudit protocols. Unfortunately, these papers [124, 125]
only claim asymptotically collective attacks are optimal. They did not provide detailed analysis
for the finite-key scenario. Thus, we believe one still needs to lift the analysis in [211] to coherent
attacks via either quantum de Finetti representation or postselection technique.
8.7 Future directions
We would like to apply our method to study more complicated protocol examples. In particular,
we would like to investigate an optical implementation of the entanglement-based BB84 since it
involves announcements about detection which are not based on seeded randomness. Therefore,
we need to check the Markov chain condition more explicitly. We will report this result in our
forthcoming paper [83]. We also hope to include more direct comparisons with other proof meth-
ods. When the dimension is large, we expect the key rate obtained from the EAT is better than
the one from the postselection technique as the postselection technique has a strong dependence
on the dimension while the EAT does not. Another interesting direction is to extend our method
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Figure 8.5: 2-MUB protocols with qudits for various values of dimension d with the depolarizing
probability Q = 0.01. The red circle marker corresponds to d = 2 (BB84), the green star marker
corresponds to d = 3, the cyan diamond marker corresponds to d = 5 and the blue cross marker
is for d = 7. Second-order correction terms are from Theorem 8.2.4. Other protocol parameters
are optimized as explained in the main text.
to prepare-and-measure protocols, which we currently cannot directly handle the ρA constraint.
Similar to the discussion about the postselection technique in Section 3.6, one may ignore this
promise or introduce an additional test for ρA. However, in either way, we do not expect good
key rates. We need to solve technical challenges before we can directly handle this constraint.




In this thesis, we focus on security proof methods in Renner’s framework [89]. One advantage of
this framework is that security proofs can be modular. In this framework, one may first prove
the security against i.i.d. collective attacks which are more restricted, and then lift the proof
to general attacks by several existing techniques: quantum de Finetti representation theorem
[89, 111], postselection technique [112, 120] or entropy accumulation theorem [97–99]. Under the
assumption of i.i.d. collective attacks, one can greatly simplify the proof by studying a single-
round system as the N -round system is assumed to be an i.i.d. state. Both asymptotic [144, 146]
and finite-size key rate [84] calculation problems have been formulated as convex optimization
problems. We discuss a numerical framework to calculate key rates. It includes numerical methods
to calculate both asymptotic and finite-size key rates. We also review several existing tools that
help extend the ranges of protocols that one can study using these numerical methods. This
numerical framework is highly versatile and can produce tight key rates. Another advantage of
using this numerical framework is that one may perform the security analysis of multiple side
channels simultaneously. This can be done by having suitable models of devices that include those
side channels and then deriving suitable mathematical descriptions for those devices. Numerical
methods also have their limitations due to the scaling of the computational resources with the
problem size. We hope more analytical tools and advanced numerical algorithms can be developed
to enhance the power of this numerical framework for key rate calculation in the future.
As applications, we calculate asymptotic key rates of the phase-matching MDIQKD protocol
[71], a variant of TF-QKD [62, 63] and of the discrete-modulated continuous-variable QKD [81,
82]. While our specific phase-matching MDI protocol is idealized, we confirm the
√
η loss scaling
of this protocol. A realistic version of this protocol with finite test states has been shown to
overcome the repeaterless bound as well in Ref. [93]. For the DMCVQKD protocols, we apply
the numerical method to calculate asymptotic key rates in both untrusted (ideal) [81] and trusted
detector noise scenarios [82]. Our initial works [81, 82] use an additional assumption - photon-
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number cutoff assumption. This assumption allows us to truncate an infinite-dimensional Hilbert
space, which makes the numerical calculation possible. Our initial work verifies the validity of this
assumption numerically, meaning that the results do not change significantly with the choice of
cutoff when the cutoff photon number is sufficiently large (i.e. 10 in our simulations for the ideal
detector scenario) compared to the mean photon number of the states received by Bob. While
this assumption gives numerically plausible key rates, it lacks rigorous justifications that one
desires for a security proof. In our recent work [85], we remove this assumption by a dimension
reduction method. We are able to show that key rates obtained without the photon-number
cutoff assumption do not deviate much from those obtained previously under the photon-number
cutoff assumption. All of these works focus on the asymptotic key rates. It is important for
future works to study finite-size effects of those protocols.
In terms of finite-key analysis, we discuss two numerical methods [83, 84]. We present pre-
liminary results to illustrate the numerical method [83] with the entropy accumulation theorem
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[41] A. Aćın, N. Gisin, and L. Masanes, From Bell’s Theorem to Secure Quantum Key Distri-
bution, Phys. Rev. Lett. 97, 120405 (2006).
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[186] H. Häseler and N. Lütkenhaus, Quantum Benchmarks for the Storage or Transmission of
Quantum Light from Minimal Resources, Phys. Rev. A 81, 060306(R) (2010).
[187] Y.-B. Zhao, M. Heid, J. Rigas, and N. Lütkenhaus, Asymptotic Security of Binary Modulated
Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution under Collective Attacks, Phys. Rev. A 79,
012307 (2009).
[188] K. Brádler and C. Weedbrook, Security Proof of Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Dis-
tribution using Three Coherent States, Phys. Rev. A 97, 022310 (2018).
[189] A. Leverrier and P. Grangier, Unconditional Security Proof of Long-Distance Continuous-
Variable Quantum Key Distribution with Discrete Modulation, Phys. Rev. Lett. 102, 180504
(2009).
[190] P. Papanastasiou, C. Lupo, C. Weedbrook, and S. Pirandola, Quantum Key Distribution
with Phase-Encoded Coherent States: Asymptotic Security Analysis in Thermal-Loss Chan-
nels, Phys. Rev. A 98, 012340 (2018).
[191] S. Ghorai, P. Grangier, E. Diamanti, and A. Leverrier, Asymptotic Security of Continuous-
Variable Quantum Key Distribution with a Discrete Modulation, Phys. Rev. X 9, 021059
(2019).
[192] C. Silberhorn, T. C. Ralph, N. Lütkenhaus, and G. Leuchs, Continuous Variable Quantum
Cryptography: Beating the 3 dB Loss Limit, Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 167901 (2002).
[193] M. Heid and N. Lütkenhaus, Security of Coherent-State Quantum Cryptography in the
Presence of Gaussian Noise, Phys. Rev. A 76, 022313 (2007).
209
[194] M. Heid and N. Lütkenhaus, Efficiency of Coherent-State Quantum Cryptography in the
Presence of Loss: Influence of Realistic Error Correction, Phys. Rev. A 73, 052316 (2006).
[195] S. Fossier, E. Diamanti, T. Debuisschert, R. Tualle-Brouri, and P. Grangier, Improvement
of Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution Systems by Using Optical Preamplifiers,
J. Phys. B 42, 114014 (2009).
[196] V. C. Usenko and R. Filip, Trusted Noise in Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribu-
tion: a Threat and a Defense, Entropy 18, 20 (2016).
[197] F. Laudenbach and C. Pacher, Analysis of the Trusted-Device Scenario in Continuous-
Variable Quantum Key Distribution, Adv. Quantum Technol. 2, 1900055 (2019).
[198] R. Namiki, A. Kitagawa, and T. Hirano, Secret Key Rate of a Continuous-Variable
Quantum-Key-Distribution Scheme when the Detection Process is Inaccessible to Eaves-
droppers, Phys. Rev. A 98, 042319 (2018).
[199] B. R. Mollow and R. J. Glauber, Quantum Theory of Parameteric Amplification. I, Phys.
Rev. 160, 1076 (1967).
[200] W. Vogel and D.-G. Welsch, Quantum Optics (Wiley, New York, USA, 2006).
[201] R. Renner, Symmetry of Large Physical Systems Implies Independence of Subsystems, Nat.
Phys. 3, 645 (2007).
[202] M. E. Shirokov, Tight Uniform Continuity Bounds for the Quantum Conditional Mutual
Information, for the Holevo Quantity, and for Capacities of Quantum Channels, J. Math.
Phys. (N. Y.) 58, 102202 (2017).
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Simplification of postprocessing map
In this appendix, we present a derivation of a general postprocessing framework for the numerical
method in Ref. [144]. Our derivation reproduces the form of postprocessing map G presented
in Ref. [144] when Eve’s systems are traced out. This formulation is an alternative formulation
from the one presented in Section 4.1.2. This formulation allows us to see directly why we
can use the quantum relative entropy as the objective function of the key rate optimization
problem. Moreover, based on this derivation, we can make several observations to simplify the
postprocessing map G in special cases, which leads to a reduction of the dimensions required in
the numerical analysis.
We begin with some definitions to set up the notations. When we write an operator on
composite registers, we omit the identity operator on the unspecified registers and may reorder
registers for ease of writing. Moreover, the relevant unspecified registers depend on the context.
Let X denote the set of Alice’s measurement outcomes. With Alice’s set of announcements SA,
we partition the set X into subsets Xa for a ∈ SA such that X =
⋃
a∈SA Xa. Similarly, we
partition Bob’s measurement outcomes Y as Y =
⋃
b∈SB Yb by using his set of announcements
SB. To simplify our notation, we assume without the loss of generality that |Xa| = ωA for
all a ∈ SA and |Yb| = ωB for all b ∈ SB for some numbers ωA and ωB independent of a
and b. This assumption can be easily satisfied by a clever way of bookkeeping measurement
outcomes. Then, we define a family of maps fa : Ω
A := {1, 2, . . . , ωA} → Xa and a family of
maps fb : Ω
B := {1, 2, . . . , ωB} → Yb such that fa’s and fb’s are bijective. Finally, we label
Alice’s POVM PA as PA := {PAx : x ∈ X} = {PA[a,fa(α)] : a ∈ S
A, α ∈ ΩA} and Bob’s POVM
PB := {PBy : y ∈ Y} = {PB[b,fb(β)] : b ∈ S
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Figure A.1: (a) A schematic circuit diagram for the relevant postprocessing steps: announcement
(with measurement), sifting, and key map. Three dashed boxes separate Alice’s, Bob’s, and Eve’s
domains. The initial pure state ρABE is evolved by an isometry at each step which introduces
additional registers and applies a unitary operation on relevant registers. UAAM, U
B
AM, US and UK
are unitary operations related to the announcement and measurement, sifting, and key map. (b)
An explanation for the controlled unitary operation used in (a). Here, m, r, and n are some
sufficiently large integers so that we have a representation of the basis elements for each register
in the computational basis of qubits. See the text in Appendix A for more explanations.
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A.1 A full model for the relevant postprocessing steps
We give a schematic circuit diagram in Figure A.1 to describe the announcement (including
measurement), sifting and key map steps. This diagram covers the scenarios related to this work,
and it works for protocols with one round of announcements and with reverse reconciliation. It
is not difficult to draw a similar diagram in other scenarios, including the direct reconciliation
schemes. Under collective attacks, Alice and Bob share a bipartite quantum state ρAB after each
transmission of a quantum signal. In the worst-case scenario, Eve holds a purification ρABE of
ρAB. The initial state in the circuit diagram is ρABE . At each step, the state is evolved by an
isometry; that is, we introduce some local registers and evolve the state by a local unitary. We also
keep track of the information leakage during the classical communication. If some information
is publicly available during the classical communication in the protocol, then each party holds
a copy of the relevant registers. One can recover the classical communication information by
measuring a local copy of these registers in the computational basis. Now, we discuss each of the
three steps in detail.
The isometries related to the announcement and measurement step are denoted by WA for
Alice and WB for Bob. In particular, WA first introduces two registers Ã and A and then applies
a unitary operator UAAM to implement Alice’s POVM P
A in a coherent fashion, where announce-
ments are stored in the register Ã and measurement outcomes are in the register A. Like Alice’s
isometry WA, Bob’s isometry WB implements his POVM P
B with the announcement register B̃
and measurement outcome register B using a local unitary UBAM. Since the announcement infor-
mation is available to everyone, Eve obtains a copy (denoted by E
Ã
) of Ã and a copy (denoted
by E
B̃
) of B̃. The coherent version of copying is represented by the controlled NOT operation.
Also, Alice and Bob each have a copy of the other party’s announcement register, denoted by
B̃copy and Ãcopy, respectively. For convenience of writing, we use Ã and B̃ to refer to both Alice’s
and Bob’s copies of Ã and B̃. As we see later, we can actually combine the register Ã with
Ãcopy and combine B̃ with B̃copy in the key rate calculation. In this diagram, the state after the






= (WA⊗WB)ρABE(WA⊗WB)†, where for
ease of writing, we reorder the registers and use a shorthand notation for collections of registers:
[A] for registers AÃA and [B] for registers BB̃B.
The sifting step partitions the set of announcement events SA × SB as SA × SB = K ∪D,
where K is the set of announcement events to be kept and D is the set of announcements to be
discarded. The sifting isometry (denoted by VS) introduces a register S to store the result of
sifting (“keep” or “discard”) and performs a unitary operator US on the local copies of registers
Ã and B̃ to compute the sifting decision. In a common scenario, each party can implement
this unitary US from the description of a protocol. If it is not from the protocol description
and additional classical communication is needed, then, after a party implements this unitary
operation, other parties obtain a copy of the register S. For simplicity, we use S to refer to
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The key map isometry VK introduces a register R and applies a local unitary UK to compute
the key map g and to store the result in the register R. This key map g takes the announcement
(a, b) ∈ SA × SB and Alice’s measurement outcome fa(α) in the case of direct reconciliation or
Bob’s measurement outcome fb(β) in the case of reverse reconciliation as inputs and outputs a
value in {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} where N is the number of key symbols. For the purpose of derivation,
we include an additional key symbol ⊥ to this set and map all discarded events to it. We see
later that we can eventually remove the symbol ⊥ from the set of key symbols. In the diagram,




















PB[b,fb(β)] ⊗ |b〉B̃ ⊗ |β〉B ,
(A.1)
where {|a〉 : a ∈ SA} and {|b〉 : b ∈ SB} are orthonormal bases for registers Ã (E
Ã
) and B̃ (E
B̃
)
and {|α〉 : α ∈ ΩA} and {|β〉 : β ∈ ΩB} are orthonormal bases for registers A and B, respectively.
(Note that |α〉 here is not a coherent state discussed in the main text.) We remark that KAa and
KBb are the same as defined in Eqs. (40) and (41) of Ref. [144] if we write fa(α) as αa and fb(β)

















(a,b)∈K |a〉〈a|Ã ⊗ |b〉〈b|B̃ and {|K〉 , |D〉} is an orthonormal basis for the register S
(ES). To write out the key map isometry VK , we take the reverse reconciliation schemes as an
example, and it is straightforward to write out VK in the case of direct reconciliation schemes
by using Alice’s measurement outcome fa(α) instead of Bob’s outcome fb(β). We first define an





|g(a, b, fb(β))〉R ⊗ |a〉〈a|Ã ⊗ |b〉〈b|B̃ ⊗ |β〉〈β|B ,
VK = VΠ + |⊥〉R ⊗ (1ÃB̃ −Π).
(A.3)
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We remark that the final state ρ
(3)




pure state since ρABE is a pure state, and we apply only isometries to it.
A.2 Removing the dependence on Eve’s registers
To access the key information, we use the projective measurement {Zj = |j〉〈j|R : j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N−
1,⊥}}. Since the final state ρ(3)R[A][B]S[E] is pure, we apply Theorem 4.1.1 [147, Theorem 1] to
rewrite conditional entropy H(Z|[E]) as










R[A][B]S[E]). We then define an announcement map A for an input state

















+ (1− ppass)ρDR[A][B] ⊗ |D〉〈D|S ,
(A.5)















To show that the symbol ⊥ has no contribution to the key rate, we use the following lemma
(see Ref. [215]).









Q ⊗ |x〉〈x|X , where p and q are probability distributions over a finite







Applying the lemma to the state ρ
(3)






























where we define G(ρAB) = VΠA(ρAB)ΠV †, which is the same as in Ref. [144].
Finally, we remark that, on the subspace where Π projects, the symbol ⊥ does not show up
anymore. Thus, we can modify {Zj} to remove the symbol ⊥ in the end. This modification gives
back to the definition of Z shown in Ref. [144].
A.3 Simplifying the postprocessing map
We now provide several remarks to explain how we can simplify the map G while making sure
that such a simplification does not change our calculated key rates. Our discussion here takes
the reverse reconciliation schemes as an example. It is straightforward to adapt the arguments
to the direct reconciliation schemes.
We first make a remark about the registers Ãcopy and B̃copy that are hidden in our notation Ã




, Alice’s register Ã and Bob’s copy Ãcopy are
both classical registers, and, likewise, Bob’s register B̃ and Alice’s copy B̃copy are classical. Since
each of the sifting and key map steps is done locally via a controlled unitary whose target is the
register S or R alone, we can pull out two copies of registers Ã and B̃ to write the final state in the
form of the quantum-classical state to which the previous lemma applies. If we look at the block
diagonal structure of G(ρAB) with respect to two copies of the register Ã, we see directly that the
state with a single copy of the register Ã is just embedded in a larger space with two copies of the
register Ã. This result means the eigenvalues of the state are unaffected by removing one copy of
the register Ã. A similar argument works for two copies of B̃. Moreover, from the previous lemma,
we see immediately that we can calculate the key rate from individual announcements if we write
the key map g as g[a, b, fb(β)] =: gab(β) for a collection of functions gab, one for each (a, b) ∈ K.
In this case, for each (a, b) ∈ K, we define an isometry Vab =
∑
β∈ΩB |gab(β)〉R ⊗ |β〉〈β|B and a








a ⊗ |a〉Ã and K̃
B

















Besides the lemma, our objective function has another important property. Since the quantum
relative entropy is invariant under an isometry, if an isometry can commute with G and Z maps,
then our objective function is also invariant under this isometry. In other words, we can add
or remove an isometry W (that acts only on Alice’s and Bob’s registers) in the final expression
of Eq. (A.7) if W commutes with G and Z maps.
From this property of our objective function, if those functions gab’s are the identity function,
then we see that each isometry Vab simply copies the register B and stores this copy to the register
R. Adding this copy is a local isometry and renaming the register B by the name R is a unitary.
Thus, we can combine the registers B and R and retain the name of R.
Also, based on this property of our objective function, we now discuss when we can omit the
appearance of the register A. As depicted in Figure A.2, the announcement and measurement
step can be decomposed into two steps. First, Alice performs a coarse-grained measurement (with
associated unitary UAA in this figure) to make announcements. Second, conditioned on her own
announcement result, Alice performs a refined measurement (with a controlled unitary UAM in the
figure) if needed to obtain the fine-grained measurement outcomes. As the refined measurement
is done in Alice’s local registers, to which Eve has no access, Alice’s refined measurement can be
described by a local isometry. This local isometry can be performed after Eve obtains a copy of
the announcement registers. In the reverse reconciliation scheme, since the key map isometry V
does not depend on the register A, the isometry that describes Alice’s refined measurement then
commutes with G and Z maps. This result means that, from the key rate calculation perspective,






for each a ∈ SA and define KA′a =
√
PAa ⊗|a〉Ã, then we can replace













for an input state σ. (A similar replacement can be done for Gab.) A similar argument can
be applied to the direct reconciliation schemes by interchanging the roles of Alice’s and Bob’s
registers to show that we can omit the register B for direct reconciliation.
Along the same line of argument, we remark that the refined measurement conditioned on the

























Figure A.2: An alternative description of the announcement step for the reverse reconciliation
schemes. This step can be decomposed into two steps. At the first step, Alice performs only a
coarse-grained measurement with a unitary UAA to obtain announcement results, and Bob also
performs a coarse-grained measurement with a unitary UBC to obtain announcement outcomes and
coarse-grained measurement information. At the second step, they choose to perform optional
refined measurements (UAM and U
B
F ) conditioned on the announcements (and previous coarse-
grained measurement information for Bob). They can postpone the refined measurements after
giving Eve announcement results and in some cases choose not to perform the refined measure-
ments.
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uses only the coarse-grained information. This process is also described in Figure A.2. Bob first
applies an isometry (with associated unitary UBC in the figure) to implement the coarse-grained
measurement which gives the same coarse-grained information needed for the key map g and then
applies an additional isometry (with associated unitary UBF in the figure) to obtain fine-grained
measurement outcomes. As the sifting step depends only on the announcement, we can move
Bob’s refined measurement after the sifting step (not shown in this figure). Since the key map
uses only the coarse-grained information, the key map isometry effectively undoes the unitary
UBF . Therefore, we can take the POVM related to the coarse-grained measurement when we write
out Kraus operators KBb in Eq. (A.1).
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Appendix B
Technical details of PM-MDI QKD
B.1 A representation of Eve’s POVM in the subspace S
In this appendix, we will describe how to find a representation of Eve’s POVM {F γ} in an
orthonormal basis of the subspace spanned by the signal states, which we previously denoted as
span(S). When we discuss about the two-mode coherent states |αA, αB〉 prepared by Alice and
Bob, for the ease of notation, we write α = (αA, αB) and |α〉 = |αA, αB〉.
If we are given 〈α|F γ |β〉 for every α,β ∈ S, then the procedure described here allows us
to find a four-dimensional representation of F γ in the subspace span(S) and helps us evaluate
the von Neumann entropy of Eve’s conditional states more straightforwardly. We remark here
that the values of 〈α|F γ |β〉 can be determined by test states in the test mode of our protocol,
as discussed in Section 5.2.4. For our simulations in Appendix B.2, we also provide a simulation
method to obtain 〈α|F γ |β〉.
Before we proceed, we want to emphasize that the set S defined in Eq. (5.2) is a basis for the
subspace span(S) and we will use this particular ordering of basis elements in the later discussion.
B.1.1 Orthonormal basis decomposition






} span a two-dimensional space, we start with a canon-







|+√µ〉 = c0 |e0〉+ c1 |e1〉
|−√µ〉 = c0 |e0〉 − c1 |e1〉 ,
(B.1)








Without loss of generality, we choose c0 and c1 to be real numbers by absorbing the complex
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phases into the definitions of |e0〉 , |e1〉. We remark here that the explicit expressions for |e0〉 and






























We then obtain a basis for span(S) as B = {|e0, e0〉 , |e1, e1〉 , |e0, e1〉 , |e1, e0〉}. We remark that
this particular ordering of basis elements is useful for the presentation and later allows us to see
the block diagonal structures of some particular POVM elements more straightforwardly.










































Once we write out F γ in the basis B, we can then find Eve’s conditional states in the basis
B by appropriate multiplications. Then the evaluation of von Neumann entropy of conditional
states is straightforward since finding eigenvalues of 4× 4 matrices is computationally simple.
B.1.2 Change of basis matrix
Suppose we have determined 〈α|F γ |β〉, where α,β ∈ S. Now we want to write out F γ in the
basis B. This can be done by a change of basis matrix.




Anm |αn〉 , (B.4)









(A†)mn 〈αn| , (B.5)
where Ānm is the complex conjugate of Anm and A
† is the Hermitian conjugate of A.
Combining previous two equations, we have
〈em|F γ |en〉 =
∑
i,j
(A†)mj 〈αj |F γ |αi〉Ain. (B.6)




































where c0 and c1 are defined from Eq. (B.1).
B.2 Simulation
In this section, we explain how to obtain values of 〈α|F γ |β〉 for |α〉 , |β〉 ∈ S through simulations.
After knowing 〈α|F γ |β〉, we can then use the results from Appendix B.1, in particular, Eq. (B.6),
to express F γ in the basis B and then proceed with the evaluation of key rate.
To avoid the confusion between our simulation method and experimental execution of the
protocol, we remark on how to obtain 〈α|F γ |β〉 in the actual implementation of the protocol.
In the parameter estimation step, the values of 〈α|F γ |α〉 for α ∈ S are directly obtained from
observed correlation. The values of 〈α|F γ |β〉 for α 6= β can be calculated by observed correlation
of test states, as explained in Section 5.2.4.
For our simulation, we propagate the input states through our simulated model of imper-
fections and then apply the POVM of detectors to the final states arriving at the detectors to
calculate 〈α|F γ |β〉.
B.2.1 Eve’s POVM associated with loss-only scenario
We now consider the loss-only scenario. Here, we simulate the quantum channel as a lossy
channel and we consider the normal situation where Charlie (Eve) is honest and performs the
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Figure B.1: Explanation of labels for input and output modes of the beam splitter.
measurements shown in Figure 5.1a. Namely, we calculate the POVM F corresponding to the
real setup with ideal devices at the central node. Our protocol can verify via test states in the
test mode that this is the actual Eve’s POVM in the loss-only scenario. As mentioned in the main
text, for the purpose of presentation, we consider the symmetric setup. For a total single-photon
transmitivity η between Alice and Bob, each path has a transmissivity
√
η.
In this section, we will label Eve’s POVM F γ associated with the loss-only scenario by adding
the subscript “loss”. As shown in Figure B.1, we will label the input modes of the beam splitter
at the central node as IA and IB and the output modes as OA and OB, where OA reaches the
detector D+ and OB reaches the detector D−.
We describe how to obtain 〈α|F γloss |β〉. First, Alice and Bob prepare coherent states |αA〉A′
and |αB〉B′ in the registers A′ and B′, respectively, and send them to Charlie. After the lossy chan-




























We now apply the POVM of the detectors to this state.
The ideal detectors are described by the following POVM:
Π+ideal = (1OA − |0〉〈0|OA)⊗ |0〉〈0|OB ,
Π−ideal = |0〉〈0|OA ⊗ (1OB − |0〉〈0|OB ),
Π?ideal = |0〉〈0|OA ⊗ |0〉〈0|OB ,
Πdideal = (1OA − |0〉〈0|OA)⊗ (1OB − |0〉〈0|OB ),
(B.8)
where |0〉 is the vacuum state.













































Now we have obtained values for 〈α|F γloss |β〉 from simulations, and we can then proceed to
write F γloss in the basis B by using Eq. (B.6).




































































































F dloss = 0,
(B.10)
where for the ease of representation, we define Ω = e−2(1−
√
η)µ, and ξ = e−
√
ηµ. Also, c0 and c1
are defined from the decomposition in Eq. (B.1). By noting that 2c20 = 1+ξ
2Ω and 2c21 = 1−ξ2Ω,







B.2.2 Models for imperfections
In this section, we consider realistic imperfections in the experimental setup. Specifically, we
consider the mode mismatch, phase mismatch, dark counts of detectors and the inefficiency of
detectors. In the following, we describe the physical models for those imperfections.
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Mode mismatch
We consider the mode mismatch with a simulation parameter V . The model of the mode mismatch










is in the mode 2, which is distinct from the mode 1. To
derive values for 〈α|F γ |β〉, we will propagate the input states, similar to the loss-only case. In
the place of IA, IB, OA, OB used in the discussion of loss-only scenario, we will replace them by
IA1, IB1, OA1, OB1 for the initial mode and IA2, IB2, OA2, OB2 for the additional mode.
Suppose Alice sends |αA〉A′ and Bob sends |αB〉B′ . Since only the relative mode mismatch
between Alice’s mode and Bob’s mode matters, without loss of generality, we leave the state in the
register A′ untouched when it reaches IA1, that is, we have |αA〉IA1 . Due to the mode mismatch,









. Correspondingly, we have the vacuum
state in the mode IA2. To summarize, the state arriving at the beam splitter of Charlie’s station








. The mode IA1 interferes with
the mode IB1 and the mode IA2 interferes with the mode IB2 independently. We remark here that
this parameter V can be made close to 1 with experimentally available compensation systems,
for example, see Ref. [59] in the setting of MDI protocols. In particular, V ≥ 95% is readily
achievable.
Phase mismatch
Ideally, Alice and Bob should prepare coherent states with the same global phase. We consider the
situation where there is a phase mismatch between Alice’s signal state and Bob’s signal state. For




for some δ. We expect that with an experimentally feasible phase compensation system, the value
of δ is typically small. For instance, the continuous-variable QKD experiment in Ref. [32] reports
a value less than π60 .
Detector dark count
We now consider dark counts of detectors. For simplicity of our presentation, we model two
detectors to have the same dark count probability pd. It is also straightforward to model the case
where two detectors have different dark count probabilities.
The effect of dark counts can be taken into consideration by modifying the POVM for detec-
tors. Eq. (B.8)) gives the POVM associated with the ideal detectors. When the detectors have
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dark counts, the associated POVM associated is modified as below
Π+dark = (1OA − |0〉〈0|OA)⊗ (1− pd) |0〉〈0|OB
+ pd |0〉〈0|OA ⊗ (1− pd) |0〉〈0|OB
= (1− pd)Π+ideal + (1− pd)pdΠ
?
ideal
Π−dark = (1− pd) |0〉〈0|OA ⊗ (1OB − |0〉〈0|OB )
+ (1− pd) |0〉〈0|OA ⊗ pd |0〉〈0|OB
= (1− pd)Π−ideal + (1− pd)pdΠ
?
ideal
Π?dark = (1− pd) |0〉〈0|OA ⊗ (1− pd) |0〉〈0|OB
= (1− pd)2Π?ideal
Πddark = (1OA − |0〉〈0|OA)⊗ pd |0〉〈0|OB
+ pd |0〉〈0|OA ⊗ (1OB − |0〉〈0|OB ) + pd |0〉〈0|OA ⊗ pd |0〉〈0|OB













Since in our simulation, we propagate the input states through the physical models of im-
perfections to derive the final states before the detectors and then use the POVM of detectors
to derive the values of 〈α|F γ |β〉, the expression of 〈α|F γ |β〉 will have a similar structure as
the loss-only case shown in Eq. (B.9). From this observation, we know that once we obtained
the expression of Eve’s POVM element F γ , when we have considered all other imperfections
except dark counts, we can then derive the POVM elements including dark counts of detectors
by probabilistic mixtures of F γ , following the same relation as between Πγdark and Π
γ
ideal.
To illustrate the idea, we give a simple example where we consider the physical channel to
be a lossy channel and we want to include dark counts of detectors in our simulation. Since we
have derived F γloss in Eq. (B.10), we can derive the expressions of F
γ
dark corresponding to this
simulation as follows:
F+dark = (1− pd)F
+
loss + (1− pd)pdF
?
loss
F−dark = (1− pd)F
−
loss + (1− pd)pdF
?
loss
F ?dark = (1− pd)2F ?loss













We take into account that any practical single-photon detector has a limited efficiency. In our
simulation method, we can easily modify the POVM of detectors as in Eq. (B.8), to include the
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efficiency of each detector separately. However, for simplicity of our presentation, we assume that
both detectors have the same efficiency ηd so that we can combine the detector’s efficiency and the
channel transmittance by redefining the total transmissivity η. Let ηt refer to the single-photon
transmission probability of the quantum channel between Alice and Bob. Since both detectors
have the same efficiency, we can redefine the total transmissivity η = ηtη
2
d and use this value of
η in the simulation. Then we can still use the POVM of detectors with the perfect efficiency in
our simulation.
B.2.3 Eve’s POVM with those imperfections
As discussed in the previous section, we now take into consideration the mode mismatch with a
simulation parameter V , and the phase mismatch with a simulation parameter δ. We consider
both detectors have the same detector efficiency ηd and the same dark count probability pd.
We will first derive Eve’s POVM F γmismatch when we consider both the mode mismatch and the
phase mismatch. Then we derive Eve’s POVM F γmodel when we include dark counts of detectors
as well. Finally, the effects of detector efficiency is taken into consideration by a redefinition of η.
For an input coherent state |αA, αB〉A′B′ , the state after the lossy channels and models for

































































We now introduce the POVM of the ideal detectors when there are two independent modes
entering the detectors due to mode mismatch.
Π+mismatch = (1OA1OA2 − |00〉〈00|OA1OA2)⊗ |00〉〈00|OB1OB2 ,
Π−mismatch = |00〉〈00|OA1OA2 ⊗ (1OB1OB2 − |00〉〈00|OB1OB2),
Π?mismatch = |00〉〈00|OA1OA2 ⊗ |00〉〈00|OB1OB2 ,
Πdmismatch = (1OA1OA2 − |00〉〈00|OA1OA2)⊗ (1OB1OB2 − |00〉〈00|OB1OB2).
(B.13)





















































We evaluate 〈α|F γmismatch |β〉 as




















where η = ηtη
2
d and ηt = 10
− 0.2L
10 for a distance L in km.
Now, we write down F γmismatch in the basis B. For the ease of representation, we define
ξ = e−
√
ηµ and Ω = e−2(1−
√
η)µ as before. We then define














V sin δ − ξ)ξΩ,
d = (ξ1−i
√
V sin δ − ξ)ξΩ,














V sin δ − ξ)(ξ1−i
√
V sin δ − ξ)Ω,
m = (1− ξ(1+
√





































































































































Finally, Eve’s effective POVM corresponding to the mode mismatch, phase mismatch and
dark counts of detectors is given as below
F+model = (1− pd)F
+
mismatch + (1− pd)pdF
?
mismatch
F−model = (1− pd)F
−
mismatch + (1− pd)pdF
?
mismatch
F ?model = (1− pd)2F ?mismatch














Technical details of DMCVQKD
C.1 Mathematical description of a noisy heterodyne detector
C.1.1 Derivation
Figure C.1: A concise but equivalent view of the noisy heterodyne detector model depicted in
Figure 6.2. Input modes are labeled in terms of Wigner functions.
As the physical model of a noisy heterodyne detector is presented in Figure 6.2, our goal
here is to find the corresponding POVM elements that correctly produce the probability density
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function P (y) of obtaining an outcome y ∈ C for an arbitrary input state ρ to the detector. In our
trusted noise model, the homodyne detector for the q quadrature measurement has its detector
efficiency η1 and electronic noise ν1 which is related to a thermal state of the mean photon
number n̄1 =
ν1
2(1−η1) . Similarly, the homodyne detector for the p quadrature measurement has
its detector efficiency η2 and electronic noise ν2 which corresponds to a thermal state with the
mean photon number n̄2 =
v2
2(1−η2) . Figure C.1 shows a compact but equivalent representation of
Figure 6.2 with Wigner functions associated to input modes. In this setup, for an output state
Wout(α, β, γ, ω) at the step labeled in Figure C.1, we measure the q quadrature of the mode α
and p quadrature of the mode β with two ideal homodyne detectors, and discard the rest modes
γ and ω. The Wigner function of an ideal homodyne detector for the q quadrature measurement





) where δ is the
Dirac delta function and similarly, the one for the p quadrature measurement with a measurement





). The factors of
√
2 are included such that
we can rederive the ideal heterodyne detector POVM {Ey : y ∈ C} in the limit of unity detector
efficiency and zero electronic noise. To discard modes γ and ω that are not measured, we perform
the integration over variables γ and ω.
For any input state ρ to the detector, one can in principle obtain the underlying probability
density function P (y) = Tr(ρGy) for every measurement outcome y ∈ C. As the correct POVM
element Gy needs to produce the observed probability density function P (y) = Tr(ρGy), this
requirement in terms of Wigner functions becomes P (y) = π
∫
d2αWρ(α)WGy(α), where Wρ is
the Wigner function of the input state ρ and WGy is the Wigner function of the operator Gy,
by the overlap formula in Eq. (2.75). In Figure C.1, we know the mathematical description of
measurements on the right, but the description of the state Wout is unknown. On the other
hand, we want to find the description of the measurement directly acting on the input state and
the Wigner function description of the input state and those of ancillary modes on the left are
either assumed to be given or known. To connect these known descriptions on the two sides of this
diagram to find the desired Wigner function of the POVM element Gy that acts on the input state
directly, we start from the right-hand side of this diagram with an unknown four-mode state Wout
and the known measurements on these modes, perform inverse beam splitter transformations from
right to left of this diagram and finally obtain WGy by integrating over variables other than α.
By starting with the multi-mode overlap formula for P (y) on the right-hand side of the diagram
and performing the process as described, we obtain
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The next step is to substitute the Wigner function of the vacuum state in Eq. (2.77) and that of
the thermal state in Eq. (2.78) and then to perform the integrals over variables β, γ and ω. We




























Next, we perform the integral related to the variable γ. Since Eq. (C.2) does not involve the
variable γ, we do not need to plug it back to solve the integral that involves the variable γ. This






















Re(β)− 1√η1 Re(y) + Re(α)
]2




Finally, we integrate over the variable β. We now need to substitute results of Eqs. (C.2) and (C.3)












Re(β)− 1√η1 Re(y) + Re(α)
]2







(Im(β) + 1√η2 Im(y)− Im(α)
]2





(1 + 2n̄1)(1 + 2n̄2)(1− η1)(1− η2)






















Finally, by putting the prefactor back and expressing the final expression in a format of

























By substituting in n̄1 =
ν1
2(1−η1) and n̄2 =
ν2
2(1−η2) , we derive Eq. (6.3) after a straightforward
simplification.
C.1.2 POVM elements in the general case
As we derive the Wigner function of an arbitrary POVM element Gy corresponding to the detector
model in Figure 6.2, we next show that the POVM elements Gy’s are projections onto displaced
squeezed thermal states up to a scaling factor. To see this, we make the following definitions:
λj :=
(1− ηj)(1 + 2n̄j)
ηj
=
1− ηj + νj
ηj
for j = 1, 2,
n̄het :=
√







































By comparing the Wigner function of Gy in Eq. (C.5) and the Wigner function of a displaced
squeezed thermal state in Eq. (2.81), we can identify Gy =
1√
η1η2π
ρDSTS(αhet, ξhet, n̄het) for the
choices of parameters αhet, ξhet and n̄het in Eq. (C.6). Therefore, each Gy is a scaled projection
onto a displaced squeezed thermal state with the displacement αhet, squeezing parameter ξhet and
the mean photon number of the initial thermal state before squeezing and displacement n̄het.
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C.1.3 POVM elements in the simple case
If η1 = η2 = ηd and ν1 = ν2 = νel, it is easy to verify that Eq. (C.5) reduces to Eq. (6.3). Then
one can identify each POVM element Gy is the projection onto a displaced thermal state with
a prefactor 1/(ηdπ) in Eq. (6.5). An alternative view is to look at the parameters αhet, ξhet and
n̄het in Eq. (C.6). In particular, since λ1 = λ2, the amount of squeezing ξhet becomes zero. Thus,
by neglecting squeezing in the POVM elements of the general case, one can also conclude each
POVM element is proportional to the projection onto a displaced thermal state. One can further
verify that the displacement is αhet =
y√
ηd





C.2 Photon-number basis representation of operators
Let N denote the photon-number basis up to Nc, that is, N = {|0〉 , . . . , |Nc〉}. To ana-
lyze DMCVQKD protocols under the photon-number cutoff assumption, that is, ρAB = (1A ⊗
ΠNc)ρAB(1A ⊗ΠNc) where ΠNc is the projection onto the subspace spanned by the basis N ., we
need to represent operators as well as observables used in the key rate optimization problems [see
Eqs. (6.11), (6.16) and (7.4)] in this photon-number basis N . When these operators are repre-
sented in this finite-dimensional Hilbert space, we can then proceed with numerical optimization
to calculate the key rate. Since Alice’s system is irrelevant for our discussion here, we focus on




















This observation allows us to define the truncated version of the operator Ô by ΠNcÔΠNc .
In Appendix C.2.1, we discuss those operators in the ideal detector scenarios for both the
heterodyne protocol (Chapter 6) and the homodyne protocol (Chapter 7). We then focus on
the trusted detector noise scenario for the heterodyne protocol in later subsections. In Ap-
pendix C.2.2, our discussion in the trusted detector noise scenario is restricted to the simplified
scenario that we use in the main text for presenting simulation results; that is, we set η1 = η2 = ηd
and ν1 = ν2 = νel. Under this scenario, we present formulae that can be efficiently evaluated
in Matlab. We then discuss the general case where the imperfections in two homodyne de-
tectors are not necessarily the same in Appendix C.2.3. For the general case, we provide the
matrix representation of the POVM elements Gy’s and leave the evaluation of region operators
and observables for the optimization problem to be done numerically.
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C.2.1 Ideal detector scenario
In our optimization problem [see Eqs. (6.11) and (7.4)], the relevant operators are of the forms
ΠNcρ
x
BΠNc and ΠNcÔΠNc , which have finite-dimensional matrix representations. Specifically, we
can find a matrix representation of Ô in the basis N . We start by writing out the annihila-
tion operator â in this basis, and then the creation operator â† is just its conjugate transpose.
Consequently, other relevant operators q̂, p̂, n̂, and d̂ can be written directly following from their




0 1 0 0 · · · 0
0 0
√




0 · · · 0
√
Nc




It is not difficult to write out the interval operators I0 and I1 and region operators R0, R1, R2,
and R3 in this basis. To do so, we use the overlap 〈q|n〉 between a quadrature eigenstate |q〉






































respectively, where Hn is the Hermite polynomial of the order of n. We then perform the relevant
integrals to obtain a finite-dimensional matrix representation in this basis.
Finally, in the expressions of Kraus operators shown in Eqs. (6.9) and (7.5), we need to take
the square root of each of region operators R0, R1, R2, and R3 or the interval operators I0 and I1
in Eq. (7.6). A caution about the ordering of truncation and square root is needed. For example,
even though the interval operators are projective on the entire infinite-dimensional space such
that the square root of each operator is identical to itself, the truncated version of each interval
operator is no longer projective in the finite-dimensional subspace spanned by the basis N . We
now explain the proper way to handle this issue. With the photon-number cutoff assumption
ρ = ΠNcρΠNc , we see from Eq. (C.8) that, for a POVM element F on the infinite-dimensional
space, the corresponding POVM element on this finite-dimensional subspace becomes ΠNcFΠNc .
As we know from Appendix A, the purpose of taking the square root of a POVM element is
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to realize this POVM measurement in an isometric fashion. Since the relevant POVM element
on this finite-dimensional subspace is ΠNcFΠNc , we need to take the square root of ΠNcFΠNc .
Therefore, we first take the truncation and then take the square root.
C.2.2 Trusted detector noise scenario with the simple case
In this simple case where two homodyne detectors in the heterodyne detection scheme have the




























where we define n̄d =
1−ηd+νel
ηd
for ease of writing and L
(j)
k (x) is the generalized Laguerre poly-

















where Lk(x) = L
(0)
k (x) is the Laguerre polynomial of degree k in the variable x. For ease of












Our goal here is to write region operators Rj =
∫
y∈Aj Gy d
2y in the photon-number basis.
For simplicity, we work out the expressions in the absence of postselection. To include the
postselection, one may numerically integrate over the discarded region and subtract this result
from the expression without postselection since this numerical integration is efficiently computable
in Matlab. We first consider off-diagonal elements (i.e. m 6= n). In this case, we plug the
expression of 〈m|Gy |n〉 in Eq. (C.11) into the definition of Rj in Eq. (6.12), write it in the polar











































































































We notice that the integral over r is a common integral in these four equations. We now






























where Γ is the gamma function and fm(a, α, k) is defined as the Taylor series coefficients of the
function below in the variable t as







We note that the Taylor series coefficients here can be quickly found in Matlab.
Now, we consider the diagonal entries of Rj (i.e. m = n). By substituting y = re
iθ
in Eq. (C.12), we note that this expression does not depend on θ. Thus, it is easy to see
〈n|R0 |n〉 = 〈n|R1 |n〉 = 〈n|R2 |n〉 = 〈n|R3 |n〉 . The integration over the phase θ gives a factor
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where the second term is efficiently computable numerically. The case for m = n follows similarly.
First-moment observables
We then proceed to evaluate the matrix elements of F̂Q and F̂P . In the photon-number basis,
the matrix elements are


























dθ e−i(n−m)θ(eiθ + e−iθ), (C.21)


























dθ e−i(n−m)θ(e−iθ − eiθ). (C.22)
As F̂Q is a Hermitian operator, we can first find entries 〈m| F̂Q |n〉 for m ≤ n. Then for m > n,
we simply set 〈m| F̂Q |n〉 to be the complex conjugate of 〈n| F̂Q |m〉. From the integration over θ,
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the nonzero entries for m ≤ n are
























By a similar procedure for F̂P , we have
























Next, we evaluate the matrix elements of ŜQ and ŜP . In the photon-number basis, they are



























dθ e−i(n−m)θ(eiθ + e−iθ)2, (C.25)


























dθ e−i(n−m)θ(e−iθ − eiθ)2. (C.26)
Again, since ŜQ and ŜP are Hermitian operators, we only need to define the upper triangular
part and then set the lower triangular part using the Hermitian property. The relevant integrals
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are simplified to be
















= πCm,m(ηd(1 + n̄d))
2fm(n̄d, 0, 1),
















= πCm,m+2(ηd(1 + n̄d))
3fm(n̄d, 2, 2).
(C.27)
For ŜP , we have
















= πCm,m(ηd(1 + n̄d))
2fm(n̄d, 0, 1),
















= −πCm,m+2(ηd(1 + n̄d))3fm(n̄d, 2, 2).
(C.28)
C.2.3 Trusted detector noise scenario in the general case
We consider the general case where two homodyne detectors may have different imperfections.








































where H` is the Hermite polynomial of order `. With simple substitutions, one may verify that
these parameters Ã, B̃, C̃ and Q(0) are defined in terms of λ1, λ2, αhet in Eq. (C.6) as
Ã := 1− λ1 + λ2 + 2








max(λ1, λ2) + 1
+ i
Im(αhet)











max(λ1, λ2) + 1
− Im(αhet)
2









and (B̃∗)1/2 = (B̃1/2)∗, where ϕ = 0 if λ1 ≤ λ2 and ϕ = π if λ1 > λ2. We
note that n̄het and ξhet are defined in terms of λ1 and λ2 and one may rewrite these parameters in
terms of n̄het, ξhet and αhet to make the matrix elements more explicitly depend on the parameters
of the displaced squeezed thermal states.
From the expression of 〈m|Gy |n〉 in Eq. (C.29), one can apply the definition of region opera-
tors Rj ’s in Eq. (6.12) to find 〈m|Rj |n〉 by numerical integration. Similarly, from the definitions
of first and second-moment observables in Eq. (6.15) in terms of POVM elements Gy’s, one can
numerically obtain a representation of these operators in the photon-number basis.
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Appendix D
Proofs and technical details related
to EAT
D.1 Deriving dual problem of Eq. (4.85)
In this section, let H be a Hilbert space and let ΦM be a measurement map given in Eq. (3.17)
with associated alphabet X for outcomes. Let W be the quantum conditional entropy function
in Eq. (4.19). Let m = |X | be the number of outcomes. We define the set
Fdual := {f ∈ Rm : f · ΦM(ρ) ≤W (ρ) ∀ρ ∈ D(H)}. (D.1)
It is also easy to see that Fdual is a convex set. Moreover, we can write the indicator function
(see Eq. (2.96)) for the set Fdual in a useful way by the following lemma.
Lemma D.1.1. Let f ∈ Rm. Let δFdual(f) be the indicator function for the set Fdual. Then,
sup
ρ
{〈f ,ΦM(ρ)〉 −W (ρ) : ρ ∈ Pos(H)} = δFdual(f). (D.2)
Proof. Let α := supρ{〈f ,ΦM(ρ)〉 −W (ρ) : ρ ∈ Pos(H)}.
If f ∈ Fdual, then 〈f ,ΦM(ρ)〉−W (ρ) ≤ 0 for any ρ ∈ D(H). As any positive operator can be
scaled from ρ ∈ D(H) by a non-negative coefficient, it is the case that α ≤ 0. Thus, α = 0 with
ρ = 0.
If f 6∈ Fdual, then there exists ρ0 ∈ D(H) such that 〈f ,ΦM(ρ0)〉 − W (ρ0) > 0. Let γ =
〈f ,ΦM(ρ0)〉 −W (ρ0) and ρβ = βρ0 with β ≥ 0. We notice that W (βρ) = βW (ρ) for any β ≥ 0.
Because ΦM is linear, with ρβ, it is the case that α > βγ. With β →∞, α→∞. Thus, Eq. (D.2)
holds.
244
To derive the dual problem of Eq. (4.85), we first compute the Fenchel conjugate of two
functions that will become useful.






2/c21 if |x| ≤ c0c1,
∞ otherwise.
(D.3)














2/c21 : |x| ≤ c0c1}
(D.5)
By a simple calculation to optimize over x, it is easy to verify that Eq. (D.4) is indeed the
conjugate function of s.13





x λ(x) = 0
∞ otherwise,
(D.6)
where s is defined in Lemma D.1.2. Then E is a convex function and its conjugate function E∗(f)
is E∗(f) = s∗(max(f)−min(f)), that is,
E∗(f) = c0
√
1 + c21[max(f)−min(f)]2 . (D.7)
Proof. The convexity of E follows from the convexity of s and the convexity of the set {λ ∈ Rm :∑























13The supremum can be found by various methods. For example, with the help of Mathematica, one can easily
find the optimal value as a function of y. Alternatively, one can solve case by case for two cases: x ≥ 0 and x < 0.
For each case, one looks for a solution of x where the derivative is zero by simple computation. Then, one verifies
that both solutions in these two cases lead to the same optimal value which is indeed the supremum.
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Let λ+ be defined as λ+(x) = max(λ(x), 0) and λ− be defined as λ−(x) = max(−λ(x), 0).
Then, it is clear that λ = λ+ − λ1 and ‖λ‖1 = ‖λ+‖1 + ‖λ−‖1. The condition
∑
x λ(x) = 0












1 : ‖λ+‖1 = ‖λ−‖1 ≤ c0c1,λ+ ≥ 0,λ− ≥ 0}
= sup
λ+∈Rm,v∈R
{〈f ,λ+〉 − vmin(f) +
√
















In the second line above, we optimize λ− and the optimal value is achieved when λ− contains
a single nonzero entry in the position corresponding to min(f). In the third line, we optimize
λ+ and the optimal value is achieved when λ+ contains a single nonzero entry in the position
corresponding to max(f). In the fourth line, we drop the constraint v ≥ 0 since the optimal value
is always achieved when v ≥ 0 due to the fact max(f)−min(f) ≥ 0. In the fifth line, we use the
definition of s. The last line follows from the definition of s∗.










subject to Tr(ρ) = 1
‖q0 − ΦM(ρ)‖1 ≤ 2c0c1
ρ ≥ 0,
(D.10)
its Fenchel dual problem is
hdual(q0) := maximize
f
q0 · f − c0
√
1 + c21[max(f)−min(f)]2
subject to f · ΦM(ρ) ≤W (ρ) ∀ρ ∈ D(H).
(D.11)
Moreover, if there exists σ ∈ D(H) such that ΦM(σ) = q0, then hprimal(q0) = hdual(q0).
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Proof. We introduce the indicator function δPos(H) for the set Pos(H) (see Eq. (2.96)). We identify
any ρ ∈ Pos(H) as an element in Rn for n = 4 dim(H)2 by representing ρ according to Eq. (2.90)
and then applying an appropriate vectorization of ρ. Similarly, we abuse the notation ΦM and let
it denote the corresponding linear map from Rn to Rm where m is the number of POVM elements
for this measurement channel. To apply Theorem 2.4.12, we define f(ρ) = W (ρ) + δPos(H)(ρ),
g(λ) = E(λ− q0) and let ΦM play the role of A in the theorem. We first calculate f∗ and g∗:
f∗(Z) = sup
ρ
{〈Z, ρ〉 − f(ρ)}
= sup
ρ
{〈Z, ρ〉 −W (ρ) : ρ ∈ Pos(H)} (D.12)
g∗(f) = sup
λ
{〈f ,λ〉 − E(λ− q0)}
= sup
λ′
{〈f ,λ′〉+ 〈f , q0〉 − E(λ′)}
= E∗(f) + 〈f , q0〉. (D.13)
Because
∑
x q0(x) = 1 and
∑
x ΦM(ρ)(x) = 1 for Tr(ρ) = 1, one can use the definition of f
and E to rewrite the problem in Eq. (D.10) as
hprimal(q0) = inf
ρ∈Rn
































Therefore, the optimization problem in Eq. (D.11) is the dual problem of the optimization problem
in Eq. (D.10).
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Since both f and g are convex, to show hprimal(q0) = hdual(q0), we just need to verify the
condition
relint(dom(g)) ∩ ΦM relint(dom(f)) 6= ∅. (D.17)
From the definition of domain [see Eq. (2.89)],
dom(g) = {λ ∈ Rm :
∑
x
λ(x) = 1, ‖λ− q0‖1 ≤ 2c0c1} ,
dom(f) = {ρ ∈ Rn : ρ ≥ 0}.
(D.18)
It is clear that q0 ∈ relint(dom(g)). Moreover, there exists some ε > 0 such that (1−ε)q0+ε1/m ∈
relint(dom(g)). We now show that (1− ε)q0 + ε1/m ∈ ΦM relint(dom(f)). By the assumption,
there exists σ ∈ D(H) such that ΦM(σ) = q0. Then for any δ > 0, it is the case that Dδ(σ) ∈
relint(dom(f)). In particular, Dε(σ) ∈ relint(dom(f)). Since ΦM(Dε(σ)) = (1−ε)q0 +ε1/m, it is
the case that (1− ε)q0 + ε1/m ∈ ΦM relint(dom(f)). Therefore, Eq. (D.17) holds. We conclude
that hprimal(q0) = hdual(q0).
Since we establish that hprimal(q0) = hdual(q0), we can now solve the primal problem in
Eq. (D.10). The difficulty is that the objective function is not differentiable at points where
ΦM(ρ) = q0. Since many standard solvers handle differentiable functions more effectively, we
introduce a slack variable and rewrite the problem to an equivalent one according to the following
lemma.

















has the same optimal value as the problem in Eq. (D.10), that is, h̃primal(q0) = hprimal(q0).
Proof. We first notice that the function −
√
c20 − t2/(4c21) is a monotonically non-decreasing func-
tion of 0 ≤ t ≤ 2c0c1. For ξ ≥ 0, ‖ξ‖1 =
∑
j ξ(j). The condition −ξ ≤ ΦM(ρ) − q0 ≤ ξ im-
plies that ξ ≥ 0 and ‖ξ‖1 ≥ ‖q0 − ΦM(ρ)‖1. Thus, it is clear that h̃primal(q0) ≥ hprimal(q0).
Let ρ? be an optimal solution for hprimal(q0) and let ξ
?(j) := |q0(j)− ΦM(ρ?)(j)|. Then
‖ξ?‖1 = ‖q0 − ΦM(ρ?)‖1 ≤ 2c0c1. This implies, (ρ?, ξ
?) is a feasible solution for h̃primal(q0) that
achieves the same objective function value as hprimal(q0). Therefore, h̃primal(q0) ≤ hprimal(q0).
We conclude that h̃primal(q0) = hprimal(q0).
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D.2 Proof of Theorem 8.2.3
The proof of this theorem relies on the following lemma.
Lemma D.2.1. Consider a CCQ state ρXPE =
∑
(x,p) |x〉〈x| ⊗ |p〉〈p| ⊗ ρ
(x,p)
E . Consider another
classical register Y which be constructed using a deterministic function on the registers X and P ,
i.e. f : X×P → Y . That is to say, there exists an isometry, V ≡
∑
(x,p) |x〉〈x|⊗ |p〉〈p|⊗ |f(x, p)〉Y
reconstructing Y from X and P . Then
Hεmin(Y X|PE)V ρV † = Hεmin(X|PE)ρ . (D.20)
Proof. To prove this lemma, we simply prove
Hεmin(Y X|PE)V ρV † ≥ Hεmin(X|PE)ρ (D.21)
Hεmin(Y X|PE)V ρV † ≤ Hεmin(X|PE)ρ . (D.22)
We start with Eq. (D.21) as it is straightforward using previous results. Namely, we see:
Hεmin(Y X|PE)V ρV † ≥ Hεmin(X|PE)V ρV † = Hεmin(X|PE)ρ . (D.23)
The first inequality comes from the fact that the entropy of a classical register is non-negative [95,
Lemma 6.7]. The equality follows from noting that TrY (V ρV
†) = ρ. Therefore we can focus on
the other direction of the inequality.
By combining [95, Definitions 6.2 and 6.5] we note the definition of the smooth min-entropy
terms we are concerned with:











λ̃ ∈ R : 1X ⊗2−λ̃M̃PE  ρ̃XPE
}
. (D.25)
One can see from these definitions it would be sufficient to show the optimal solution for
Hεmin(Y X|PE)V ρV † is a feasible solution for Hεmin(X|PE)ρ to prove Eq. (D.22). Suppose the
optimal solution of Hεmin(Y X|PE)V ρV † is taken at (λ,MPE , ρY XPE) where ρY XPE is chosen as
a CCCQ state by [95, Lemma 6.6]. This gives
1Y ⊗1X ⊗2−λMPE  ρY XPE :=
∑
(y,x,p)
|y〉〈y| ⊗ |x〉〈x| ⊗ |p〉〈p| ⊗ ρ(y,x,p)E . (D.26)
Applying the pinching map ∆P (·) :=
∑
p |p〉 〈p| · |p〉 〈p| on both sides, we get
∑
(y,x,p)
|y〉〈y| ⊗ |x〉〈x| ⊗ |p〉〈p| ⊗ 2−λM (p)E 
∑
(y,x,p)




E := 〈p|MPE |p〉. We can further un-compute Y by applying V † · V on both sides,
∑
(x,p)
|x〉〈x| ⊗ |p〉〈p| ⊗ 2−λM (p)E 
∑
(x,p)
|x〉〈x| ⊗ |p〉〈p| ⊗ ρ(f(x,p),x,p)E , (D.28)




|p〉〈p| ⊗M (p)E  V †ρY XPEV (D.29)
Since V † · V is a CPTNI map, we know that
P (V †ρY XPEV, ρXPE) ≤ P (ρY XPE , V ρXPEV †) ≤ ε, (D.30)






†ρY XPEV ) is a feasible solution forH
ε
min(X|PE)ρ, which implies (D.22).
We now prove the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 8.2.3. Let Ω′ be the event that Protocol 8.1 does not abort (i.e. Ω is satisfied)
and error correction succeeds (i.e. ZN1 = Ẑ
N
1 )
14. Let Ω′′ be the event that the QKD protocol does
not abort and error correction succeeds. Let ρ̃|Ω′′ be the output of the QKD protocol conditioned
on not aborting and error correction succeeding and ρ|Ω′ be the output of Protocol 8.1 conditioned
on not aborting and error correction being applied and succeeding.
Fundamentally, we are interested in the entropy of the raw key which excludes the sifted
registers or the registers used for parameter estimation. We can denote this set of registers
Z ≡ AN1 \ (AS ∪ AT ). However, we note that Alice announces AT , making it part of what is




1 , and T
N
1 . Therefore, by
Lemma D.2.1, we can conclude:




1 |ÃN1 B̃N1 TN1 AT CE)ρ̃|Ω′′ . (D.31)
We can handle the classical communication cost of error correction by [95, Lemma 6.8]:
H ε̄min(A
N




1 |ÃN1 B̃N1 TN1 AT E)ρ̃|Ω′′ − leakEC (D.32)
= H ε̄min(A
N
1 |ÃnB̃NTN1 AT E)ρ|Ω′ − leakEC (D.33)




1 . However, Bob knows Alice’s result whenever she does not apply the
key map.
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where C is the register storing the classical communication due to error correction, and the
























. We stress that Bob’s
private register, B
N
1 , for both the EAT and the QKD protocol, is excluded in the equality as
they differ15. We note that AT is conditioned upon as Alice publicly announced it, but X
N
1 is
not conditioned upon as Bob computes it locally and only announces if they do not abort.
With all of this addressed, we can conclude that we would like to do privacy amplification
using the smooth min-entropy term:
H ε̄min(A
N
1 |ÃN1 B̃N1 TN1 AT E)ρ|Ω′ (D.34)





1 |ÃN B̃NTN1 E)ρ|Ω′ on the left-hand side of Eq. (8.1).
Following a similar derivation in the DIQKD setting in [43], and also handling the AT register,
we use the following series of claims:
H ε̄min(A
N






























1− ε̄2/16) . (D.37)
The first inequality follows from the data-processing inequality for smooth min-entropy as the
left hand side may be obtained by tracing off the B
N
1 registers. The second inequality follows
from the chain rules in [95, Eq. (6.59)]. The final equality follows from Lemma D.2.1 for the




1 , and the data-processing
inequality for the max-entropy term.
Now what is left is to bound the max-entropy terms using the original version of EAT (The-
orem 3.7.3) [97]. To do this we use the EAT in the form of Theorem 3.7.3 with the replacements
Si → AT ,iBi, Pi → Ti, and E → E. We note it is allowed to use AT as we may treat it as if it
were actually N registers where it is ⊥ whenever Ti 6= 0. The Markov conditions trivially hold
since Ti uses seeded randomness. Then using the fact that ATiBi =⊥ × ⊥ except when Ti = 1
which happens with probability γ, we construct the max-tradeoff function analytically by the
15In the EAT subprotocol (Protocol 8.1), we set each Bi to be the ⊥ symbol due to the proof technique. This




= (1− γ)H(ATiBi|Ti = 0)Mi(ω) + γH(ATiBi|Ti = 1)Mi(ω) ≤ γ log2 |A × B|,
(D.38)
where A,B are the alphabets of private outcomes that are announced during parameter estima-
tion. This tells us we can let the max-tradeoff function fmax(q) = γ log2 |A×B| for all q ∈ P(X ).
This also implies ‖∇fmax‖∞ = 0. Therefore, using this with Theorem 3.7.3, we get
H ε̄/4max(AT B
N
1 |TN1 E)ρ|Ω′ ≤ Nγ log2(|A × B|) + 2
√
N log2(1 + 2dS)
√
1− 2 log2(ε̄/4 · (εEA + εEC))
(D.39)
where we have replaced ρ[Ω′] with εEA + εEC.
We now combine Eq. (D.37) and Eq. (D.39) to get the following:
H ε̄min(A
N












N log2(1 + 2dS)
√
1− 2 log2(ε̄/4 · (εEA + εEC)) (D.40)
We now apply Theorem 8.2.1 to the right-hand-side min-entropy term (with appropriate choice of




1 |ÃN1 B̃N1 TN1 AT E)ρ|Ω′ ≥ Nβ − c̃
√






N log2(1 + 2dS)
√
1− 2 log2(ε̄/4 · (εEA + εEC)) (D.41)
Applying the leftover hashing lemma (Theorem 3.3.2) [89] completes the proof.
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